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Summary
Posiva submitted the construction licence application for the encapsulation plant and the 
disposal facility in Olkiluoto to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEE) in 
December 2012. The MEE requested from Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) 
a statement required by the Nuclear Energy Act section 23 and a safety assessment re-
port required by the Nuclear Energy Decree section 36 in February 2013. This publication 
presents STUK’s statement, safety assessment report and the statement from the nuclear 
safety advisory board as required by the Nuclear Energy Decree section 37. The statement 
was submitted to the MEE in February 2015.
STUK’s safety assessment report and statement are based on the review of construction 
licence technical documentation and on the inspection programme carried out during the 
review. Based on the review STUK accepted Posiva’s preliminary safety analysis report, 
post closure safety case, probabilistic risk assessment of the design stage, proposal for a 
classification document, description of quality management during the construction of the 
nuclear facility, preliminary plans for the arrangements for security and emergencies, a 
plan for arranging the safeguards control that is necessary to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, and the applicant’s arrangements for the implementation of regulatory 
oversight by STUK. The inspection programme focused on Posiva’s safety culture, organi-
zation, management system, resources, competence and procedures. Inspections in accord-
ance with the programme were extended also to Posiva’s suppliers.
In STUK’s safety assessment report and statement STUK concludes that, based on Posiva’s 
construction licence application documentation, the encapsulation plant and the disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel proposed by Posiva can be constructed to be safe. Radiation 
doses for workers and local residents arising from the operation of the encapsulation plant 
and the disposal facility will be below the limits given in legislation with high probability. 
After the closure of the disposal facility radiation exposure for local residents and other 
biosphere will fall below the regulatory limits with high probability. As part of the radia-
tion and nuclear safety review STUK assessed that Posiva’s organization, management 
system, resources, arrangements for security, emergency preparedness and safeguards are 
at a sufficient level, so that the project can be carried out safely.
STUK’s statement and safety assessment on the construction of the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel. STUK-B 196. Helsinki 2015. 91 pp.
Keywords: nuclear waste, waste disposal, safety assessment report, construction licence, Olkiluoto, 
spent nuclear fuel, encapsulation plant, disposal facility
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The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
has requested a statement referred to in Section 
23 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) from the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) 
regarding the construction licence application by 
Posiva Oy (Posiva) concerning the Olkiluoto en-
capsulation plant and disposal facility for spent 
nuclear fuel1.
Posiva has submitted the construction licence 
application and the documents required by Section 
32 of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, and it 
also has separately submitted, to the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), the docu-
ments in accordance with Section 35 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and Section 16 of the Government 
Decree on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste 
(736/2008), on which the safety assessment of the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority is primar-
ily based. The documents and reports listed above 
have been delivered to the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) in several batches and 
updated after the actual licence application was 
submitted during 2013 and 2014. The updates 
have been made and supplements added, both 
based on requests for clarification by the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority and the progress of 
Posiva’s own design.
Posiva’s construction licence application propos-
es the disposal of a maximum of 9,000 tU (tonnes 
of uranium) of spent nuclear fuel. The volume cor-
responds to the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel 
generated during the operation of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj’s (TVO) operating plant units Olkiluoto 
1 and 2, the plant unit Olkiluoto 3 under construc-
tion and the planned plant unit Olkiluoto 4, as 
1 In this statement, the term ‘nuclear waste facility’ is used 
for the encapsulation plant and disposal facility in accord-
ance with the definition of the Government Decree 736/2008, 
which covers both facilities.
Statement of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
on the construction of the Olkiluoto encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
well as the operating Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units of 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum). The volume 
does not include the spent nuclear fuel delivered 
from the Loviisa plant units to the reprocessing 
facility in Mayak, Russia, in accordance with the 
agreement that remained in force until 1996.
The statement and the safety assessment by 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority on the 
safety of the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility and Posiva’s project are valid, even 
if TVO's Olkiluoto 4 plant unit would not progress 
into the construction licence application phase 
and its spent nuclear fuel was left outside Posiva’s 
construction licence. If the Olkiluoto 4 project were 
not to be realised, it would decrease the amount 
of spent fuel to be disposed of and decrease the 
surface area and rock volume required for the area 
needed for disposal.
Posiva’s disposal project is based on the KBS-3 
disposal concept in accordance with the multibar-
rier principle, in which the spent nuclear fuel 
packed into canisters made out of copper and iron 
is disposed of, after a minimum of 20 years of 
interim storage, in repositories to be built at the 
approximate depth of 430 metres in bedrock. The 
disposal canisters are protected by buffer material 
manufactured out of swelling clay, and the deposi-
tion tunnels are filled with clay material. Once the 
operation is over, the whole disposal facility will be 
closed by backfilling all excavated areas with clay 
material and crushed rock. Close to the surface, the 
underground rooms are filled in with structures 
that make intrusion into the repository difficult. 
The planned disposal of spent nuclear fuel will be 
passively safe after closure. Ensuring the safety of 
the facility will not require monitoring of the dis-
posal site or other maintenance activities.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
has drawn up a safety assessment on the pro-
ject, which can be found in Attachment 1 to this 
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statement. Attachment 2 includes the statement 
from the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety, 
requested by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority.
The nuclear waste facility is a nuclear facility of 
considerable general significance as referred to in 
Section 11 of the Nuclear Energy Act, which means 
that granting it a construction licence requires a 
valid Government decision-in-principle (Nuclear 
Energy Act, Section 18). The Government has is-
sued a decision-in-principle regarding Posiva’s pro-
ject in December 2000, and the Parliament has rat-
ified it in May 2001. This decision-in-principle cov-
ers the disposal of the spent fuel from the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 plant units as well as the Loviisa 1 and 2 
plant units. In addition to the decision-in-principle 
confirmed in 2001, the Government has issued two 
separate decisions-in-principle in 2002 and 2010, 
on the basis of which the disposal project has been 
expanded to cover the disposal of the spent nuclear 
fuel from the Olkiluoto 3 and Olkiluoto 4 plant 
units. The Parliament confirmed both separate de-
cisions-in-principle in the corresponding years. The 
first decision-in-principle was specified as valid 
for a period of 15 years. Posiva’s construction li-
cence application has been submitted at the end of 
2012, which means that the requirement of a valid 
decision-in-principle is fulfilled for Posiva’s project.
In addition to a valid decision-in-principle, the 
fulfilment of the prerequisites laid down in Section 
19 of the Nuclear Energy Act is a condition for 
granting the construction licence. The Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority has assessed the 
fulfilment of the prerequisites regarding nuclear 
and radiation safety in this statement and the at-
tached safety assessment. The assessment of the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority on the 
fulfilment of the prerequisites laid down in Section 
19 of the Nuclear Energy Act is as follows:
1) if plans concerning the nuclear facility meet the 
safety requirements laid down in this Act, and ap-
propriate account has been taken of the safety of 
workers and the population when planning the op-
erations in question;
The Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility proposed by Posiva has been designed in 
such a way that the requirements on the nuclear 
and radiation safety during the operation of the 
facilities are fulfilled. The encapsulation plant as 
well as the necessary parts of the disposal facility 
follow the defence-in-depth safety principle. The 
structural safety of the facilities has been ensured 
by successive barriers; depending on the handling 
phase of the spent nuclear fuel, these barriers in-
clude the nuclear fuel cladding, nuclear fuel trans-
port cask or the disposal canister, as well as the 
structures of the encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility. For functional safety, the removal of decay 
heat and the criticality safety of the fuel are man-
aged structurally with passive solutions. Functions 
important for the management of radioactive sub-
stances include the nuclear fuel handling functions 
and filtration of exhaust air related to prevent-
ing the spread of radioactive substances, which 
are single failure tolerant at the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility. Posiva will specify the 
detailed design requirements of the systems, for 
which the approval of the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority must be received as necessary, 
before construction of the facility’s structures and 
the manufacturing of the components are initiated.
Posiva has prepared for operational occurrences 
and accidents at the encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility in accordance with safety require-
ments. Posiva has analysed the potential opera-
tional occurrences and accidents and prepared for 
them by following the redundancy, separation, and 
diversity principles as part of the defence-in-depth 
safety principle in the design of the systems that 
implement the safety functions.
Posiva has provided analyses on the releases 
and radiation doses caused by normal operation, 
operational occurrences and accidents at the en-
capsulation plant and disposal facility. The radia-
tion doses caused by the operation of the encapsu-
lation plant and disposal facility are lower than 
the maximum values of radiation exposure laid 
down in Government Decree 736/2008. The emer-
gency arrangements required during the operation 
of the encapsulation and disposal facilities com-
mensurate with the based on estimated radiation 
exposures.
Posiva has developed the KBS-3 concept de-
scribed above for several decades together with the 
Swedish company Svensk Kärnbränslehantering 
AB (SKB). The manufacturability of the system 
components has been proved on a level sufficient 
for the construction licence by component-specif-
ic manufacturing tests, and correspondingly, the 
feasibility of constructing the bedrock facilities 
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has been proven by demonstrations at the under-
ground rock characterisation facility (Onkalo) in 
Olkiluoto. It is important that the reliability of 
the rock suitability classification system related 
to the implementation of the bedrock facilities is 
assessed during the first construction phase of the 
repository. In cooperation with each other, Posiva 
and SKB have tested the emplacement of the 
disposal canister, buffer and tunnel backfill in ac-
cordance with the requirements at the Äspö hard 
rock laboratory in Sweden. In addition, Posiva has 
also initiated the installation tests of the disposal 
system's components carried out in Onkalo. The 
goal of the installation tests is to prove that the 
components of the disposal system can be installed 
in accordance with the accuracy requirements set. 
Under the decision-in-principle in 2001, Posiva has 
constructed an underground rock characterisa-
tion facility, which is planned to function as a part 
of the disposal facility. In the construction of the 
underground rock characterisation facility, Posiva 
has complied with the requirements for nuclear fa-
cilities, and STUK has regulated the construction 
of the rock characterisation facility with the same 
procedures used for constructing a nuclear facility.
The post-closure safety of the disposal facility 
is based on two objectives, which are achieved by 
barriers that complement each other. The primary 
objective is the containment of the radioactive 
material from the bedrock. The leak-tight disposal 
canister protected by the clay material emplaced 
around it, as well as the bedrock surrounding the 
repository that separates them from the surface 
environment, play a key role in this. The bed-
rock and the closure of the disposal facility cre-
ate favourable and foreseeable conditions for the 
engineered barriers. The second objective of the 
barriers is to limit and retard the migration of ra-
dionuclides from the disposal depth to the ground 
surface in the event that a release of radionuclides 
occurs.
In order to demonstrate the post-closure safety, 
Posiva has presented an analysis in the licence ap-
plication material regarding the anticipated future 
evolution scenario, as well as variant and possible 
disturbance scenarios of the disposal system and 
the surrounding environment. Based on its scenar-
io analysis, Posiva has selected the most significant 
evolutions that lead to a release of radionuclides, 
and has analysed the radiation doses incurred to 
humans and surrounding environment, as well as 
the radionuclide releases into the environment. 
The results of the analyses remain under the limit 
values set in the Government Decree (736/2008).
In the review of the facility's post-closure safety 
case, development needs have been identified; by 
taking these needs into account, the clarity, trace-
ability and reliability of the post-closure safety 
case can be improved. The Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority has presented the areas for im-
provement in a separate decision addressed to 
Posiva, in which taking these development needs 
into account in the operating licence application 
material is required.
The plans presented by Posiva are appropriate 
and sufficient for the safety of the personnel and 
the population at the construction licence applica-
tion phase, with the following observations and 
limitations:
•	 Posiva	has	submitted	a	plan	on	specifying	 the	
system design of the nuclear waste facility to 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. 
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
will have oversight of the progress of the de-
sign and verify the sufficient level of design 
in accordance with Section 108 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and YVL Guides before the 
construction of the facility’s structures and the 
manufacturing of the components begin.
•	 Posiva	has	submitted	a	plan	on	the	installation	
tests of the disposal system's components to the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. The 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority will 
review the installability of the system as based 
on the tests before excavation of the deposition 
tunnels can begin.
•	 In	 connection	 with	 construction	 of	 the	 first	
deposition tunnels, Posiva must prove the re-
liability of the rock suitability classification 
system. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Au-
thority will review the functionality of the rock 
suitability classification system as part of the 
oversight of the placement of the first deposi-
tion tunnels and the rock construction.
•	 Posiva	 has	 submitted	 a	 development	 pro-
gramme of the disposal concept focusing on the 
barriers to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, in which it has taken account of the 
same areas of improvement as the ones that the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority has 
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highlighted in the safety assessment. The Ra-
diation and Nuclear Safety Authority will have 
oversight of the progress of the development 
work in accordance with the programme during 
the period between the construction and operat-
ing licences.
2) if the location of the nuclear facility is appropri-
ate with respect to the safety of the planned opera-
tions and environmental protection has been taken 
into account appropriately when planning opera-
tions;
The proposed location has been found suitable 
as a disposal site in the decision-in-principle in 
2001. Based on the decision-in-principle, the pro-
ject received permission to proceed with the con-
struction of the underground rock characterisation 
facility and the more detailed site-specific studies. 
After the decision-in-principle, an underground 
rock characterisation facility, Onkalo, has been 
constructed at the site, and the characterisation 
of the site has continued. Knowledge of the site 
has increased significantly after the decision-in-
principle stage.
The studies of the disposal site and the analy-
ses on the evolution scenarios of the site reaching 
far into the future are sufficient for the construc-
tion licence, and they have not introduced any 
matters on the basis of which the selected disposal 
site would not be favourable for post-closure safety. 
Based on the studies and analyses, the conclusion 
may be reached that the bedrock's characteristics 
are suitable for implementing the disposal as pro-
posed. The disposal depth of 400–450 metres of the 
spent fuel is in accordance with the decision-in-
principle issued for the Olkiluoto disposal facility 
and the safety requirements set by the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority. The disposal depth 
has been selected taking account of the post-clo-
sure safety of the disposal and the sufficient pro-
tection from above-ground phenomena and human 
activity.
Based on studies performed the planned site is 
appropriate for a nuclear waste facility with regard 
to operational and post-closure safety, and environ-
mental protection has been taken into account in 
planning the operation.
3) if physical protection has been taken into account 
appropriately when planning operations;
Posiva has used Design Basis Threat and risk 
analyses in the design and assessment of the secu-
rity arrangements and has also analysed the phys-
ical protection requirements. The principles, proce-
dures and plans related to security arrangements 
and the planned information security principles 
have been described in the application material. In 
the actual design of the nuclear waste facility, vari-
ous security zones have been presented in accord-
ance with the defence-in-depth safety principle, 
and the protection of important structures and sys-
tems have been taken into account in the design.
Posiva has presented the security plan for the 
construction period of the nuclear facilities as well 
as the composition of the security organisation and 
its tasks, monitoring equipment, communications 
equipment, protective equipment and equipment 
for use of force. Together with TVO, Posiva has also 
presented joint security standing orders for confir-
mation, which must be in force before the construc-
tion of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility is initiated.
Based on what has been presented above, 
Posiva’s plans for the implementation of security 
arrangements are appropriate and sufficient, with 
the following specifying comments:
•	 The	joint	security	standing	orders	of	Posiva	and	
TVO must be confirmed before construction be-
gins.
•	 The	 details	 of	 the	 security	 arrangements	
planned for the construction period must be 
specified before construction begins. The de-
tailed requirements concerning these issues 
have been given in a decision by the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority that is confiden-
tial (Act on the Openness of Government Activi-
ties 621/1999, Section 24(1), paragraph 7).
4) if a site has been reserved for the construction 
of a nuclear facility in a local detailed plan in 
accordance with the Land Use and Building Act 
(132/1999), and the applicant is in possession of 
the site required for the operation of the facility;
Reviewing whether the requirements of this 
section are fulfilled is not within the sphere of 
authority of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, and its realisation shall be reviewed by 
other authorities.
In the valid land use plan for the Olkiluoto re-
gion, an area has been reserved for a nuclear waste 
facility. In addition, the precautionary action zone 
required by Section 9(6) of the Government Decree 
736/2008 has been reserved at the disposal area for 
the prohibitions on measures referred to in Section 
STUK-B 196
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63(1), paragraph 6 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
5) the methods available to the applicant for ar-
ranging nuclear waste management, including fi-
nal disposal of nuclear waste and decommissioning 
of the facility, are sufficient and appropriate;
The low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste 
accumulated during the operation of Posiva’s nu-
clear waste facility and from its decommissioning 
originates from the handling of spent fuel at the 
facility. Posiva has presented sufficient and appro-
priate arrangements and plans for the construction 
licence application phase regarding the handling 
and disposal of the nuclear waste generated as well 
as the decommissioning of the facility, with the fol-
lowing comments and limitations:
•	 Before	 construction	 of	 the	 disposal	 facility	 be-
gins, Posiva must present specified, more de-
tailed plans to the Radiation and Nuclear Safe-
ty Authority for the low- and intermediate-level 
waste repository at the disposal facility, as well 
as a specified estimate on the combined effects 
of the various types of nuclear waste to be 
placed into Posiva’s disposal facility.
6) if the applicant's plans for arranging nuclear 
fuel management are sufficient and appropriate;
The purpose of the nuclear waste facility pro-
posed in the construction licence application is the 
handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. There 
is no need to arrange nuclear fuel management for 
the facility.
The spent nuclear fuel handled at the nuclear 
waste facility is stored at the interim storages at 
nuclear power plants, from which it is transported 
into the encapsulation plant for disposal.
7) the applicant's arrangements for the implemen-
tation of control by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) as referred to in para-
graph 3 of section 63 subsection 1, in Finland and 
abroad, and for the implementation of control as 
referred to in paragraph 4 of section 63 subsection 
1 are sufficient;
The arrangements and procedures for imple-
mentations of the regulatory control described in 
the report submitted by Posiva have been found to 
be adequate at the construction licence application 
phase. With its decision, the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority has approved the report on ar-
ranging the control possibilities of the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority submitted by Posiva 
in connection with the construction licence ap-
plication. Posiva has implemented the personnel 
training required in the decision of the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority on the practical 
actions required by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority's control. Based on this, Posiva’s 
arrangements for implementing the control are ap-
propriate and sufficient.
8) if the applicant has the necessary expertise avail-
able;
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
has assessed the competence of Posiva’s personnel 
and the external expertise available to Posiva in 
connection with processing the construction licence 
application as well as based on the document re-
views and a separate inspection programme. As a 
result, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
states that Posiva has a sufficient and exten-
sive expertise available for constructing a nuclear 
waste facility.
In the long term, the use of nuclear energy can 
only be considered in line with the overall good of 
society if society on its part commits to maintain-
ing the social structures required by the safe use 
of nuclear energy as well as the educational and 
research infrastructure required. The long-term 
nature of disposal requires the society to invest 
in maintaining the resources and competence for 
the entire duration of the facility's operation. In 
particular, preparations must be made for main-
taining sufficient expertise in areas related to the 
post-closure safety of the disposal of nuclear waste.
9) if the applicant has sufficient financial prerequi-
sites to implement the project and carry on opera-
tions;
Posiva’s owners, TVO and Fortum, are responsi-
ble for ensuring that Posiva has sufficient financial 
prerequisites to implement the project safely and 
carry on operations. In accordance with the agree-
ment between the owners of Posiva, it will collect 
the costs of the spent fuel disposal project from 
its owners. TVO and Fortum will remain under a 
waste management obligation in accordance with 
the Nuclear Energy Act, and they are therefore 
responsible for the costs of nuclear waste manage-
ment.
In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
TVO and Fortum have provided for the cost of 
nuclear waste management by paying fund hold-
ings into the National Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund. Sufficient funds have been collected into the 
12
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National Nuclear Waste Management Fund for 
the processing and disposal of the currently exist-
ing nuclear waste. In this respect, the provisions 
strengthen the financial prerequisites.
Based on this, Posiva’s arrangements are appro-
priate and sufficient.
10) if the applicant is otherwise considered to have 
the prerequisites to engage in operations safely and 
in accordance with Finland's international con-
tractual obligations;
With regard to Section 19(10) of the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the field of the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority includes international agree-
ments on nuclear safeguards, nuclear liability is-
sues and EU Council directives as well as the 
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management. The requirements of the inter-
national agreements are implemented via Finnish 
legislation and prevailing practice.
In accordance with Section 118 b of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, the use of nuclear energy must 
be planned and implemented so that the obliga-
tions concerning nuclear safeguards, as provided 
in the Nuclear Energy Act and in the Euratom 
Treaty and provisions issued under them, are met. 
Posiva’s facilities are the first of their type, and the 
regulatory control measures by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European 
Commission have not yet been completely resolved. 
In its plan, Posiva has taken the known control 
needs and obligations during construction and 
operation into account. Similarly, the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority has taken the cor-
responding needs and obligations into account in 
its control system.
As a part of Section 19(10) of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, the following covers the prereq-
uisites related to the safe operation or imple-
mentation of the disposal project presented in 
the Nuclear Energy Act, the decisions-in-principle 
issued to Posiva, and the construction licence ap-
plication.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
has approved the management system manual 
describing Posiva’s management system. In the 
management system manual, Posiva emphasises 
giving safety first priority in all activities and cre-
ating as well as maintaining a good safety culture. 
The goal is that the personnel are aware of the 
safety significance of their own work. Posiva evalu-
ates the management system and the operation of 
the organisation regularly and systematically with 
the continuous improvement of the operation as 
the goal.
Based on Posiva’s application, the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority has approved the 
responsible manager for the construction of the 
nuclear waste facility. The Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority has approved the deputy of the 
responsible manager conditionally, requiring ad-
ditional instruction in the security arrangements. 
The approval becomes valid after the additional 
instruction has been provided. Correspondingly, 
Posiva must nominate a manager responsible for 
the operation and his/her deputy for the opera-
tional phase of the nuclear waste facility, and 
propose them to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority for approval.
In the construction licence application, Posiva 
has presented a report on the re-openability of 
the repository and an estimate on the costs of the 
opening. The safe re-opening of the facilities and 
the return of the disposal canisters is feasible tech-
nically with currently available working methods. 
In the view of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, the retrievability of nuclear waste to be 
disposed of is feasible technically, and re-openabil-
ity does not endanger the post-closure safety of the 
disposal.
In parallel with the vertical disposal solution 
described above, Posiva has developed a horizon-
tal disposal solution (KBS-3H) based on the same 
safety principles, which have been presented in 
the construction licence application material. The 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority is not 
aware of any issues why the horizontal disposal 
solution could not fulfil the safety requirements. 
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority would 
be able to process the change upon separate ap-
plication by Posiva, in accordance with Section 112 
of the Nuclear Energy Decree. A change made dur-
ing the construction of the disposal facility would 
probably cause a delay in the planned start of the 
disposal.
In the construction licence application, Posiva 
has presented a report on the transports of spent 
nuclear fuel and, in addition, it has presented a 
preliminary report to the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority on the transport arrangements 
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and the security for transport. The transports of 
spent nuclear fuel can be implemented as based 
on Posiva’s plans. The safety of the transports is 
ensured separately and, in accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, a transport can only be 
carried out after the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority has ascertained that the transport ar-
rangements and the required security and emer-
gency planning arrangements meet the require-
ments set for them.
Summary
In addition to the Sections 18–19 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the general principles of the use of 
nuclear energy are presented in Sections 5–7 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act:
Section 5 The use of nuclear energy, taking into 
account its various effects, shall be in line with the 
overall good of society.
Section 6: The use of nuclear energy must be 
safe; it shall not cause injury to people, or damage 
to the environment or property.
Section 6 a Nuclear waste generated in connec-
tion with or as a result of the use of nuclear energy 
in Finland shall be handled, stored and perma-
nently disposed of in Finland […], and
Section 7 Sufficient physical protection and 
emergency planning as well as other arrangements 
for limiting nuclear damage and for protecting 
nuclear energy against illegal activities shall be a 
prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy.
The planned disposal of spent nuclear fuel in 
Olkiluoto has been found to be in line with the 
overall good of society in the decisions-in-principle 
made by the Government, and in the long term, 
disposal is also a prerequisite for the safe use of 
nuclear energy. The nuclear waste facility pro-
posed by Posiva is part of nuclear waste manage-
ment as a whole, in accordance with Section 6 a 
of the Nuclear Energy Act. In the statement, the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority has pre-
sented the conclusions on the fulfilment of Section 
7 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
As a conclusion and based on what has been 
presented in this statement and the attached safe-
ty assessment, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority states that the prerequisites of Sections 
18 and 19 of the Nuclear Energy Act for granting 
a construction licence and the principles laid down 
in Sections 5–7 have been fulfilled. The encapsula-
tion plant and disposal facility for spent nuclear 
fuel proposed by Posiva can be constructed to be 
safe.
Director General Petteri Tiippana
Director  Risto Paltemaa
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1 Introduction
On 28 December 2012, Posiva Oy (Posiva) sub-
mitted an application to the Government for the 
construction of a spent nuclear fuel encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki. 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
has requested a statement from the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) regarding 
the construction licence application for a nuclear 
facility by Posiva (TEM/2955/08.05.01/2012, 15 
February 2013).
This safety assessment presents the grounds 
for STUK’s statement. The safety assessment is 
based on the review of Posiva’s construction licence 
application and the related documents delivered to 
STUK. It covers the project's nuclear safety and ra-
diation safety, security arrangements, the planning 
of emergency response arrangements and nuclear 
safeguards. The conclusions of this safety assess-
ment are based on the maximum volume of waste 
requiring disposal proposed by Posiva, but they are 
also valid for volumes of waste smaller than that.
1.1 The disposal project in general
In its construction licence application, Posiva pro-
poses the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for a maxi-
mum of 9,000 tonnes of uranium (tU). This corre-
sponds to the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel 
generated during the operation of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj’s (TVO) operating plant units Olkiluoto 
1 and 2, the plant unit Olkiluoto 3 under construc-
tion and the plant unit Olkiluoto 4 being planned, 
as well as the operating Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units 
of Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum). The vol-
ume does not include the spent nuclear fuel deliv-
ered from the Loviisa plant units to the reprocess-
ing facility in Mayak, Russia, in accordance with 
the agreement that remained in force until 1996.
The spent nuclear fuel is stored in interim stor-
ages at the nuclear power plants, from which it 
will be transported to the encapsulation plant for 
disposal. The encapsulation plant has not been 
designed for extensive storage of nuclear fuel; in-
stead, only the amount of nuclear fuel intended for 
disposal will be transported there each time.
Posiva’s disposal project is based on the KBS 3 
concept in accordance with the multibarrier prin-
ciple, in which the spent nuclear fuel is packed 
into canisters made out of copper and iron after a 
minimum of 20 years of interim storage and then 
disposed of in a repository to be built in bedrock. 
Posiva’s nuclear waste facility consists of an encap-
sulation plant located on top of the disposal facility 
above ground as well as a disposal facility reaching 
down to a depth of approximately 450 metres.
At the encapsulation plant, the spent nuclear 
fuel is placed into a disposal canister and the can-
ister's copper lid is welded. The finished disposal 
canisters are transferred from the encapsulation 
plant into the underground disposal facility via a 
shaft. The construction of the encapsulation plant 
will be completed before the operation of the nu-
clear waste facility begins.
In the disposal facility, the disposal canisters 
are transferred into the deposition tunnels and 
emplaced into disposal holes lined with bentonite 
clay. After the canisters have been emplaced, the 
tunnels are backfilled with clay material as the 
planned number of canisters is emplaced in them. 
More deposition tunnels are constructed in the dis-
posal facility as the disposal progresses during the 
operating period.
A repository will also be constructed as part 
of the disposal facility for the disposal of waste 
containing radioactive substances generated dur-
ing the operation of the encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility and in connection with its decom-
missioning.
After all the spent nuclear fuel and the nuclear 
waste produced during use and decommissioning 
have been disposed of, the operating period of the 
16
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nuclear waste facility will end with the decommis-
sioning of the encapsulation plant located above 
ground and backfilling as well as sealing the rooms 
in the disposal facility underground. Close to the 
surface, the underground rooms are filled in with 
structures that make intrusion into the reposito-
ries difficult. The planned disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel will be passively safe after closure. Ensuring 
the safety of disposal will not require monitoring 
the disposal site or other maintenance activities 
after the disposal facility has been closed.
1.2 Safety regulations
Sections 5–7 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) 
contain provisions regarding the use of nuclear 
energy.
Section 5: The use of nuclear energy, taking into 
account its various effects, shall be in line with the 
overall good of society.
Section 6: The use of nuclear energy must be 
safe; it shall not cause injury to people, or damage 
to the environment or property.
Section 6 a: Nuclear waste generated in connec-
tion with or as a result of the use of nuclear energy 
in Finland shall be handled, stored and perma-
nently disposed of in Finland […], and
Section 7: Sufficient physical protection and 
emergency planning as well as other arrangements 
for limiting nuclear damage and for protecting 
nuclear energy against illegal activities shall be a 
prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy.
The principles of Chapter 2 a of the Nuclear 
Energy Act must be followed in the use of nuclear 
energy: the safety of nuclear energy use must be 
maintained at as high a level as practically possi-
ble, safety must be ensured in accordance with the 
safety principle of defence-in-depth, the maximum 
values of radiation exposure of the plant’s person-
nel or the environment must not be exceeded, and 
the design of the facility must provide for the pos-
sibility of operational occurrences and accidents. 
The safety of the nuclear facility must be proven 
reliably, and the overall safety must be assessed at 
regular intervals. Safety must take priority during 
the construction and operation of a nuclear facil-
ity, and preparations for the decommissioning of 
the facility, disposal of the nuclear materials and 
nuclear waste must be made already during the 
design phase of the facility. The licensee must have 
a sufficient number of qualified personnel suitable 
for the related tasks, a responsible manager as 
well as a management system at its disposal. The 
licensee of a nuclear facility must ensure that the 
necessary emergency response and security ar-
rangements are in place.
The following Government decrees issued under 
Section 82 of the Nuclear Energy Act provide more 
specific safety regulations based on the general 
safety requirements set out in the Nuclear Energy 
Act:
•	 Government	Decree	on	the	Safety	of	Disposal	of	
Nuclear Waste (736/2008)
•	 Government	Decree	on	the	Security	in	the	Use	
of Nuclear Energy (734/2008)
•	 Government	 Decree	 on	 Emergency	 Response	
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(716/2013).
In addition to these, the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) has published a collection 
of regulations, the YVL Guides, which define the 
detailed safety requirements. The licensee has the 
right to present a procedure or solution that differs 
from the YVL Guides, but in that case the licensee 
must prove that the requirement or safety level 
laid down in the YVL Guides is met.
The material related to Posiva’s construction 
licence application has been reviewed against 
the valid YVL Guides, which were published in 
2013. In an international comparison, the require-
ment level of STUK’s new guides is high. The 
guides were drawn up to fulfil the requirements by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association (WENRA) that were up-to-date at the 
time of drawing up the guides. The validity of the 
guides is evaluated regularly, and they are updated 
as necessary.
STUK’s renewed YVL Guides were published 
after Posiva had delivered the construction licence 
application as well as the construction licence ap-
plication materials addressed to STUK. According 
to STUK’s decision (1/0010/2011), Posiva has had 
the right to use the latest drafts of the YVL Guides 
under preparation in preparing its licence ap-
plication. As far as possible, Posiva has used the 
drafts available during the preparation phase of 
the construction licence application, but changes to 
the drafts of the YVL Guides were still being made 
during 2013.
STUK-B 196
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1.3 Other points of departure for 
the safety assessment and the 
structure of the safety assessment
The safety assessment is based on the techni-
cal materials in accordance with Section 35 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree and Section 16 of 
Government Decree 736/2008, delivered to STUK 
by Posiva. The materials have been delivered to 
STUK in several batches and have been updated 
or otherwise supplemented during the application 
process, based on the remarks by STUK on the one 
hand and the progress of the facility design on the 
other.
STUK has reviewed the technical materials 
mentioned above in connection with reviewing the 
construction licence application and granted its ap-
proval for them:
•	 Preliminary	safety	analysis	report,	STUK	deci-
sion 1/H42241/2012 10.2.2015
•	 Probabilistic	 risk	 assessment	 in	 the	 design	
stage, STUK decision 1/H42253/2012 10.2.2015
•	 Proposal	 for	 a	 classification	 document,	 STUK	
decision 3/H42261/2014 10.2.2015
•	 Report	on	the	quality	management	of	the	con-
struction of a nuclear facility, STUK decision 1/
H41401/2014 24.6.2014
•	 Preliminary	plan	concerning	security	arrange-
ments, STUK decision 2/H42217/2014 5.1.2015
•	 Preliminary	 plan	 concerning	 emergency	 re-
sponse arrangements, STUK decision 3/
H41501/2013 3.4.2014
•	 Plan	for	arranging	the	safeguards	control	nec-
essary to prevent proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, STUK decision 18/H42212/2014 12.12.2014
•	 Report	 on	 the	 arrangements	 referred	 to	 in	
paragraph 7 of Section 19 of the Nuclear En-
ergy Act (Ensuring the implementation of regu-
latory control by STUK), STUK decision 9/
H42212/2013 9.12.2013
•	 The	 post-closure	 safety	 case	 of	 the	 disposal	
in Olkiluoto, STUK decision 1/H42252/2015, 
10.2.2015
In the safety assessment, the safety of Posiva’s 
project has been assessed against the require-
ments laid down in Government Decrees 736/2008, 
734/2008 and 716/2013. The requirements of 
Government Decree 736/2008 have been presented 
in the safety assessment, but the structure is not 
directly based on that of the Decree on the Safety 
of Disposal of Nuclear Waste: rather, it has been 
written in sections focusing on various fields. Due 
to the method of discussion, the subsections of the 
sections of the Government decree have been dis-
cussed in parts as necessary, and each subsection 
has been presented in connection with the field in 
which the issue is covered. The requirements of 
the Government Decree on the Security in the Use 
of Nuclear Energy and the Decree on Emergency 
Response Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
have not been presented in the safety assessment, 
but the issues required by the decrees have been 
reviewed. A summary of the results of the entire 
review is presented at the end of the safety assess-
ment.
In addition to the aforementioned Government 
decrees, the safety assessment also covers the re-
quirements of Sections 18 and 19 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act which have not been separately in-
cluded in the current Government decrees, but the 
assessment of which is within STUK’s field. This 
refers to paragraph 1 of Section 18 which concerns 
the decision-in-principle of the project and para-
graphs 6–8 of Section 19 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act which concern the arrangement of nuclear fuel 
management, ensuring STUK’s regulatory control 
and the expertise of the licence applicant. The safe-
ty assessment also covers the fulfilment of inter-
national agreements that are binding on Finland 
and concern nuclear safeguards, nuclear safety and 
nuclear waste management, also ensuring that the 
applicant otherwise has the prerequisites for the 
safe management of operations (Nuclear Energy 
Act, Section 19(10)).
In addition to the Government decrees and 
Sections 18 and 19 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the 
following fields have been covered in the safety as-
sessment: the transport of spent nuclear fuel, the 
alternative horizontal disposal solution (KBS-3H), 
and the re-openability of the repository of spent 
nuclear fuel.
1.4 Scope of application of Government 
Decree 736/2008 and definitions
Section 1: Scope of application
This Decree shall apply to the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste originating in 
a nuclear facility into a facility to be constructed in 
bedrock.
The decree shall also apply to radioactive waste 
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as referred to in section 10 of the Radiation Act 
(592/1991), if such waste is sited in a disposal 
facility for nuclear waste, as referred to in subsec-
tion 1.
Provisions on the handling and storage of spent 
nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste in a nuclear 
facility attached to a nuclear power plant are laid 
down in the Government Decree on the Safety of 
Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008)1.
The Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility is a plant complex designed for the disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel.
Section 2: Definitions
For the purposes of this Decree:
1) nuclear waste facility shall refer to a nuclear 
facility used for the encapsulation of spent nuclear 
fuel or conditioning of other nuclear waste for dis-
posal, and to a disposal facility for spent nuclear 
fuel or other nuclear waste;
2) disposal facility shall refer to an entirety 
comprising the rooms for disposal of the waste 
packages (emplacement rooms) and the adjoining 
underground and above-ground auxiliary facilities.
3) disposal site shall refer to the location of the 
disposal facility and, after disposal has been com-
pleted, the area entered in the real estate register in 
accordance with Section 85 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree (161/1988), and the underlying ground and 
bedrock.
4) short-lived waste shall refer to nuclear waste, 
the activity concentration of which after 500 years 
is below the level of 100 megabecquerels (MBq) 
per kilogram in each disposed waste package, and 
below an average value of 10 MBq per kilogram of 
waste in one emplacement room;
5) long-lived waste shall refer to nuclear waste, 
the activity concentration of which after 500 years 
is above the level of 100 megabecquerels (MBq) per 
kilogram in a disposed waste package, or above an 
average value of 10 MBq per kilogram of waste in 
one emplacement room;
6) annual dose shall refer to the sum of the ef-
fective dose arising from external radiation within 
the period of one year, and of the committed effec-
tive dose from the intake of radioactive substances 
within the same period of time;
1 The Decree has been repealed by the Government Decree on 
the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (717/2013)
7) long-term safety shall refer to the safety of 
disposal after the operational period of the disposal 
facility, taking account of radiological impacts on 
man and the environment;
8) safety case shall refer to documentation for 
demonstrating compliance with the long-term safe-
ty requirements;
9) safety functions shall refer to factors prevent-
ing and limiting the releases and migration of dis-
posed radioactive materials;
10) barrier shall refer to an engineered or natu-
ral structure or material used for achieving safety 
functions;
11) assumed operational occurrence shall refer 
to an incident influencing the safety of a nuclear 
waste facility that can be expected to occur at least 
once during any period of a hundred operating 
years;
12) postulated accident shall refer to such inci-
dent influencing the safety of a nuclear waste facil-
ity that can be assumed to occur more rarely than 
once during any period of a hundred operating 
years; postulated accidents are grouped further into 
two classes on the basis of their frequency:
a) class 1 postulated accidents, which can be as-
sumed to occur at least once during any period of a 
thousand operating years;
b) class 2 postulated accidents, which can be 
assumed to occur less frequently than once during 
any period of a thousand operating years;
13) expected evolution scenario shall refer to 
such change affecting the performance of barriers 
that has a high probability of causing radiation ex-
posure during the assessment period and which can 
be caused by interactions occurring in the disposal 
facility, by geological or climatic phenomena, or by 
human action; and
14) unlikely events impairing long-term safety 
shall refer to such potential events significantly af-
fecting the performance of barriers that have a low 
probability of causing radiation exposure during 
the assessment period and which can be caused by 
geological phenomena or by human action.
This safety assessment uses the definitions of 
Government Decree 736/2008. To specify the defini-
tion of paragraph 1, Posiva’s nuclear waste facility 
in this safety assessment refers to the complex 
consisting of the encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility.
STUK-B 196
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Safety during operation refers to the operat-
ing period of the nuclear waste facility from the 
pre-operational tests to the decommissioning and 
closure of the facility. The decommissioning of the 
encapsulation plant includes dismantling the plant 
and taking care of the resulting active waste. The 
operating period of the disposal facility will end 
when the underground rooms have been closed by 
backfilling and plugging all tunnels and shafts ex-
cavated underground.
Section 22: Disposal in the ground
If nuclear waste, as referred to in the Nuclear 
Energy Act, will be disposed of in a facility con-
structed in the ground, said disposal shall be 
planned and implemented in compliance with the 
requirements laid down in sections 3—9 and 13—
21 herein. Only very low-level waste, the average 
activity concentration of which does not exceed the 
value of 100 kBq per kilogram, and the total activ-
ity of which does not exceed the limits laid down 
in section 6 subsection 1 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, can be placed in a facility constructed in the 
ground.
Posiva’s construction licence application does 
not include a disposal facility constructed in the 
ground; therefore, this section is not covered in this 
safety assessment.
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2 The safety principles of 
the disposal system
2.1 General requirements
Implementing the disposal in stages
Section 10: General requirements concerning dis-
posal
Disposal shall be implemented in stages, with 
particular attention paid to aspects affecting long-
term safety. The planning of the construction, op-
eration and closure of a disposal facility shall take 
account of reduction of the activity of nuclear waste 
through interim storage, the utilisation of high-
quality technology and scientific data, and the need 
to ensure long-term safety via investigations and 
monitoring. However, the implementation of the 
various stages of disposal shall not be unnecessar-
ily postponed.
The planning for the disposal of the spent fuel 
and the stages of progress have followed the sched-
ule in the Government decision-in-principle issued 
in 1983, which has been later specified by decisions 
made by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
There is no experience of the disposal of spent 
fuel in Finland or internationally, and the plan-
ning of the disposal – characterising the features 
of the disposal site and demonstrating the safety 
through analyses – has required a preparation pe-
riod that has been much longer than for the other 
nuclear facilities operating or under construction 
in Finland.
During the interim storage of spent nuclear 
fuel, the activity and heat production of the fuel 
are reduced, which makes the disposal easier to 
implement both technically and for the radiation 
safety of the personnel. The starting point for the 
design of the encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility as well as the post-closure safety case has 
been at least 20 years of interim storage for the 
fuel assemblies to be handled and disposed of. 
Posiva has proposed that the fuel elements to be 
brought into the encapsulation plant should be 
stored for 30–50 years, during which time the ac-
tivity and heat production of the fuel have been 
significantly reduced compared to a fuel element 
removed from the reactor. Due to the storage time 
required for the spent fuel generated by the use of 
the Olkiluoto 3 and Olkiluoto 4 plant units, the use 
of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility is 
planned to continue until 2120.
After the decision-in-principle concerning the 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel was ratified in 
2001, Posiva moved on to the detailed site stud-
ies in accordance with the safety requirements 
and the plans presented in the application for a 
decision-in-principle, as a part of which Posiva has 
constructed an underground rock characterisation 
facility (Onkalo). Onkalo is planned to be a part 
of the disposal facility, and in constructing the 
underground rock characterisation facility, Posiva 
has followed the requirements for nuclear facilities 
applied to rock construction. STUK has regulated 
the construction of the research facility using the 
same procedures as for regulating the construction 
of a nuclear facility (STUK’s decision Y810/22, 26 
October 2001).
During the construction phase of the encapsu-
lation plant and disposal facility, Posiva will con-
struct the encapsulation plant, other rooms needed 
for the use of the facilities and the first stage of the 
repository. The construction of the disposal facility 
and the excavated rooms being open cause distur-
bances to the bedrock surrounding the disposal fa-
cility: for the sake of post-closure safety, the inten-
tion is to minimise the disturbances. For this rea-
son, the disposal facility will be expanded during 
the operation of the facility as based on the needs 
of the progress of the disposal. The deposition tun-
nels and other excavated rooms will be closed off 
as the disposal in the tunnel or area in question is 
completed. The immediate closure of the deposition 
tunnels promotes the restoration of characteristics 
that are favourable to post-closure safety.
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Conclusion
Posiva has taken the reduction of activity of the 
spent nuclear fuel by interim storage into account 
in the design of the encapsulation plant and dis-
posal facility. The stages related to the life cycle 
of the disposal facility are construction, disposal 
activities and closure. Posiva has designed these 
stages in a way that is beneficial to post-closure 
safety. Posiva has proceeded in the disposal pro-
ject for spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the 
schedule presented by the Government and the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, and the 
implementation of the various stages of disposal 
has not been postponed unnecessarily.
Selection of the disposal site
Sections 12(1) and 12(4): Disposal site
The geological characteristics of the disposal site 
shall, as a whole, be favourable to the isolation of 
the radioactive substances from the environment. 
Any area with a feature that is substantially 
adverse to post-closure safety shall not be se-
lected as the disposal site.
The depth of the waste emplacement rooms shall 
be selected appropriately as regards the waste type 
and local geological conditions. The goal related 
to disposal depth shall be that any impacts on the 
long-term safety of above-ground events, activities 
and environmental changes will remain minor and 
that intrusion into the waste emplacement rooms 
will be difficult.
Olkiluoto has been selected as the location 
of Posiva’s disposal facility in the decision-in-
principle in 2001. In connection with the choice of 
location, it has been estimated that the character-
istics of bedrock in Olkiluoto are favourable on the 
general level for ensuring the post-closure safety of 
spent nuclear fuel disposal. In addition, no issues 
that would indicate the unsuitability of the dis-
posal site have been found at the selected location. 
In the decision-in-principle, the disposal depth for 
spent fuel has been set as 400–700 metres.
In the construction licence application material, 
Posiva has studied the geological structures of the 
bedrock at the disposal site, the presence of water 
conductive structures and fractures, the technical 
properties of rock types, the water conductivity of 
the bedrock and the stresses in the bedrock and 
the chemical properties of groundwater as well 
as constructability in connection with the choice 
of disposal depth. In addition to these, the protec-
tion of depth against the effects of above-ground 
natural phenomena and human activities has been 
taken into account.
Deeper down, the frequency of fractures in the 
disposal bedrock and the flow rate of groundwater 
decrease, which is favourable to post-closure safety. 
In depths that exceed the selected disposal depth, 
the disadvantages due to unfavourable relation-
ship between the stresses in the bedrock and the 
rock strength as well as the salinity of the ground-
water increase. In addition, the depth is limited 
by the horizontal fracture zone: the intention is to 
avoid penetrating it by considered adaptation of 
the disposal facility. Posiva has estimated that at 
the selected disposal depth of 400–450 metres, the 
requirements for the post-closure safety and the 
constructability of the disposal facility are fulfilled.
The most important above-ground natural phe-
nomena with regard to disposal are the changes of 
conditions due to an ice age as well as permafrost. 
Based on modelling, Posiva has estimated that the 
permafrost would reach the depth of 60–240 me-
tres during a dry, cold period lasting 10,000 years. 
Using the same analysis, Posiva has estimated 
that permafrost extending to a depth of 400 metres 
would require a dry, cold period of 100,000 years, 
which it considers unlikely. There are uncertainties 
related to climate evolution analyses that extend 
far into the future, and for this reason, Posiva 
has also estimated the effects of permafrost that 
reaches the disposal depth on the performance of 
the engineered barriers.
The disposal site has been selected so that it 
has no particular natural resources that would 
increase interest in ore-prospecting or mining ac-
tivities. Extensive use of groundwater as drinking 
water is not to be expected in Olkiluoto, because 
the groundwater is saline. No water intake plants 
are expected in Olkiluoto or its immediate vicinity, 
because the areas are not currently classified as 
groundwater areas. The choice of location and the 
disposal depth of several hundreds of metres re-
duce the risk of unintentional intrusion by humans 
in the disposal facility. In the safety case, the as-
sessment of exposure pathways of various radioac-
tive materials is required based on the Guide YVL 
D.5, one of which is a medium-deep drilled water 
well.
The suitability of the volume of bedrock planned 
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for disposal has been assessed in more detail in 
Section 7.1 of the safety assessment, and the ful-
filment of the safety requirements as a result of 
various evolution scenarios has been assessed in 
Section 7.3 of the safety assessment.
Conclusion
The spent fuel disposal depth of 400–450 metres 
is in accordance with the decision-in-principle is-
sued regarding the Olkiluoto disposal facility and 
the safety requirements set by STUK. The disposal 
depth has been selected with due attention given 
to the post-closure safety of the disposal and to suf-
ficient protection against above-ground and human 
activities.
2.2. Multibarrier principle
Section 11: Multibarrier principle
The long-term safety of disposal shall be based 
on safety functions achieved through mutually 
complementary barriers, so that a deficiency of an 
individual safety function or a predictable geologi-
cal change will not jeopardise the long-term safety.
Safety functions shall effectively prevent releases 
of disposed radioactive materials into the bedrock 
for a certain period, the length of which depends on 
the duration of the radioactivity in waste. For short-
lived waste, this period shall be at least several 
hundreds of years, and for long-lived waste, at least 
several thousands of years.
The multibarrier principle is a principle guid-
ing the design of the disposal of nuclear waste, 
which corresponds to the defence-in-depth safety 
principle required by Section 7 b of the Nuclear 
Energy Act. In disposal in the bedrock, the bedrock 
surrounding the repository acts as a natural bar-
rier. The characteristics of the bedrock must be 
stable and maintain favourable conditions for the 
performance of the engineered barriers. The bed-
rock must also retard the migration of radioactive 
material into the biosphere above the bedrock. In 
designing the disposal system, the waste matrix, 
waste package, buffer surrounding the packages, 
backfill of the emplacement rooms and structures 
closing off the entire disposal facility must be 
taken into account as engineered barriers. The 
activity of the spent nuclear fuel, along with the 
risk caused by the radioactive substances, shall 
decrease by several orders of magnitude during 
the first few thousands of years. For this reason, 
the safety requirements separately state that the 
engineered barriers must effectively prevent the 
release of radioactive substances into the sur-
rounding bedrock for several thousands of years. 
The activity concentration of the low- and inter-
mediate-level waste generated during the use of 
the encapsulation plant is significantly lower than 
the activity concentration of the spent nuclear 
fuel, and the half-life of the radioactive materials 
is typically shorter; for this reason, the engineered 
barriers are required to contain the radionuclides 
for several hundreds of years for this type of waste.
The spent fuel disposal solution proposed by 
Posiva is primarily based on containment of the 
radioactive materials from the bedrock and the 
living environment. The containment is primar-
ily based on maintaining the leak-tightness of the 
disposal canister. The performance of the canister 
is ensured by the bentonite buffer that surrounds 
it as well as the closure structures of the disposal 
facility and bedrock that surrounds the disposal 
facility, which creates favourable and foreseeable 
conditions for the disposal system. As the radionu-
clides are released from the disposal canister, the 
second objective of the disposal system is to isolate 
and retard the migration of radionuclides into or-
ganic nature.
Posiva has specified the following safety func-
tions for the components of the spent fuel disposal 
system:
•	 The	safety	function	of	the	disposal	canister	is
– to ensure a prolonged period of containment 
of spent fuel within the protective struc-
tures. This safety function rests first and 
foremost on the mechanical strength of the 
canister's cast iron insert and the corrosion 
resistance of the copper surrounding it.
– to ensure the subcriticality of the spent nu-
clear fuel in the long term.
•	 The	safety	functions	of	the	buffer	are	intended	
to:
– contribute to mechanical, geochemical and 
hydrogeological conditions that are favour-
able for the canister.
– protect canisters from external processes 
that could compromise the safety function of 
complete containment of the spent fuel and 
associated radionuclides.
– limit and retard radionuclide releases in the 
event of canister failure.
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•	 The	 safety	 functions	 of	 backfilling	 the	 deposi-
tion tunnels are intended to:
– contribute to favourable and predictable me-
chanical, geochemical and hydrogeological 
conditions for the buffer and canisters.
– limit and retard radionuclide releases in the 
event of canister failure.
– contribute to the mechanical stability of the 
rock adjacent to the deposition tunnels.
•	 The	safety	functions	of	the	closure	are	intended	
to:
– prevent the underground openings from 
compromising the long-term isolation of the 
repository from the surface environment and 
normal habitats for humans, plants and ani-
mals.
– contribute to favourable and predictable geo-
chemical and hydrogeological conditions for 
the other engineered barriers by preventing 
the formation of significant water conductive 
flow paths through the openings.
– limit and retard inflow to and release of 
harmful substances from the repository.
•	 In	 Posiva’s	 disposal	 solution,	 the	 bedrock	 acts	
as a natural barrier, and its safety functions are 
intended to:
– isolate the spent fuel repository from the 
surface environment and normal habitats 
for humans, plants and animals and limit 
the possibilities of human intrusion, and iso-
late the repository from the changing condi-
tions at the ground surface.
– provide favourable and predictable mechani-
cal, geochemical and hydrogeological condi-
tions for the engineered barriers.
– limit the transport and retard the migration 
of harmful substances that could be released 
from the repository.
Posiva has presented the roles of the barriers in 
the construction licence application material and 
specified their safety functions. Posiva does not 
specify safety functions for the spent nuclear fuel, 
even though the slow dissolution of the uranium 
oxide matrix of the spent nuclear fuel into the 
groundwater in the event that the disposal canis-
ter loses its leak-tightness is a key factor promot-
ing safety. However, the characteristics of the fuel 
and the assumptions on fuel behaviour used in 
proving the safety as a part of the performance of 
the disposal system have been described in a way 
that is sufficient for the construction licence ap-
plication phase. The safety functions specified by 
Posiva generally describe the tasks of the barriers 
and the functions related to containment and the 
limitation of the release and migration of radionu-
clides.
The performance targets of the bedrock and the 
engineered barriers and the fulfilment of the safety 
functions, as well as the evolution scenarios after 
the closure of the disposal facility, have been cov-
ered in Section 7 of the safety assessment.
Conclusion
The disposal system and the safety functions speci-
fied for the various barriers presented by Posiva 
are in accordance with the multibarrier principle.
2.3. Investigation and monitoring 
programme implemented during 
the operational period
Section 9: Disposal operations, subsection 4
The long-term performance of barriers shall be 
confirmed by establishing an investigation and 
monitoring programme, to be implemented during 
the operational period of the final disposal facility.
Section 10: General requirements concerning dis-
posal
Disposal shall be implemented in stages, with 
particular attention paid to aspects affecting long-
term safety. The planning of the construction, op-
eration and closure of a disposal facility shall take 
account of reduction of the activity of nuclear waste 
through interim storage, the utilisation of high-
quality technology and scientific data, and the 
need to ensure long-term safety via investiga-
tions and monitoring. However, the implementa-
tion of the various stages of disposal shall not be 
unnecessarily postponed.
As part of the construction licence application 
material, Posiva has delivered a monitoring pro-
gramme to STUK that covers the period of time 
before the operation of the disposal facility. The 
programme describes Posiva’s monitoring plans for 
the monitoring of bedrock mechanics, hydrology, 
hydrogeochemistry, the surface environment and 
foreign materials used in construction, as well as 
the behaviour of the engineered barriers. The plan 
proposed by Posiva focuses on the construction pe-
riod during the first phase of the disposal facility, 
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but it also describes the general principles for mon-
itoring during the operation of the disposal facility.
The results from the monitoring of the bedrock 
and groundwater are primarily used to verify the 
models that describe the evolution of the site. In 
addition, the results of the monitoring are used to 
monitor that the bedrock maintains the character-
istics important to post-closure safety as effectively 
as possible (Government Decree 736/2008, Section 
12) and that the rock construction will not cause 
unexpected or larger than estimated harmful ef-
fects. The disturbances caused by rock construction 
are covered in Section 4.2 of the safety assessment. 
The results from the monitoring of the above-
ground environment are used as initial data in 
modelling the evolution of the environment.
The plans proposed by Posiva on monitoring the 
characteristics of the bedrock and groundwater as 
well as the effects of rock construction are based on 
the programme developed for monitoring the un-
derground rock characterisation facility (Onkalo). 
Posiva has long experience in the characteristics to 
be monitored in addition to the technology used for 
monitoring based on the Olkiluoto site investiga-
tions and monitoring the construction of Onkalo. 
There is still development work remaining on the 
confirmation of bedrock characteristics related to 
the construction of the disposal facility and the 
measurements used in monitoring the disposal 
facility; this is covered in Section 7.1 of the safety 
assessment.
Posiva has presented the plans for monitor-
ing the engineered barriers as a new field in 
the monitoring programme, in accordance with 
STUK’s requirements. In the programme, Posiva 
has presented how it will utilise the tests related 
to the feasibility of disposal and the full-scale 
tests in developing the monitoring methods. The 
key principle in monitoring the engineered barri-
ers is that the monitoring cannot interfere with 
the performance of the barriers or risk the safety 
of the disposal. The monitoring of the engineered 
barriers is particularly focused on the period when 
the disposal facility is in operation. Monitoring 
the engineered barriers is still at the development 
stage, and it requires the development of the moni-
toring objects and the technology, as well as the 
requirements by authorities. The development of 
the disposal monitoring programmes and measure-
ment technology is emphasised internationally in 
EU's framework programmes and IAEA’s projects, 
for example.
The environmental radiation monitoring pro-
gramme related to the operation of a nuclear facil-
ity shall be submitted to STUK in connection with 
the operating licence application. As part of the 
construction licence application material, Posiva 
has supplied STUK with a programme to study the 
baseline state of the environment. The programme 
proposes ways to study the radiation in the envi-
ronment before the facility is commissioned. The 
releases of radioactive substances into the environ-
ment that may occur from Posiva’s nuclear waste 
facility are covered in Section 3.5 of the safety 
assessment, and the plans on preparing for the 
operation of the facility are covered in Chapter 5.
The disposal activities are planned to continue 
until the 2100s, and during this time, the licensee 
of the facility will be responsible for the monitoring 
related to the disposal. After the disposal of nucle-
ar waste has been carried out in accordance with 
the requirements, the responsibility for the nuclear 
waste and any possible monitoring and control 
activities is transferred to the state in accordance 
with Section 34 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
Conclusion
Posiva has drawn up a programme on the monitor-
ing of the bedrock and the above ground environ-
ment during the construction period of the disposal 
facility. The programme is extensively based on 
Posiva’s experiences in monitoring the construc-
tion of the underground rock characterisation facil-
ity. The development of the monitoring programme 
must also be continued as based on the experiences 
and information gained during the construction of 
the disposal facility. Posiva has presented a plan 
for developing the monitoring of the engineered 
barriers during the operation of the disposal fa-
cility. With regard to monitoring the engineered 
barriers, there is also a need to specify the detailed 
requirements by the authorities.
The monitoring programme presented by Posiva 
fulfils the requirements laid down in Sections 9 
and 10 of the Government Decree 736/2008 regard-
ing the investigation and monitoring programme 
and the control measurements during the opera-
tional period of the disposal facility.
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3 The design of the encapsulation plant 
and disposal facility with regard 
to the safety during operation
3.1. General safety principles of 
the nuclear waste facility
At Posiva’s nuclear waste facility, the spent fuel is 
placed into disposal canisters, which are disposed 
of in the deposition holes drilled into the deposition 
tunnels. The key functions of the operation of the 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility are re-
lated to the handling of the spent nuclear fuel, fuel 
transport cask and disposal canister.
The key issue in designing the safe opera-
tion of the nuclear waste facility is the controlled 
handling of the fuel so that the risk of damaging 
the fuel is minimal. In addition, preserving the 
integrity of the fuel is ensured by maintaining the 
fuel in a subcritical state and taking care of remov-
ing the decay heat. The subcriticality of fuel that 
has cooled down for a long time and the removal 
of decay heat has been ensured by designing the 
structures that surround the fuel during the vari-
ous handling stages, in such a way that the fuel 
is maintained in a subcritical state and the decay 
heat is removed in all situations without active 
measures.
Posiva has specified three safety functions for 
the nuclear waste facility: management of ra-
dioactive materials, management of reactivity and 
removal of decay heat. The management of radio-
active materials includes ensuring the integrity of 
the fuel by handling the fuel in a controlled man-
ner. If radioactive substances should be released 
at the facility, the air in the fuel handling cell and 
controlled area can be filtered. The filtration can 
also be implemented by gravity, if the power supply 
of the ventilation systems has been cut off. It fol-
lows from the above that the safety functions of the 
facilities can be implemented without an external 
power supply. At the facilities, the fuel handling 
functions have been designed so that they will stop 
in the event of a disturbance in the power supply.
Defence-in-depth safety principle
Nuclear Energy Act, Section 7 b Safety principle of 
defence-in-depth
The safety of a nuclear facility shall be ensured 
by means of successive levels of protection inde-
pendent of each other (safety principle of defence-
in-depth). This principle shall extend to the opera-
tional and structural safety of the plant.
According to the preliminary safety analysis 
report included in Posiva’s construction licence 
application material, the defence-in-depth safety 
principle has been followed in the design of the 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility. In accord-
ance with the safety requirements, Posiva follows 
the three first levels of the defence-in-depth safety 
principle.
The first level of the defence-in-depth safety 
principle means that the aim is to prevent the oc-
currence of operational occurrences and accidents 
in the design of the facility. This requires that the 
facility is constructed in compliance with the re-
quirements and that it is operated reliably – which 
can be achieved by following high-quality require-
ments and sufficient safety margins during all 
stages of the facility's life cycle.
The second level of the defence-in-depth safety 
principle refers to preparing for deviations from 
normal operational conditions. The facility must 
have systems for detecting deviations and limiting 
the development of disturbances into accidents as 
well as guiding the facility into a controlled state, 
if necessary.
The third level of the defence-in-depth safety 
principle refers to accident management. Systems 
that limit the escalation of accidents, protect the 
barriers for confinement of radioactive materials 
and prevent the occurrence of severe fuel damage 
must be designed for the facility.
The following levels of the defence-in-depth 
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safety principle concern design extension condi-
tions and severe accidents, which are not applied 
to the nuclear waste facility designed by Posiva. 
This is a definition in accordance with the safety 
requirements, on the basis that the volume of nu-
clear fuel and the activity inventory handled at the 
encapsulation plant at a time are small compared 
with the radiation dose limits that result from the 
releases caused by design extension conditions of 
the assumed accidents.
Applying the defence-in-depth safety 
principle to the safety functions
Section 6(3): Handling of spent nuclear fuel and 
other nuclear waste
In handling of spent nuclear fuel, any damage 
to the fuel and occurrence of a self-sustaining chain 
reaction of fissions shall be prevented, and suffi-
cient cooling of the fuel shall be ensured, to a high 
degree of certainty.
The following presents the application of the 
defence-in-depth safety principle to safety func-
tions during the operation of the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facilities.
Reactivity management
On the first level of the defence-in-depth safety 
principle, reactivity management has been taken 
into account in the design of the structures that 
contain fuel by ensuring subcriticality through 
structural design solutions. The structures that 
contain fuel include the fuel transport cask, fuel 
drying station and the disposal canister.
The structures must be designed in accordance 
with the safety requirements stated in the YVL 
Guides, so that the effective multiplication factor 
does not exceed 0.95 under normal circumstances 
or during operational occurrences, or the value 
0.98 in other design basis scenarios – even if the 
structure containing fuel had been filled with wa-
ter.
Despite the design basis described above, safety 
is further ensured by structural means by design-
ing the structures containing fuel in a way that 
prevents water from coming in contact with the 
fuel in the handling cell.
In the criticality safety analyses, it has been 
found that the fuel cannot form a critical configu-
ration under dry conditions during normal use. If 
the structures containing fuel should be filled with 
water, it is possible to prove that the criticality 
safety will not be endangered by taking the burn-
up credit into account.
The potentiality of the fuel handled at the en-
capsulation plant becoming critical in an accident 
would require the configuration formed by the rod 
lattice of the fuel element to break and settle into 
a formation suitable for criticality. In addition, the 
free spaces in the fuel formation would need to be-
come filled with water. The completion of both con-
ditions in an accident is quite unlikely; therefore, it 
may be stated that the fuel will remain subcritical 
under normal circumstances as well as during 
operational occurrences and postulated accidents.
As a result, there is no need to take the second 
or third level of the defence-in-depth safety princi-
ple into account with regard to reactivity manage-
ment.
Removal of decay heat
The spent fuel processed in the encapsulation plant 
and disposal facility has cooled down for a long 
time – or, in other words, the amount of radioactive 
substances and, as a result, the decay heat produc-
tion of the fuel have significantly decreased due to 
radioactive decay. In the design of the encapsula-
tion plant and disposal facility, it is assumed that 
the fuel has cooled down for a minimum of 20 
years in the interim storage for spent fuel before 
it is transferred to the encapsulation plant. The 
assumption is conservative because, according to 
Posiva, the fuel transferred to the encapsulation 
plant has cooled down much longer than assumed 
during interim storage (30–50 years).
Following the first level of the defence-in-depth 
safety principle with regard to removing the decay 
heat means that the structures of the encapsula-
tion plant and disposal facility must be designed 
so that the decay heat can transfer out of the fuel. 
When the fuel is transferred to the encapsulation 
plant, its temperature is 65–100 °C, depending on 
whether the fuel is brought in a water- or gas-filled 
transport cask. The residual thermal output of a 
single assembly is 114–460 W, depending on the 
type of facility the fuel assembly comes from.
Without active cooling, the fuel temperature 
can rise up to 120 °C during normal operation. 
During operational occurrences or accidents, the 
temperature may rise to 300 °C at maximum. This 
temperature is still far from a temperature that 
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could cause damage to the fuel structure. The fuel 
may be damaged due to heating at a temperature 
of approximately 800 °C. The safety requirements 
set a temperature limit of 650 °C for the fuel in 
reactor conditions during class 1 postulated ac-
cidents.
It can be stated that the fuel remains at suf-
ficiently low temperatures with regard to perma-
nent damage under normal circumstances as well 
as during operational occurrences and accidents 
at the encapsulation plant and disposal facil-
ity. However, due to reasons of operability, during 
normal operation the facilities containing fuel are 
actively cooled with air conditioning systems.
With regard to the removal of decay heat, the 
monitoring of fuel temperature so that the suffi-
ciently low temperature of the fuel can be ensured 
applies to the second level of the defence-in-depth 
safety principle. The fuel temperature is monitored 
at the fuel drying station, and the temperature 
of the canister filled with fuel is monitored while 
the canister is in the canister transfer trolley. The 
cooling of the fuel handling and storage facilities is 
regulated as based on the air temperature.
Due to the low residual thermal output of fuel, 
decay heat cannot cause a postulated accident at 
the encapsulation plant or disposal facility, be-
cause the fuel integrity cannot be endangered due 
to heating caused by decay heat. For the removal 
of decay heat, it is not necessary to take the third 
level of the defence-in-depth safety principle into 
account in the design of the facility.
Management of radioactive substances
In the management of radioactive substances, the 
first level of the defence-in-depth safety principle 
includes prevention of the fuel from getting dam-
aged. The fuel, transport cask and disposal can-
ister must be handled safely so that the integrity 
of the fuel is not endangered. The safe handling of 
fuel is realised at the encapsulation plant by using 
planned movements and low lifting heights in han-
dling the fuel. The fuel transport routes are prede-
termined, and an action by an operator is required 
for the transport to be realised. The protective au-
tomation system monitors that the allowed lifting 
and transport areas are not exceeded and stops the 
movement, if necessary. If paths cross, potential 
crashes are prevented by allowing the power sup-
ply of one device moving one component at a time.
With regard to the management of radioac-
tive substances, the second level of the defence-
in-depth safety principle includes measurement 
systems that observe radioactivity. The spread of 
radioactive substances within the facility is limited 
by maintaining the underpressure levels in the 
rooms and the leak-tightness of facilities contain-
ing radioactive substances. In those instances, 
the air flow moves into the direction of the more 
active room. Under normal circumstances, radio-
active substances may spread from the fuel into 
the airspace of the handling cell and, during op-
erational occurrences, also in the controlled area. 
The exhaust ventilation of the handling cell filters 
the air of the handling cell during fuel handling as 
well as based on radiation measurements, if nec-
essary, thereby limiting the spread of radioactive 
substances into the environment. The filtration in 
the exhaust ventilation of the controlled area turns 
on as controlled by the protective automation if the 
exhaust ventilation radiation measurement sys-
tem detects activity in the air.
In the postulated accidents at Posiva’s nu-
clear waste facility, radioactive substances may 
be released at the facility. The third level of the 
defence-in-depth safety principle involves reduc-
ing the amount of released radioactive substances 
and mitigating the consequences of the accident 
by filtering the radioactivity with exhaust venti-
lation filters. In addition, it is possible to prevent 
the spread of radioactive substances from the 
controlled area into the environment by closing 
the ventilation's shut-off damper, which makes 
it possible to isolate the radioactive substances 
inside the encapsulation plant. During accidents, 
the emergency automation system carries out the 
safety functions' monitoring, control and protection 
measures, if the control and protective automation 
systems for normal situations and operational oc-
currences are out of operation.
Structural defence-in-depth safety principle
The structural defence-in-depth safety principle 
means that the facility has successive structures 
that back up each other, which are used to prevent 
and limit the spread of radioactive substances in 
the facility. The structural defence-in-depth safety 
principle is realised at Posiva’s nuclear waste fa-
cility. The first barrier against spreading is the 
fuel cladding, and the next level at the various 
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stages of the fuel encapsulation and disposal is the 
fuel transport cask, the fuel handling cell or the 
disposal canister. The structures and filtration in 
the exhaust ventilation in the control area of the 
encapsulation plant act as the final barrier against 
spreading.
Strength and independence of 
the defence-in-depth levels
The strength and independence of the levels in 
accordance with the defence-in-depth safety prin-
ciple have been taken into account in the safety 
design of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility. The safety 
functions at the same safety level follow the redun-
dancy, separation, and diversity principles.
The redundancy principle is realised through 
the doubling of the safety functions. In that case, 
the safety function can be implemented even if 
a component in the system would be inoperable. 
The redundancy principle has been applied to the 
suspension and transfer functions of the fuel han-
dling systems, the systems that limit the spread of 
radioactive substances, and the measurement sys-
tems that monitor the areas of the facility. Of these 
functions, the power supply to the systems that 
monitor the facility and carry out alarm functions 
has been ensured in all situations.
The independence of the safety functions from 
each other is ensured by applying the principles of 
diversity and separation. The diversity principle 
has been followed in systems where the redun-
dancy principle is not fully realised. For example, it 
is not possible to comply fully with the redundancy 
principle in lifting a transport cask. This has been 
complemented by a shock absorber implemented 
under the floor of the transport cask transfer cor-
ridor. In the event of a fall, the transport cask will 
maintain its leak-tightness, thanks to the shock 
absorber. The diversity principle is also realised 
in the grip of the fuel transfer machine, which has 
been secured by two separate methods.
The safety function separation principle is fol-
lowed both structurally and functionally. In the 
functionally isolated systems, faults cannot trans-
fer from one system into another on the same level 
of the defence-in-depth safety principle or from 
one level to another. The functional isolation has 
been applied to safety blocks in the separation of 
the subsystems of the electrical and automation 
systems.
Structural separation has been taken into ac-
count in systems where a disturbance caused by 
an external reason could spread from one safety 
function or subsystem into another. For example, 
the parallel subsystems carrying out the same 
safety function have been placed in different fire 
compartments, which means that a fire in a single 
compartment will not cause the loss of the whole 
safety function.
Conclusion
In connection with the construction licence appli-
cation, Posiva has delivered a preliminary safety 
analysis report, which describes the facility level 
design bases at a sufficient level. Based on the de-
sign documentation, it can be stated that the facil-
ity can be implemented in a way that makes it pos-
sible to fulfil the safety requirements laid down in 
Government Decree 736/2008. Posiva will specify 
the system-specific design after the construction 
licence has been granted, so that the system design 
fulfils the sufficient level of detail specified in the 
YVL Guides for the design before construction of 
the structures and the manufacturing of the equip-
ment of the nuclear waste facility is initiated.
Posiva has described the realisation of the 
defence-in-depth safety principle at a sufficient 
level in the construction licence application ma-
terial. Posiva’s nuclear waste facility follows the 
operational and structural defence-in-depth safety 
principle. The strength and independence of the 
levels in accordance with the defence-in-depth 
safety principle are sufficiently realised.
The functions of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility 
have been designed so that, in accordance with 
Section 6(3) of the Government Decree 736/2008, 
any damage to the fuel and occurrence of a self-
sustaining chain reaction of fissions will be pre-
vented and sufficient cooling of the fuel will be 
ensured in the handling of spent nuclear fuel.
Radiation protection arrangements
Section 6(2): Handling of spent nuclear fuel and 
other nuclear waste
The nuclear waste facility shall employ effective 
radiation protection arrangements in order to limit 
the occupational radiation exposure and radiation 
impacts caused in the environment of the facility. 
In waste handling, releases of radioactive materials 
inside the facility and into the environment shall 
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be prevented and limited as necessary with con-
tainment, recovery and filtering systems. Sufficient 
radiation protection shall be ensured in handling 
of spent nuclear fuel or other highly irradiating 
nuclear waste by using remote handling and radia-
tion shielding.
Posiva has estimated the external dose rates 
and the occurrence of contamination by radioactive 
material in the various areas of the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility. Based on the estimate, 
the rooms in the controlled area are classified into 
radiation protection zones. The passage of employ-
ees in the controlled zone is monitored and restrict-
ed by passage and access control arrangements.
The radiation exposure of personnel is moni-
tored with personal dosimeters. In addition, the 
facility has fixed dose rate meters. During the nor-
mal operation of the facility, the estimated collec-
tive annual dose of the personnel is 13 man-mSv. 
Most of the dose is collected during the mainte-
nance of the fuel handling cell and its equipment.
The release of radioactive substances into the 
environment is monitored with continuously oper-
ating measuring instruments and samples taken 
from the release routes at regular intervals. The 
monitoring of releases is complemented with an 
environmental radiation monitoring programme.
The spent nuclear fuel is handled in an un-
derpressurised handling cell whose exhaust air is 
filtered. The low- and intermediate-level nuclear 
waste generated during the handling of spent nu-
clear fuel is processed and packed in the facility's 
controlled area, where the ventilation can be fil-
tered if necessary in the event of a possible opera-
tional occurrence or accident. If the waste packages 
are damaged, the corrective actions are planned 
on a case-by-case basis. The radioactive water pro-
duced by decontamination is collected by the drain 
system of the controlled area and processed in the 
active water processing system.
The spent fuel handled in the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility is always in an enclosed 
space: inside a transport or transfer package, 
inside the handling cell or the inside the drying 
station connected to the handling cell or in the dis-
posal canister.
The surface dose rate limit has been specified 
for the transport and transfer package in accord-
ance with the transport requirements that are 
based on international recommendations. The re-
alisation of the limits is ensured in connection with 
the separate permit process for the transport and 
transfer package. In the dimensioning of the thick-
ness of the handling cell wall, the amount of radio-
active substances contained by the fuel handled in 
the cell has been taken into account, in addition to 
ensuring that the dose rate on the other side of the 
wall is not too high for the radiation safety of the 
personnel. Similarly, the thicknesses of the walls 
in the handling and storage areas for disposal 
canisters that contain fuel are dimensioned to pro-
vide sufficient radiation protection. At the disposal 
facility, the canisters are transferred with a can-
ister transfer vehicle, where the canister is inside 
a separate radiation shield. In the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility, the fuel and the disposal 
canisters are handled via remote control due to the 
high dose rate.
Conclusion
The design of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility takes 
account of limiting the radiation dose received by 
the personnel and the environment by all practical 
measures. Fuel handling is designed so that the 
release of radioactive substances in the facility and 
their spreading to the environment is limited as 
far as possible. The radiation exposure of the per-
sonnel is reduced by implementing the handling of 
fuel and the disposal canisters via remote control.
Disposal actions, waste accounting 
and the protection zone
Section 9(1), 9(5) and 9(6): Disposal operations
The transfer of waste packages into the emplace-
ment rooms shall be carried out so that the pos-
sibility of accidents remain low and the packages 
cannot be damaged in any way that would affect 
long-term safety.
A record shall be maintained of disposed waste, 
including waste package specific data on the waste 
type, radioactive materials, location within the 
waste emplacement room, and other necessary 
data. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) shall arrange the permanent recording of 
information concerning the disposal facility and 
disposed waste.
An adequate protection zone shall be reserved 
round the disposal facility as a provision for the 
prohibitions on measures referred to in section 63 
subsection 1 point 6 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
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The spent nuclear fuel in the disposal canister 
is transferred from the encapsulation plant into 
the disposal facility via a canister lift. The can-
isters are transferred into the deposition tunnel 
either directly or after interim storage. During the 
canister transfers, the structures and functions 
that support the canister load are single failure tol-
erant, and the canister is prevented from tipping 
over. The transfer of the canister from the canister 
storage at the disposal facility into the deposi-
tion tunnel is carried out by means of a transfer 
and emplacement vehicle. During the transfer, the 
canister is placed inside a radiation shield that 
also functions as mechanical protection for the 
canister in the event of a possible tunnel collapse, 
or against rocks that may fall from the roof of the 
tunnel.
If the canister is damaged during any step of 
the disposal operation in a way that affects post-
closure safety, the canister can be returned into the 
encapsulation plant to be reprocessed. If necessary, 
the fuel can be transferred into a new canister in 
the handling cell.
Posiva receives the data of the spent nuclear 
fuel to be disposed of from the licensees of the 
nuclear power plants that send the fuel. In the con-
struction licence application material, Posiva has 
stated that a fuel data system will be developed for 
the nuclear waste accounting, in cooperation with 
the owners of Posiva. The plan for waste account-
ing is sufficient at the construction licence stage. 
Waste accounting must be in use by the time the 
operating licence application for Posiva’s facility is 
submitted.
The permanent storage of information on the 
spent nuclear fuel to be disposed of has been 
specified as the task of the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) in the Government decree. 
Because the duties of the National Archives Service 
include receiving and storing documents released 
by the authorities (Decree on the National Archives 
Service 832/1994), the permanent storage of the 
information is implemented in cooperation with the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) 
and the National Archives Service. More specific 
plans for the permanent storage of the information 
have not been made yet, because it is currently es-
timated that the closure of Posiva’s nuclear waste 
facility and the arrangement of the permanent stor-
age of information will occur in the 2100s.
An area has been reserved for the nuclear waste 
facility in the currently valid land use plan of the 
Olkiluoto area. In addition, the protection zone 
required by Section 9(6) of Government Decree 
736/2008 has been reserved in the disposal area for 
the prohibitions on measures referred to in Section 
63(1), paragraph 6 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
Conclusion
Posiva’s nuclear waste facility has been designed 
so that the transfer of the disposal canister into the 
repository can be implemented in such a way that 
the risk of accidents is low and the disposal canis-
ter will not be damaged in a way that affects post-
closure safety. If the disposal canister is damaged, 
it can be transferred back into the encapsulation 
plant for reprocessing and the spent nuclear fuel 
can be transferred into a new canister, if necessary.
Posiva has a plan for developing nuclear waste 
accounting for the nuclear fuel subjected to dis-
posal. The nuclear waste accounting must be in 
use before the operation begins. Together with 
the National Archives Service, the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) arranges the 
storage of disposed waste in a permanent manner. 
The permanent storage of information will become 
timely after Posiva’s nuclear waste facility is closed 
in the 2100s, as anticipated.
In the land use plan for the Olkiluoto island, 
the required precautionary action zone has been 
reserved for the disposal facility.
3.2. Operational occurrences 
and accidents
Section 8: Prevention of operational occurrences 
and accidents
In order to prevent operational occurrences and 
accidents, the design, construction and operation 
of a nuclear waste facility shall employ proven or 
otherwise carefully examined, high-quality technol-
ogy. A nuclear waste facility shall encompass sys-
tems that facilitate quick and reliable detection of 
an operational occurrence or accident and prevent 
the aggravation of any event. Effective technical 
and administrative measures shall be provided for 
the mitigation of the consequences of potential ac-
cidents.
The functions at a nuclear waste facility, the 
failure of which could result in a significant release 
of radioactive materials or radiation exposure of 
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personnel at the facility, shall be ensured. Ensuring 
the functions important to safety shall primarily be 
based on inherent safety features, alongside systems 
and components that do not require external power 
supply or which, as a consequence of a loss of power 
supply, will settle into a state deemed preferable 
from the safety point of view.
The design of a nuclear waste facility shall take 
account of any impacts caused by potential natural 
phenomena and other events external to the facility. 
As external events, even unlawful activities aiming 
at damaging the facility shall be taken into ac-
count.
In a nuclear waste facility, the placement and 
protection of systems alongside operative methods 
shall ensure that fire, explosions or other events in-
side the facility do not pose a threat to safety.
In the functions of the encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility, the various lifting and transfer 
functions related to the fuel, transport cask and 
canister are essential. Equipments will be designed 
and manufactured for these functions; with the ex-
ception of the crane in the transport cask reception 
area, the equipment is unique and designed for the 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility. However, 
all devices are based on proven techniques includ-
ing additional safety solutions to reach as high a 
level of nuclear safety as possible. Prototypes are 
made out of the devices, and their suitability for 
the planned purpose is proven through testing. 
Based on the tests, changes can be made if neces-
sary in the design of the actual devices.
The principles and systems related to the obser-
vation and management of operational occurrences 
and accidents as well as the arrangements related 
to the mitigation of the consequences of accidents 
have been covered above, in Section 3.1.
The functions at Posiva’s nuclear waste facility, 
the failure of which could result in a significant 
release of radioactive substances or radiation ex-
posure of personnel at the facility or the popula-
tion in the area surrounding the facility, have been 
ensured. The secured or single failure tolerant 
functions have been covered in more detail above 
in Section 3.1.
Out of the safety functions, maintaining sub-
criticality and the removal of decay heat are based 
on the natural safety features that do not require 
an external power source and will be realised even 
if external power source has been lost. This issue 
has been covered in more detail above, in Section 
3.1. The spent nuclear fuel handling functions are 
designed in such a way that in the event of a fault 
situation or loss of external power source, the de-
vices stop and remain in a controlled state.
The functions of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility 
are designed in such a way that any of the han-
dling functions can be interrupted for an unfore-
seen period. For this reason, the external threats 
with an impact on the durability of the structures 
are phenomena included in the potential external 
threats to be taken into account in the design 
of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility. Such external 
threats include exceptional weather phenomena, 
such as storm winds, heavy rain and snow as well 
as lightning. Other external threats to be taken 
into account in the design include earthquakes, 
aircraft crash and explosions. The external threats 
are taken into account in the design of the struc-
tures of the nuclear waste facility as well as the 
dimensioning of the systems and the equipment. 
Illegal activity is covered in Section 10.
For the design of Posiva’s nuclear facility, the 
potential internal threats have been investigated 
and an analysis on which of the same are relevant 
with regard to Posiva’s nuclear waste facility has 
been completed. The relevant internal threats with 
regard to the encapsulation plant are fires and 
falling loads that may occur during the handling 
of spent nuclear fuel. The relevant internal threats 
related to the disposal facility are fires, collapsing 
structures, explosion accidents and flooding in the 
facility caused by groundwater. Fires have been 
taken into account in the design of the encapsula-
tion plant and disposal facility by establishing fire 
compartments and designing the structures to be 
fire-resistant. Systems intended for fire protection 
and management have been designed for the nu-
clear waste facility. The other internal threats have 
been taken into account in a manner sufficient for 
nuclear and radiation safety in the design of the 
nuclear waste facility.
Conclusion
The design, construction and operation of Posiva’s 
nuclear waste facility employ proven or other-
wise carefully examined, high-quality technology. 
Prototypes will be made of the functions for which 
unique equipment is manufactured, in order to en-
sure functionality.
32
STUK-B 196 STUK’S SafeTy aSSeSSmenT of PoSiva’S conSTrUcTion licence aPPlicaTion
In accordance with the structural defence-in-
depth safety principle, systems for detecting opera-
tional occurrences and accidents and preventing 
them from developing into more serious events 
have been designed for the facility. Preventing 
the release and spread of radioactive substances 
has been taken into account in the design of the 
nuclear waste facility. The natural safety features 
have been taken into account in the design of the 
safety functions.
Internal and external threats have been taken 
into account in the design of Posiva’s nuclear waste 
facility, so that the threats considered possible do 
not affect the safety of the facility.
Operational safety analyses 
of the nuclear facility
Section 13: Operational safety of nuclear waste fa-
cility
Compliance with safety requirements concern-
ing the operation of a nuclear waste facility shall be 
proven in connection with commissioning as far as 
possible. Insofar as this is not possible, operational 
safety shall be demonstrated through experimental 
or computational methods, or via a combination 
thereof. Computational methods shall be selected 
so that the actual risk or harm remains below the 
results of calculations, with a high degree of cer-
tainty. Computational methods shall be reliable 
and validated for dealing with the events under 
analysis. The selection of operational occurrences 
and accidents to be analysed shall take account of 
their estimated probabilities.
The fulfilment of the safety requirements on 
the operation of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility is 
verified during the construction licence application 
phase as based on the facility design documentation 
and the analyses that describe the behaviour of the 
facility. Experimental and computational methods 
have been used to analyse the behaviour of Posiva’s 
nuclear waste facility. Experimental methods have 
been used in the analysis describing the dimension-
ing of the shock absorber of the transport cask, for 
example. Computational methods have been used 
to implement, for example, the spent nuclear fuel 
criticality safety reviews, analyses describing the re-
moval of decay heat, and the analyses on estimating 
releases of radioactive substances and the resulting 
radiation doses. The fire safety analyses have also 
been carried out using computational methods.
The computational methods have been selected 
in a way that ensures the cases are described in a 
conservative enough manner. The computational 
methods have been assessed to be sufficiently 
reliable and qualified for the cases. Out of the op-
erational occurrences or accidents, only the cases 
estimated to result in releases of radioactive sub-
stances have been reviewed in detail.
Conclusion
Experimental and computational methods have 
been used in the analyses describing the behaviour 
of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility. The calculation 
methods and initial assumptions of the analyses 
have been selected conservatively. The computa-
tional methods have been estimated to be suffi-
ciently conservative and qualified for handling the 
events reviewed.
3.3. Safety classification and 
seismic classification
Section 7: Safety classification
The systems, structures and components of a nu-
clear waste facility shall be classified on the basis of 
their significance in terms of the operational safety 
of the facility, or the long-term safety of disposal. 
The required quality level of each classified object, 
and the inspections and testing necessary for veri-
fying the quality, shall be adequate as regards the 
significance of the object in terms of safety.
The safety of the nuclear facility is ensured by 
safety functions; in order to control these functions, 
the facility must be divided into systems that form 
structural or functional units. In order to prove 
their safety significance, the nuclear facility’s sys-
tems, structures and components must be grouped 
into safety classes 1, 2, and 3 and the Class EYT 
(non-nuclear safety classification), based on their 
safety significance. Post-closure safety must also be 
taken into account in the safety classification of the 
disposal facility's systems, structures and compo-
nents. Structures important to post-closure safety 
in accordance with Guide YVL D.5 can include at 
least the waste packages and the buffer materials 
surrounding them, as well as special structures 
and the bedrock immediately surrounding the un-
derground areas of the disposal facility.
In the encapsulation plant and disposal facility, 
spent nuclear fuel and the fuel basket of the fuel 
transport and transfer cask, insert of the disposal 
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canister and fuel rack of the fuel drying system as 
structures that ensure the criticality safety of nu-
clear fuel have been classified in safety class 2. Out 
of the functional systems, the most important for 
the implementation of safety functions and classi-
fied in the safety class 3 are the devices participat-
ing in the handling of the spent nuclear fuel and 
the disposal canister, the systems preventing and 
limiting the spread of radioactive substances, as 
well as the measurements and alarms important 
for safety.
In the disposal system proposed by Posiva, 
maintaining the integrity of the disposal canister 
is a key safety function, and the disposal canister 
has been classified in safety class 2, due to post-
closure safety. As structures that ensure the per-
formance of the canister and prevent the spread of 
radionuclides, the bentonite buffer, the backfill and 
closure structures of the deposition tunnel and the 
bedrock surrounding the repository have been clas-
sified in safety class 3.
The systems, structures and components of the 
nuclear facility must be classified according to the 
seismic resistance. Systems, structures and compo-
nents assigned to seismic category S1 must main-
tain their integrity, leak-tightness, functionality 
and proper position in a loading situation caused 
by a design basis earthquake. Seismic category 
S2A comprises systems, structures and compo-
nents, the maintenance of whose performance and 
integrity is not essential for the accomplishment of 
safety functions but which may have effects that 
may affect the safety-related operation, integrity or 
automated safety functions of seismic category S1 
systems. Seismic category S2B comprises all other 
systems, structures and components at the nuclear 
facility.
The seismic classification concerns the opera-
tional safety of the facilities. In the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility, the equipment required 
for preventing the spent fuel from falling, the 
structures and equipment preventing the release 
of radioactive substances as well as the measure-
ments required in emergency situations have been 
classified in the seismic category S1. All of the 
structures and equipment, the collapse of which 
could damage the fuel or the disposal canister, 
have mainly been classified in safety class S2A. In 
the disposal facility, those structures in the bed-
rock facilities in which the disposal canister is not 
inside a radiation shield that provides mechanical 
protection have been placed in seismic category 
S2A.
The safety class determines the level of qual-
ity required in the design and implementation of 
the object and the extent of control procedures. 
The requirements and procedures typical to each 
field are applied to the various fields of technology. 
The requirements that concern these issues have 
been set in the YVL Guides on the various fields of 
technology. Posiva has determined the connection 
between the safety class and the required level of 
quality in the classification document delivered as 
part of the construction licence application mate-
rial. The inspection classes proposed by Posiva, 
determining the quality level, mainly follow the 
safety classification.
Conclusion
As part of the construction licence application ma-
terial, Posiva has presented a safety and seismic 
classification for the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant 
and disposal facility. In the safety classification, 
Posiva has taken the importance of the systems, 
structures and components for operational and 
post-closure safety into account. Posiva has also 
specified the connection between the safety im-
portance of the systems, structures and compo-
nents and the quality level. The safety classifica-
tion proposed by Posiva fulfils the requirements of 
Section 7 of Government Decree 736/2008. Posiva’s 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility are facili-
ties of a new type, of which there is no extensive 
experience. For this reason, the safety importance 
and classifications of systems, structures and com-
ponents must be evaluated and if necessary, the 
classifications must be changed during the design 
and construction.
3.4. Spent nuclear fuel
As a result of the planned operation of the 
Olkiluoto 1–4 and the Loviisa 1–2 plant units, it 
is estimated that a maximum of 9,000 tU of spent 
fuel will be accumulated with an activity inven-
tory at the order of magnitude of 9·1010 GBq and 
for the disposal of which 4,500 disposal canisters 
will be required. For the Loviisa 1–2 plant units, 
the annual discharge burn-up of the fuel element 
is planned to rise to the level of 47.5 MWd/kgU 
at maximum, for the Olkiluoto 1–2 plant units to 
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the level of 53 MWd/kgU at maximum and for the 
Olkiluoto 3–4 plant units to the level of 47 MWd/
kgU at maximum. Correspondingly, the average 
burn-up for the various plant units is estimated to 
be 40.6 MWd/kgU for the Loviisa 1–2 plant units, 
39.5 MWd/kgU for the Olkiluoto 1–2 plant units 
and 45.1 MWd/kgU for the Olkiluoto 3–4 plant 
units. The design basis of the encapsulation plant 
and disposal facility has been an average burn-up 
of 60 MWd/kgU for the fuel elements handled, and 
a cooling time of 20 years at minimum. Both design 
bases have been selected conservatively. STUK will 
approve increases in the burn-up and the fuel used 
at nuclear power plants separately, taking into ac-
count the entire life cycle of nuclear fuel up to the 
post-closure safety of disposal.
In the preliminary safety analysis report deliv-
ered as part of the construction licence application 
material, Posiva has described the characteristics 
of the spent fuel handled and disposed of at the en-
capsulation plant and disposal facility. The power 
plant-specific data on the various types of fuel have 
been presented in the memos delivered as topical 
reports of the preliminary safety analysis report. 
For the Olkiluoto 1-2 and the Loviisa 1-2 plant 
units, detailed data related to fuel have been pre-
sented. For the fuel of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, 
the data is still preliminary, and the data for the 
fuel of the Olkiluoto 4 plant unit are not yet avail-
able.
The key canister-specific criteria on the disposal 
of spent fuel are the radiation dose rate, production 
of decay heat and criticality safety. The fuel ele-
ments to be placed in the canister must be selected 
as based on the canister-specific loading plans and 
the fuel element acceptance criteria, taking the 
production of decay heat, radiation dose rate and 
reactivity of the spent fuel element into account. 
In addition, the selection of the fuel elements to 
be placed into the disposal canister must be opti-
mised by the aid of the annual fuel accumulation, 
discharge burn-ups and operational periods of the 
plant units.
Fuel handling management is based on the fuel 
database planned by Posiva, which will be imple-
mented together with the owners of Posiva, as well 
as the identification of the fuel elements aided by 
identification and location-based information.
The analyses of activity and decay heat have 
been presented comprehensively with various fuel 
types in accordance with several burn-ups and 
various enrichment levels.
According to Posiva, the handling and dis-
posal of leaking and damaged fuel rods is normal, 
planned activity. Posiva has clarified the proce-
dures separately with regard to the leaking fuel 
rods from Fortum and TVO. The damaged fuel rods 
from TVO are packed into rod capsules that are 
placed into rod magazines. Posiva proposes several 
procedures for the disposal of rod capsules. The 
fuel elements from Fortum that are found to leak 
will be transported to Olkiluoto as is, or packed 
into gas-tight cases. In both cases, the selection 
between methods will be made before the operation 
of the encapsulation plant begins. For post-closure 
safety, the fuel elements have been taken into ac-
count in the release rate of radioactive substances 
used as the source term of the analysis.
The fuel elements act as the source term for 
evaluating post-closure safety. Posiva sets 10-7/a as 
the relative radionuclide release rate from the fuel 
matrix. Posiva has characterised the fuel elements 
sufficiently and has provided sufficient grounds for 
the behaviours of the source term. Based on the 
probabilistic sensitivity analyses, the release of 
radionuclides from the fuel element is one of the 
most important parameters with regard to post-
closure safety.
Conclusion
Sufficient information on fuel has been presented 
in Posiva’s construction licence application mate-
rial. Due to the great safety importance of the 
source term, Posiva must reduce the uncertainties 
related to it by applying for an operating licence. 
Posiva has not determined any other fuel accept-
ance criteria related to post-closure safety, than 
the criteria related to decay heat production and 
criticality safety. The acceptance criteria must be 
specified based on the factors used as the basis of 
the assessment of post-closure safety, such as the 
characteristics of the source term, by the time the 
application for an operating licence is submitted.
3.5. Realisation of the radiation dose 
constraints during operation
Section 3: Operation of nuclear waste facility
A nuclear waste facility and its operation shall 
be designed so that:
1) the radiation exposure of workers at the facil-
STUK-B 196
35
STUK’S SafeTy aSSeSSmenT of PoSiva’S conSTrUcTion licence aPPlicaTion
ity is limited by all practicable means and so that 
the maximum values laid down in the Radiation 
Decree (1512/1991) are not exceeded;
2) as a consequence of undisturbed operation of 
the facility, releases of radioactive materials into 
the environment remain insignificantly low;
3) as a consequence of assumed operational 
occurrences, the annual dose to the most exposed 
people other than personnel of the facility remains 
below the value of 0.1 millisievert (mSv); and
4) as consequence of a postulated accident, the 
annual dose to the most exposed people other than 
workers of the facility remains below:
a) the value of 1 mSv when a Class 1 postulated 
accident occurs;
b) the value of 5 mSv when a Class 2 postulated 
accident occurs.
When applying this section, radiation doses 
arising from natural radioactive materials in the 
host rock of or released from groundwater bodies 
into the underground rooms of the disposal facility, 
shall not be taken into account.
In accordance with the YVL Guides, the limita-
tion of the radiation exposure of the plant person-
nel by all practical measures has been taken into 
account in the design of the encapsulation plant 
and disposal facility. The radiation exposure is 
decreased especially by the remote handling of the 
spent fuel and radiation shields.
During undisturbed operation of the encapsula-
tion plant and disposal facility, releases of radioac-
tive substances into the environment may occur 
if the cladding of a single fuel rod leaks upon its 
arrival to the encapsulation plant or if its leak-
tightness is lost in connection with normal fuel 
handling in the handling cell. In these cases, gase-
ous and particulate radioactive matter is released 
from the fuel into the air. In the handling cell, fine 
matter containing radioactive substances may be 
released from the surface of the fuel and spread 
into the air and on surfaces. Radioactive wastewa-
ter and possibly also aerosols are created when the 
surfaces are cleaned. The surface of the fuel trans-
port cask may also release radioactive substances 
that have become attached to it. However, the re-
leases of radioactive substances that occur at the 
disposal facility in connection with normal opera-
tion are very small, because the disposal canisters 
and the packages of low- and intermediate-level 
waste handled at the facility are leak-tight, and 
their surface is clean from radioactive substances.
From the encapsulation plant, air from the 
controlled area or water used to clean the facilities 
is released into the environment in a controlled 
manner. The air and water containing radioac-
tive substances is cleaned with the filters in the 
ventilation systems and the wastewater cleaning 
system, before it is released into the sea or into the 
atmosphere through the plant ventilation stack in 
a controlled and measured manner.
According to the estimate presented in the pre-
liminary safety analysis report of the facility, the 
effective annual dose resulting from the releases 
of radioactive substances from the facility during 
normal operation is clearly under 0.0001 µSv to 
the most exposed individuals of the population, 
which is one hundred thousandth of the maximum 
limit set for an annual dose in the YVL Guides 
(0.01 mSv).
The postulated operational occurrences at the 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility have been 
covered in the preliminary safety analysis report 
in accordance with Guides YVL D.3 and YVL D.5. 
According to the analysis, damage to fuel elements 
in the handling cell will cause the largest annual 
dose on the part of operational occurrences to the 
most exposed individuals in the population. In 
the analysis, an erroneous attempt to set a fuel 
element into a fuel position in the drying system 
that already contains a fuel assembly has been as-
sumed. In this case, it is postulated that 10% of the 
rods of both fuel assemblies are damaged. In this 
instance, the annual dose caused by the release 
is 0.00002 mSv based on the estimate, which is 
clearly under the maximum limit set for the an-
nual dose for operational occurrences (0.1 mSv).
The postulated accidents at the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility have been covered in the 
preliminary safety analysis report in accordance 
with Guides YVL D.3 and YVL D.5. Some of the 
postulated accidents (earthquake, aircraft crash, 
collapses in the underground area and explosion 
accidents) are nevertheless studied as external 
threats and initiating events of accidents. Posiva 
assumes conservatively that all postulated acci-
dents are in class 1.
According to the analysis, failure of the canister 
lift and the disposal canister falling into the canis-
ter shaft, together with the lift car, will cause the 
highest annual dose out of the analysed accidents 
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to the most exposed individuals in the population. 
The release is filtered, in which case the annual 
dose is less than 0.01 mSv based on the estimate, 
i.e. clearly under 1 mSv, which is the limit value for 
an annual dose for the postulated accident.
In the construction licence application material, 
Posiva has reviewed the unfiltered releases of ac-
cidents in order to dimension the emergencies. The 
analyses are classified as design extension condi-
tions of postulated accidents, and they describe 
which kind of radiation doses may be released from 
the encapsulation plant and disposal facility when 
taking account of rare combinations of failures. 
According to Guide YVL D.3, it is not necessary to 
study the design extension conditions of postulated 
accidents or take them into account in the design, 
because the amount of fuel contained by the encap-
sulation plant at a time does not exceed the limit 
value 100 tU. Based on the reviews by Posiva, the 
disposal canister being damaged in case of a failure 
of the canister lift would cause the highest annual 
dose of approximately 20 mSv to the most exposed 
individuals of the population, which corresponds to 
the limit value set for the annual dose for design 
extension conditions of postulated accidents.
Conclusion
The encapsulation plant and disposal facility can 
be constructed in a way that fulfils the require-
ments of Section 3 of the Government Decree 
736/2008. The annual dose limits set for radiation 
exposure under normal circumstances, operational 
occurrences and accidents, are not reached in the 
cases analysed. The analysed events are selected 
in accordance with the largest potential releases. 
Based on the analyses, the limit values set in the 
regulations are not reached even in the case of un-
likely events, such as an unfiltered release.
3.6. Probabilistic risk assessment 
in the design stage
The probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in the de-
sign stage covers the fuel handling stages, starting 
from the arrival of spent fuel at the encapsulation 
plant and ending with its placement in the deposi-
tion hole underground. The design stage PRA has 
been drawn up as based on the preliminary design 
information, general equipment reliability data, 
conservative assumptions and expert assessments.
The design stage PRA has been drawn up in 
two stages. The analysis first includes a qualita-
tive section, in which the identification of potential 
risks – including internal and external threats, 
risk assessment and elimination – were carried out 
comprehensively. At the second stage of analysis, 
quantitative models were created for the event 
sequences that were estimated to be the most sig-
nificant with regard to risks. Quantitative analysis 
presents estimates on the release of radioactive 
substances into the environment and the radiation 
doses caused to the personnel of the facility with 
their probabilities. Quantitative analysis does not 
deal with the accidents that do not immediately 
result in a release or radiation exposure.
In the design stage PRA, significant environ-
mental release can only occur in the events where 
one or more fuel assemblies are damaged and the 
filtration of the ventilation fails at the same time. 
The most important initiating event is the disposal 
canister falling into the deposition hole and the 
loss of the canister's leak-tightness. The filtration 
function significantly limits the environmental re-
lease, and the failure of filtration is mostly due 
to a postulated human error in connection with 
the maintenance of the system that has not been 
discovered in the testing carried out after main-
tenance. All identified environmental releases are 
under the limit of a large release presented in 
Guide YVL A.7 with a large margin.
The probability of the personnel becoming ex-
posed to life-threatening radiation doses is very 
low, and it would require the person accessing the 
fuel handling cell or the weld inspection chamber. 
This is prevented with the help of design and in-
structions. The presence of personnel near the dis-
posal canister suggests the low probability of this 
leading to the annual dose limit being exceeded, 
which may be a result of issues such as human er-
ror, failure in the sampling of the transport cask, 
or a collapse in the repository that prevents the 
person from exiting the area.
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Conclusion
Based on the review by STUK, the design-phase 
PRA of the encapsulation plant and disposal fa-
cility has been implemented in accordance with 
the requirements presented by Guides YVL D.3 
and YVL A.7. The encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility can be constructed in a way that fulfils 
the requirements of Section 8 of the Government 
Decree 736/2008 (covered above in Section 3.2). As 
the detailed design of the systems progresses, it 
should be ensured through the aid of PRA that the 
filtration functions in particular and the arrange-
ments that prevent personnel from accessing the 
fuel handling cell or the canister weld inspection 
chamber when presence in these areas may result 
in significant radiation doses are as reliable as pos-
sible.
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4 Constructing a nuclear 
waste facility
4.1. Encapsulation plant and the 
other buildings above ground
The nuclear waste facility complex designed by 
Posiva and constructed above ground includes the 
encapsulation plant and the other buildings above 
ground needed to support the operation of the facil-
ity, for example.
The potential internal and external threats to 
the facility have been taken into account in the 
design and placement of the encapsulation plant, 
of which the postulated earthquakes, extreme 
weather conditions, aircraft crash, explosions and 
fires in particular exert an impact on the design of 
the structures. The structure of the encapsulation 
plant is much simpler than e.g. a nuclear power 
plant, and it is not possible for temperatures or 
pressures comparable to a nuclear power plant to 
be generated during the encapsulation process that 
the structures would need to withstand.
In the encapsulation plant, an important single 
factor affecting the dimensioning of the structures 
is the radiation protection of the operating person-
nel, which has been planned to be implemented 
with the massive concrete structures surrounding 
the handling areas of the fuel and the canister. The 
building of the encapsulation plant is designed in 
accordance with the EN standards and the related 
Finnish national appendices. The areas of the facil-
ity where surface contamination is assumed to be 
likely to occur are equipped with a stainless steel 
lining that makes cleaning easier, and the other 
areas where occasional surface contamination may 
occur are surfaced with a surface treatment that is 
easy to clean.
In connection with constructing the under-
ground rock characterisation facility, Posiva has 
constructed buildings at the site required for the 
construction of the research facility or the research 
activities. Out of these buildings, the disposal facil-
ity's ventilation building is important to the opera-
tional safety of the disposal facility in postulated 
accidents where the possibility exists of a release 
of radioactive substances. STUK has ensured and 
provided through regulation that the safety re-
quirements of the ventilation building and ventila-
tion systems that have already been implemented 
as part of the control of Onkalo have been fulfilled 
to the extent required by the YVL Guides.
According to STUK, the implementation of the 
encapsulation plant and the other buildings above 
ground is being carried out using proven technol-
ogy used in constructing nuclear facilities, and 
they can be implemented in accordance with the 
requirements found in the YVL Guides.
4.2. Disposal facility
Section 9(3) Emplacement activities
The emplacement activities shall be separated 
from the excavation and construction work of the 
disposal facility in such a manner as to ensure that 
excavation and construction work cannot have any 
harmful impact on the operational safety of the fa-
cility or the long-term safety of disposed waste.
Section 12(3) Disposal site
The layout, excavation, construction and closure 
of underground facilities shall be implemented so 
that the characteristics of the host rock deemed im-
portant in terms of long-term safety are retained as 
far as possible.
Posiva has covered the construction of the un-
derground sections of the disposal facility, phasing 
of the construction, use of the facilities and their 
closure in the preliminary safety analysis report 
delivered as part of the construction licence ap-
plication material, and the background reports 
that complement it. Posiva has presented the 
development needs related to the construction of 
the repository in the disposal concept development 
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plan delivered to STUK as well as the reports that 
complement the construction licence application 
material.
The disturbance caused by the construction to 
the bedrock must remain controlled and less than 
the set design requirements, so that the anticipat-
ed mechanical, geochemical and hydrogeological 
conditions favourable to the engineered barriers 
are maintained during construction, and that they 
will begin to return towards the baseline condi-
tions before construction, after a reasonable time 
from closure. Key issues taken into account by 
Posiva in the construction of the disposal facility 
to ensure the realisation of this goal include 1) the 
placement of the disposal facility's repository 2) 
the construction of the repository in phases, their 
operation and closure, as well as 3) the placement 
of bore and drill holes, sealing water leaks, limiting 
the excavation disturbance zone and limiting the 
chemical disturbance caused by construction mate-
rials detrimental to long-term performance.
Posiva places the repository with an aim to 
avoid geological and hydrogeological zones that 
are unfavourable for post-closure safety as well as 
fractures in the bedrock, in which significant dislo-
cations may occur or that may – due to their water 
conductivity or flow characteristics – cause the 
groundwater chemistry to become unfavourable or 
act as rapid flow routes from the deposition holes 
to the surface. For this purpose, Posiva has devel-
oped a rock suitability classification (RSC), which 
is used as the basis for positioning the repository 
during the various stages according to the set cri-
teria, all the way to the selection of the placement 
of a single deposition hole. Posiva must develop 
the rock suitability classification method further 
for the needs of post-closure safety, optimal use 
of space and positioning. More information about 
the rock suitability classification system and the 
related development needs can be found in Section 
7.1 of the safety assessment.
The actual disposal activities are separated 
from the construction of the repository by dividing 
the construction and operation of the repository 
in phases. The excavation and construction work 
progresses ahead of the disposal¬ activities, and in 
a way that maintains a sufficient distance from the 
facilities in which disposal and closure of the tun-
nels is carried out, taking issues such as vibrations 
and explosion pressure caused by the excavation 
into account. Posiva has analysed the distance and 
delivered a report as a part of the construction 
licence application material. The closure of the 
deposition tunnels and eventually also the disposal 
panels progresses in stages. Dividing the construc-
tion, disposal activities and closure of the facilities 
in stages limits the number of facilities that are 
open simultaneously, which on its part reduces the 
disturbances caused by construction.
As other ways of limiting the disturbance 
caused by construction, Posiva aims to limit the 
excavation disturbance zone and to remove the 
disturbance zone at plug structure locations. Water 
leaks in the bedrock facilities cause hydrogeo-
chemical disturbances in the groundwater environ-
ment, e.g. by conducting highly saline groundwater 
from great depths and fresh water from the surface 
towards the bedrock facilities, which in turn may 
alter the groundwater chemistry at the disposal 
depth to be more unfavourable to the engineered 
barriers. Posiva aims to limit these hydrogeochemi-
cal disturbances by sealing water leaks primarily 
by means of rock injections. With the use of vari-
ous construction materials, foreign substances are 
introduced in the repository and the disposal bed-
rock: some of them may alter the conditions of the 
groundwater chemistry more unfavourable to the 
engineered barriers. Requirements regarding the 
placement of bore holes have been set on boring 
carried out from above ground and underground, 
so that the holes will not form rapid flow routes 
from the repository to important geological or hy-
drogeological zones, or directly to the surface.
The above-described factors affecting the per-
formance of the disposal system have been taken 
into account during the construction of Onkalo, 
and procedures have been developed to manage 
them. There is still need for development of excava-
tion planning and the detailed requirements set for 
excavation. Posiva must specify the limit values for 
disturbances that guide the design and construc-
tion before the repository is constructed.
Posiva has needs for the further development 
of rock construction related to the implementation 
in accordance with the design requirements. The 
development needs are related to issues such as 
the new work phases and construction materials 
used in the construction of the repository as well as 
the precision required from the working methods. 
In the excavation of the repository, Posiva must be 
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able to produce rooms compliant with the require-
ments repeatedly, which must be proven during the 
first construction phase of the repository. STUK 
oversees that the necessary construction require-
ments and procedures have been developed to a 
sufficient level before the construction of the re-
pository begins.
As presented in the decision-in-principle, Posiva 
has constructed the Onkalo underground rock 
characterisation facility, which forms a part of the 
planned underground disposal facility. The extent 
of Onkalo covers a part of the connections to the 
surface and technical facilities. The same require-
ments have applied to the design and construction 
of Onkalo as the disposal facility, and STUK has 
overseen Onkalo at the extent needed and using 
procedures that correspond to the construction of 
a nuclear facility. The excavations of Onkalo are 
mainly complete, and Posiva is inspecting Onkalo’s 
data on implementation, which is being used to 
prove that Onkalo’s construction is compliant with 
the requirements.
Conclusion
The underground disposal facility can be con-
structed so that the disturbances caused by con-
struction to the bedrock and groundwater environ-
ment remain controlled. There is still development 
work left in connection with the application of the 
rock suitability classification, which Posiva must 
continue when it introduces the developed method 
in placing the facilities. In addition, Posiva must 
develop the rock construction¬ methods and mate-
rials further in order to prove that it can produce 
bedrock facilities compliant with the requirements.
4.3. Quality management 
during construction
Section 17(1) Construction and commissioning
The holder of a construction licence for the 
nuclear waste facility shall ensure that the facil-
ity will be constructed in compliance with the ap-
proved plans and procedures. Moreover, the licensee 
shall ensure that the plant supplier and subcon-
tractors producing services and products important 
in terms of safety act in an appropriate manner.
Posiva proposes that the nuclear waste facility 
should be constructed so that it fulfils the statu-
tory requirements and the valid requirements by 
authorities. The construction of the facilities is 
monitored continuously during construction. The 
quality of the construction is assured by pre-
planning the activities, oversight and documenting 
the implementation. In addition, instructions are 
provided for the activities. Posiva requires a high 
level of quality and a good safety culture from the 
suppliers participating in the construction. As the 
party carrying out the project, Posiva will draw 
up a separate plan for the management and or-
ganisation of the entire construction project. The 
following presents the procedures and instructions 
developed by Posiva in order to reach the goals 
mentioned above.
For the implementation of the construction pro-
ject, Posiva has established a project with the goal 
of implementing, within the approved schedule, 
the buildings, facilities, equipment and structures 
within the scope of the project and as required by 
disposal, in such a way that they fulfil the require-
ments set for them with regard to both quality and 
safety as well as technical performance character-
istics. For project management, Posiva has drawn 
up a project plan, subproject plans for the encap-
sulation plant and disposal facility, a risk manage-
ment plan, safety plan and resource plan. STUK 
has reviewed these plans.
Posiva has described the quality management 
and assurance of design, equipment manufacture 
and installation as well as construction in a sepa-
rate report in accordance with Section 35(4) of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree. Posiva’s management sys-
tem shall be followed in the quality assurance of 
Posiva’s construction activities. According to the re-
port, the task of quality assurance is to ensure that 
the Finnish acts and decrees as well as the regula-
tions and instructions issued by the authorities are 
followed in construction. In addition, the purpose of 
quality assurance is to ensure that Posiva has set 
quality requirements for its activities and that the 
activity complies with them. Posiva has provided 
instructions for the procedures related to the defini-
tion of the quality requirements and quality assur-
ance requirements for products and functions.
Posiva’s quality management is based on 
Posiva’s management system and its processes and 
instructions. Posiva’s management system is speci-
fied by the detailed procedures followed in the con-
struction of nuclear facilities, such as quality plan-
ning, control and assurance as well as continuous 
improvement, and their organisation is described 
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in the quality plan of the facility project that refers 
to the processes, procedures and instructions used.
According to Posiva, it can utilise a quality 
group that acts as an independent party (QA) 
with regard to the construction implementation 
organisation; the group is tasked with ensuring 
that Posiva’s management system is followed in 
the construction and that the construction is im-
plemented in accordance with the requirements 
and instructions set as well as the plans that have 
been drawn up.
The design, construction and commissioning 
of a nuclear waste facility require systematic re-
quirement management procedures so that it is 
possible to ensure that the facility being commis-
sioned is compliant with the requirements. Posiva 
has provided instructions for the management of 
changes and technical requirements, for which 
Posiva’s development department is responsible. It 
inspects and approves the system-specific require-
ment specifications, in the drawing up of which 
the project participates. The goal is to specify the 
requirements with enough detail that redesign 
required by the maintenance and changes during 
operation of the systems and equipment can be 
carried out throughout the life cycle of the facility.
The implementation plans of Posiva’s nuclear 
facilities are drawn up in the facility project in ac-
cordance with the design process. In the project, the 
implementation of the product from design to com-
missioning is managed by system-specific quality 
plans.
According to Posiva’s proposal, the main goal of 
the guidance of implementation design is to ensure 
that the design is implemented in accordance with 
the instructions and the goals set. In addition to 
ensuring that the implementation design process 
and the design result documentation are compliant 
with the requirements, the key goal of guidance is 
also to ensure implementation in accordance with 
the specified schedules.
Posiva monitors and guides the activities of 
the external design organisations through au-
dits, follow-up meetings and reviews, among other 
things. According to Posiva’s instructions, the key 
goal of technical design reviews is to identify 
problems related to safety, reliability, maintain-
ability, manufacturability, installability, operation 
and maintenance, as well as present proposals for 
solving them. In addition, in the result data design 
review, for example, it is ensured that the design 
results are correct – meaning that the set safety, 
reliability and cost goals are reached. Design guid-
ance includes reviews of initial and result data 
and intermediate reviews as necessary, based on 
issues such as the safety importance of the assign-
ment, particularly demanding issues or interfaces 
between several technological sectors.
Manufacturing and construction 
management
According to Posiva, it can utilise a quality group 
that acts as an independent party (QA) with regard 
to the construction implementation organisation; 
the group is tasked with ensuring that the prod-
uct fulfils the requirements set for it. The group 
inspects that the detailed inspection plans are in 
accordance with the general inspection plans, and 
that the construction, manufacturing and installa-
tion have also been implemented according to plan.
Posiva has described the quality assurance pro-
cedures during the installation phase in the instal-
lation manual. During the phase, the equipment 
and structures are installed, and the installation 
inspections are carried out in accordance with the 
inspection plan. Responsible persons are appointed 
for the installations, also tasked with monitoring 
the progress of the installation in accordance with 
a separate monitoring plan. The quality control 
group verifies that the installation is compliant 
with the requirements. The group's task is also to 
invite STUK or an inspection body to carry out the 
inspections in accordance with the inspection plan.
For commissioning management, Posiva has 
drawn up a separate commissioning plan that 
will be specified during the construction phase. 
According to the plan, Posiva will establish a sepa-
rate commissioning organisation to take care of the 
implementation of the phase.
Monitoring the suppliers
The assessment and monitoring activities carried 
out by Posiva that are focused on the management 
system and quality assurance activities of the de-
sign and operations of equipment manufacture or-
ganisations are invariably also based on auditing.
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Conclusion
Posiva has developed and introduced sufficient pro-
cedures for the guidance and monitoring of the nu-
clear waste facility construction project. In STUK’s 
view, it is possible by following the procedures to 
ensure that the nuclear waste facility and its sys-
tems, components and structures are designed, 
manufactured, constructed, installed and commis-
sioned in accordance with the approved plans and 
procedures.
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5 Commissioning and operation
Commissioning the nuclear waste facility
Section 17(2) Commissioning and operation
In connection with the commissioning of a nu-
clear waste facility, the licensee shall ensure that 
the systems, structures and components and the 
facility as a whole operate in the planned manner. 
The licensee shall also ensure that an expedient or-
ganisation is in place for the future operation of the 
facility, alongside a sufficient number of qualified 
personnel and instructions suitable for the purpose.
Posiva states that it will ensure the usability 
and the safe operation of the nuclear waste facil-
ity with skilful design, construction and commis-
sioning of high quality According to Posiva, it can 
utilise, in addition to that of its own personnel, 
the expertise of the personnel of its owners, TVO 
and Fortum, as well as its Finnish and foreign 
partners. The organisations that own Posiva have 
experience in the construction projects of several 
nuclear facilities. In addition to its owners, Posiva 
uses other external expertise in e.g. research, de-
sign and work related to the safety analyses.
In the design of the facility, drawing up the 
safety analyses and assessing the design and 
safety, Posiva utilises the experience of its owners 
in the design and use of facilities as well as their 
maintenance, in addition to the competence of its 
own personnel. In particular, Posiva orders exper-
tise in nuclear waste management from Fortum.
The starting point of Posiva’s long-term person-
nel plan has been to ensure that it has sufficient 
expertise available in the construction project. 
According to the plan, Posiva has strengthened the 
competence required during the design and con-
struction phase by recruiting people with previous 
experience in the field of nuclear energy during the 
last few years. Posiva has estimated that its own 
personnel resources are sufficient to manage the 
facility's design basis and safety requirements and 
to ensure that the nuclear facility conforms to the 
requirements.
The conformity of the facility to the require-
ments and its safe use must be proven at the test-
run phase. For the commissioning of the compo-
nents, structures, systems and the facility, Posiva 
has drawn up a commissioning plan, which de-
scribes the planned trial run procedures for dem-
onstrating that the facility, its systems, structures 
and components function in accordance with the 
requirements and operate safely. According to the 
plan, it is verified during the commissioning that 
the instructions drawn up for the operation of the 
facility are correct and sufficient.
Posiva’s commissioning organisation is planned 
to be formed as based on the project and line or-
ganisations responsible for constructing Posiva’s 
nuclear waste facility. Similarly, Posiva has speci-
fied the starting points on which the design of the 
future operating organisation and the total num-
ber of its personnel is based. Posiva’s principle is 
that the operational functions important for safety 
at the encapsulation plant and disposal facility 
are carried out by Posiva’s own organisation. In 
certain operation and maintenance tasks as well 
as radiation monitoring and laboratory services, 
among other things, Posiva may rely on TVO's per-
sonnel trained for these tasks; however, the overall 
responsibility remains with Posiva.
Posiva has estimated that the personnel re-
sources of the operating department are 30–40 
persons, and their theoretical training will begin 
well in advance before the test run begins, in ac-
cordance with the training programme. The train-
ing programme includes the personnel of the oper-
ating department participating in the test run of 
the facility, its systems and equipment. For Posiva, 
the goal of the training and the induction is that 
the personnel taking care of the operating tasks of 
the nuclear waste facility are sufficiently qualified 
to ensure the safe operation of the nuclear facility 
when the operating phase begins.
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Conclusion
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) has assessed the competence of Posiva’s 
personnel and the external expertise available to 
Posiva in connection with processing the construc-
tion licence application, as well as based on the 
document reviews and a separate inspection pro-
gramme. As a result of the assessments and re-
views, STUK states that Posiva has sufficient and 
extensive expertise available for constructing a nu-
clear waste facility and that, as an organisation, it 
has the capability to start the construction phase 
of a nuclear waste facility.
Posiva has drawn up sufficient plans with which 
it can ensure that the nuclear facility, its systems 
and equipment operate safely and in compliance 
with the requirements, through test runs carried 
out during the commissioning phase as well as 
comprehensive, validated instructions for opera-
tion. Posiva’s plans also include arranging training 
at the correct time for the operating organisation 
for the structure and number of personnel, with re-
gard to which Posiva has made preliminary plans.
Preparing for operation
Section 18 Operation
The operation of a nuclear waste facility shall 
be based on written instructions that correspond 
to the current structure and state of the facility. 
Instructions shall be made available for the iden-
tification and control of operational occurrences 
and accidents. Significant events influencing safety 
shall be documented so as to facilitate their later 
analysis.
The Operational Limits and Conditions of a 
nuclear waste facility shall include the technical 
and administrative requirements for ensuring the 
operation of the facility in compliance with design 
bases. The licensee shall operate the facility in com-
pliance with these requirements and restrictions, 
and supervise compliance and report any devia-
tions from them.
The nuclear waste facility shall have a condition 
monitoring and maintenance programme for ensur-
ing the integrity and reliable operation of systems, 
structures and components. Written orders and ap-
pended instructions shall be issued for the service 
and repair of components.
Compliance with requirements concerning the 
operational radiation safety of the nuclear waste 
facility shall be ensured through continuous or pe-
riodic measurements inside the facility, in possible 
significant release routes and in the environs of the 
facility.
The operating instructions related to the opera-
tional activities of the nuclear waste facility and 
instructions for the identification and management 
of operational occurrences and accidents, as well 
as the Operational Limits and Conditions (OLC), 
are to be drawn up before the operating licence 
application is submitted. Similarly, the condition 
monitoring and maintenance programme for the 
nuclear waste facility must be drawn up before the 
operating licence application is submitted. Posiva 
has an existing condition monitoring and main-
tenance programme for the facilities and systems 
implemented as part of Onkalo.
In order to ensure radiation safety, radiation 
measurements have been designed for the facility 
in significant release routes. Posiva’s own measur-
ing devices will be placed in the surroundings of 
the facility, but Posiva will also utilise TVO's exist-
ing radiation measurement network in the facility 
environment.
Conclusion
Posiva has preliminary plans for preparations for 
activity during operation. The fulfilment of the re-
quirements on operational activities will be assessed 
during the processing of the operating licence.
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6 Decommissioning and closure
According to Section 7 g of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the design of a nuclear facility shall provide 
for the facility's decommissioning. […] When the 
operation of a nuclear facility has been terminated, 
the facility shall be decommissioned in accordance 
with a plan approved by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK). Dismantling the facility 
and other measures taken for the decommissioning 
of the facility may not be postponed without due 
cause.
Section 12(3) Disposal site
The layout, excavation, construction and closure 
of underground facilities shall be implemented so 
that the characteristics of the host rock deemed im-
portant in terms of long-term safety are retained, as 
far as possible.
With regard to a nuclear waste facility, decom-
missioning refers to dismantling the sections above 
ground so that no special actions are needed in the 
facility area due to radioactive substances originat-
ing from the facility. In this case, closure refers to 
closing off the rooms of the disposal facility in a 
manner intended to be permanent. The closure of 
the deposition tunnels in stages has been covered 
as a part of the engineered barriers in Section 7.2. 
The decommissioning and closure of facilities that 
have been carried out in an approved manner and 
in compliance with the requirements are a prereq-
uisite for the expiry of waste management obliga-
tion in accordance with Section 32 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act. Posiva has covered the closure and de-
commissioning in the preliminary safety analysis 
report delivered as part of the construction licence 
application material.
Posiva has chosen immediate decommission-
ing as the decommissioning strategy. After the 
spent fuel disposal activities come to an end, the 
decommissioning of the encapsulation plant will 
begin with a year-long preparation phase, after 
which the components exceeding the levels for the 
concentration of radioactive substances will be 
dismantled and packed for disposal. The levels for 
radioactive substances and the detailed require-
ments for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
have been presented in STUK’s YVL Guides.
There are only a few rooms and systems that 
will be significantly contaminated as a result of 
the normal operation of the encapsulation plant. 
In the preliminary safety analysis report, Posiva 
has briefly presented the techniques used for dis-
mantling, an estimate on the amount of waste gen-
erated during decommissioning, and an estimate 
on the radiation doses caused to the personnel. 
The encapsulation plant will be decommissioned 
and the decommissioning waste will be disposed 
of in accordance with the plan proposed by Posiva 
within three years of the end of the operation. The 
operation of the encapsulation plant is planned to 
continue until the 2100s, which means that Posiva 
has time to develop detailed plans for decommis-
sioning, based on the operating experiences. A de-
tailed decommissioning plan must be submitted in 
connection with the operating licence application 
for the nuclear waste facility. The decommission-
ing plan for the nuclear facility must be updated 
every six years in accordance with Section 28 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, unless otherwise provided 
in the facility's licence conditions.
In the preliminary safety analysis report deliv-
ered as part of the construction licence application 
material as well as the safety case, Posiva has pre-
sented the principles of closing down the disposal 
facility and a preliminary plan on the structures 
and materials to be used for the closure. At this 
stage, the plan is sufficient for presenting a pos-
sible closure solution and the assumptions related 
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to proving post-closure safety. The starting point of 
Posiva’s design has been to ensure that the favour-
able conditions of the bedrock remain, by restoring 
the excavated spaces so that they match the state 
before the bedrock facilities were constructed as 
closely as possible. The closure of the central tun-
nels of the disposal facility will begin after decades, 
and the closure of the other facilities will only 
begin at the end of the operating phase – which 
means that Posiva has time to develop detailed 
plans for closure, based on the experiences from 
disposal.
Conclusion
Posiva has submitted a sufficient description of 
the decommissioning of the encapsulation plant 
for the construction licence and has taken decom-
missioning into account in the facility's design re-
quirements. In the construction licence application 
material, Posiva has presented the principles of 
closure in a way that is sufficient for the construc-
tion licence and has planned the closure to be im-
plemented in such a way that the bedrock main-
tains the characteristics important to post-closure 
safety as effectively as possible.
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7 Post-closure safety
Section 16: Presentation of, and updates to, the safe-
ty case
The safety case shall be presented in connection 
with the construction licence application and the 
operating licence application of the nuclear waste 
facility. The safety case shall be updated at 15 year 
intervals unless otherwise provided in the licence 
conditions. Furthermore, the safety case shall be up-
dated prior to the permanent closure of the facility.
Detailed requirements pertaining to the con-
tents of the safety case are presented in Guide 
YVL D.5. The requirements cover the specification 
of the safety functions of the barriers and setting 
the goals for their performance targets, construct-
ing the scenarios, models and data needed for the 
calculations assessing the release and migration 
of radionuclides, the assessment of uncertainties 
as well as the complementary considerations. The 
guide also covers the principles followed in creat-
ing the safety case, its documentation and quality 
management.
In connection with the construction licence ap-
plication, Posiva has submitted the safety case of 
the nuclear waste facility to STUK. The safety case 
describes the disposal concept, the disposal system 
and the barriers. Justification for the safety of the 
disposal concept is provided by the safety func-
tions, for which performance targets are specified. 
The safety functions are covered more extensively 
in Section 2.2 of the safety assessment, the perfor-
mance targets are covered in Section 7.3, and the 
performance of the barriers is covered in Sections 
7.1 and 7.2.
The construction of scenarios (evolution 
schemes describing the potential future behaviour 
of the disposal system) used in providing justifica-
tion for post-closure safety, scenario analysis, is 
covered in more detail in Section 7.3 of the safety 
assessment. The safety case has taken account of 
the amounts of radioactive substances released 
from the disposed spent nuclear fuel into the liv-
ing environment through the barriers, as well as 
the resulting radiation doses. This is covered in 
more detail in Section 7.3 of the safety assessment, 
which also discusses how the results of Posiva’s 
analyses comply with the safety requirements.
Section 7.4 of the safety assessment covers the 
description of the performance of the disposal sys-
tem and the conditions of the disposal site with the 
help of both conceptual and mathematical models, 
as well as determining the required data.
The method of managing uncertainties is as-
sessed in Section 7.4 of the safety assessment.
In the report on the fulfilment of the require-
ments laid down in Government Decree 736/2008 
submitted to STUK by Posiva, it has been stated in 
accordance with the requirements that the safety 
case will be updated in connection with the operat-
ing licence application as well as before the facility 
is finally closed. Posiva states that it will submit 
the safety case to the authorities in connection 
with the construction and operating licence ap-
plications.
Conclusion
In a separate decision, STUK has found Posiva’s 
safety case to be in compliance with the require-
ments and sufficient at the construction licence 
stage. Posiva will update the safety case in connec-
tion with the operating licence application and at 
intervals in accordance with the valid regulations, 
as well as before the facility is finally closed. Based 
on this, the requirement of the Government Decree 
is fulfilled.
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7.1. Natural barrier
Sections 12(1) and 12(2): Disposal site
The geological characteristics of the disposal site 
shall, as a whole, be favourable to the isolation of 
the radioactive substances from the environment. 
Any area with a feature that is substantially ad-
verse to post-closure safety shall not be selected as 
the disposal site.
The planned final disposal site shall contain 
sufficiently large, intact rock volumes that facilitate 
the construction of the waste emplacement rooms. 
For the purposes of disposal facility design and 
acquiring data required for safety assessments, the 
geological characteristics of the host rock at the site 
shall be characterized through investigations at 
the intended disposal depth, in addition to surface-
based investigations.
Characteristics and performance 
of the natural barrier
Compared to the Finnish bedrock in general, 
Olkiluoto has been studied extensively. The char-
acterisation work carried out to start the construc-
tion of the disposal site is sufficient. The charac-
terisation work must continue as the construction 
progresses into the less studied sections of the dis-
posal site. Posiva’s description of the disposal site 
is based on the results of several research fields 
and methods, and there is still room for develop-
ment in combining the information gained from 
them into an overall view. Combining the results 
from various fields of research and model descrip-
tions must be continued and deepened in order to 
improve the reliability of the safety case.
A key part of the disposal site's performance 
analysis is estimating the effects of the future 
climate evolution on the disposal system. An im-
portant and justified starting point of the safety 
case is the information from the Weichselian gla-
ciation and interpretations from the glaciation 
phases that preceded it. The description of climate 
evolution based on various observations and model 
calculations is sufficient at the construction licence 
stage, but it must be developed further no later 
than the submission period of the operating licence 
application by studying the effects of various op-
tions of climate evolution on the disposal system 
in a wider extent than what has been presented 
in the construction licence application material. 
The performance analyses can be further improved 
by describing how the disposal system as a whole 
responds to various mechanical, hydrostatic and 
chemical loads as well as dynamic conditions.
The performance analysis of Posiva’s disposal 
site does not include the low- and intermediate-
level waste repository to be constructed on the 
side of Onkalo’s access tunnel. The repositories for 
spent fuel as well as for low- and intermediate-lev-
el waste must be handled as a single entity in the 
performance analysis. The repositories of low- and 
intermediate-level waste and spent fuel can affect 
each other, for example via chemical changes in the 
groundwater or a thermal change caused by the 
spent fuel. The interactions between the reposito-
ries of low- and intermediate-level waste and spent 
fuel must be taken into account in the performance 
assessment of the disposal site before the construc-
tion of the disposal rooms of low- and intermediate-
level waste can be started.
Suitability of the disposal site
A key section of the disposal site description in 
the safety case focuses on interpretations related 
to the suitability and performance of the site as 
based on performance assessment. In addition to 
the properties and evolution of the site Posiva has 
specified post-closure safety requirements and de-
tailed design criteria related to the bedrock, de-
rived from the safety functions of the barriers.
Posiva has accumulated practical experience 
related to the stability of the bedrock in Olkiluoto 
during the excavation of the underground rock 
characterisation facilities. Based on that experi-
ence, it considers the bedrock to be sufficiently 
stable round the deposition tunnel and deposition 
holes. The understanding and measurements of 
the baseline stress of the bedrock are sufficient at 
the construction licence stage; however, Posiva will 
have to reduce specific uncertainties and deficien-
cies related to them before the construction of the 
disposal facilities can be started. Moreover, further 
investigations are required related to the impact 
of the heterogeneity of the bedrock to the stability 
of the bedrock and concerning the rock mechanical 
properties of the fracture zones on various scales.
Posiva explains the minor seismic activity in 
the bedrock in the Fennoscandian Shield with 
historical data and measurements. The materials 
support the assumption that the area will remain 
seismically stable in the future and that the risk 
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of a major earthquake in the area of the disposal 
facility, leading to broken disposal canisters, is 
very low. The seismic investigations conducted by 
Posiva are sufficient at the construction licence 
stage, but will need to be extended in order to im-
prove the reliability of the safety case. The amount 
of collected data needs to be extended during the 
construction and operation of the facility, since 
the safety of the disposal will be evaluated over 
time-spans that clearly exceed the data coverage 
presented. Seismic risks need to be further investi-
gated by taking account of the bedrock structures 
and their properties in Olkiluoto more diversely, as 
well as by assessing further magnitudes and fre-
quencies of earthquakes under various geological 
circumstances. The seismic threat associated with 
the disposal system must be examined more ex-
tensively by conducting probabilistic consequence 
analyses which more extensively cover the mecha-
nisms related to the occurrence and progress of 
earthquakes in addition to the spreading of faults 
into adjacent fracture structures. Posiva general-
ises large and small fracture zones into individual 
shape surfaces. Posiva must also examine model-
ling methods which characterise bedrock fractures 
in a more heterogeneous manner. Changing the an-
gle of examination may affect, for example, the in-
terpretation of earthquake magnitudes, fractured 
zone respect distances, and assumptions of the 
critical fracture sizes. Moreover, Posiva must more 
specifically analyse the impact of temperature 
rise on bedrock stability during the operation and 
thermal period following the closure of the disposal 
facility.
Posiva justifies the low groundwater flow round 
the disposal facility with the water tightness of 
the sparsely fractured rock in Olkiluoto, and with 
a rock classification system. Posiva claims that 
its classification system is suitable for selecting 
water tight sections of rock for disposal. While the 
justifications on the sufficient water tightness of 
the rock and low groundwater flow are sufficient, 
Posiva must prepare a clear summary of the rock 
groundwater flow model as background informa-
tion for the safety assessment to be presented in 
the operating licence application. The reliability of 
measurement techniques must be ascertained due 
to uncertainties with regard to the measurements 
related to the characterisation of the hydraulic 
properties of the bedrock at the disposal site and 
disturbances caused by excavations. The various 
research and implementation stages of the dis-
posal facilities must be designed to systematically 
ensure that the deposition tunnel complies with 
the set requirements at the excavation stage and 
when completed.
The reliability of the fracture network model-
ling concept must be ascertained during construc-
tion by comparing the hydrogeological modelling 
results of the disposal facilities with measurement 
data from actual tunnels. Alternative modelling 
options are available for describing water-bearing 
fractures in bedrock. The options describe rock 
heterogeneity in varying ways and should be taken 
into account at least in order to ascertain the suf-
ficiency of the modelling method chosen by Posiva. 
Differing modelling methods may lead to predic-
tions of disposal facilities which are drier than 
what is currently assumed, for example, as well as 
individual water flow channels that allow substan-
tial flows.
Posiva’s safety case provides plausible grounds 
for favourable groundwater chemistry in the bed-
rock at the disposal depth. The hydrochemical 
characterisation and the interpretation of the 
paleohydrogeochemical evolution of the Olkiluoto 
baseline represent some of the most solid grounds 
Posiva has provided for the stability of the rock sur-
rounding the disposal facilities. The Posiva safety 
case includes an assessment of salinity develop-
ments over the next 50,000 years. Such evolutions 
seem overly pessimistic concerning groundwater 
dilution in the rock adjacent to the disposal facili-
ties, because they do not account for the water-rock 
interactions occurring during meteoric water in-
filtration. Posiva must further elaborate on and 
comprehensively improve the hydrogeochemical 
evolution description. Also, a more detailed under-
standing is required of recovery after disturbances 
caused by construction once the various sections of 
the facility have been closed. An important aspect 
related to the stability of groundwater chemistry is 
investigating the reasons for the chemical incon-
sistency between porewater in the bedrock matrix 
and groundwater in the fracture zones of rock.
According to Posiva’s understanding, the natu-
ral resources in Olkiluoto will not prove particu-
larly interesting in the future, and the grounds 
provided by Posiva are sufficient for obtaining a 
construction licence. The data given in the operat-
50
STUK-B 196 STUK’S SafeTy aSSeSSmenT of PoSiva’S conSTrUcTion licence aPPlicaTion
ing licence application materials concerning natu-
ral resources require further clarification as well 
as updates as more geological information on the 
area becomes available.
Already in the early stages of developing the 
KBS-3 concept, Posiva has proposed rock require-
ments starting from preserving the performance of 
the engineered barriers. The performance assess-
ment conducted by Posiva shows that according to 
expected lines of evolutions, the favourable proper-
ties of the rock surrounding the disposal facilities 
will continue to evolve in a stable and predictable 
manner, and the requirements imposed by Posiva 
on the bedrock are very likely to be fulfilled by a 
large margin.
The disposal facilities must be constructed with 
the objective of preserving those bedrock proper-
ties which favour post-closure safety. Posiva de-
scribes the objective on a general level within 
the context of the disposal facility safety concept. 
Posiva has set design requirements for the bedrock 
surrounding the repository, but long-term targets 
are not set regarding the safety functions and per-
formance targets for the preservation of favourable 
properties of bedrock. Before the construction of 
the disposal facility can be started, Posiva must 
assess the favourable properties for the bedrock 
surrounding the disposal facility and justify the 
design requirements with them.
Positioning of the disposal facilities
Posiva uses a rock classification system to select 
suitable rock sections and to ensure the sufficient 
quality of the rock surrounding the disposal facili-
ties. The system includes criteria and the confirma-
tion of them on the scale of the disposal facility, 
panel area, deposition tunnel and deposition hole. 
The verification and approval of compliance with 
requirements will occur in phases. Posiva has pre-
pared the instructions for the classification system 
that it intends to employ in launching the suit-
ability assessment of the first deposition tunnels 
and deposition holes. It is very important that the 
reliability of the rock classification system is as-
sessed during and after the first disposal facility 
construction phase, and that the continued devel-
opment of the system accounts for user experienc-
es. Classification criteria in the various construc-
tion phases and the prediction-outcome method, 
for example, require further development. Posiva 
must finalise the assessment process procedures 
and provide more specific rock classification devel-
opment plans before the construction work can be 
started. The rock classification system will be fully 
assessed again in connection with processing the 
operating licence application.
The current classification particularly high-
lights the mechanical stability of the rock section 
to be selected for disposal and low groundwater 
flow in spite of construction. So far, Posiva’s clas-
sification does not include requirements for all rock 
properties, which may be relevant for post-closure 
safety. Posiva must submit a clearer description 
of the connection between the rock classification 
criteria and the projected long-term target values 
with respect to the rock surrounding the disposal 
facilities. The operating licence application mate-
rials must include more specific grounds for de-
termining the respect distances of the structures 
delimiting the disposal facility layout and for de-
termining extensive individual fractures.
Conclusion
The investigations, performance assessment and 
conclusions regarding the suitability of the bed-
rock in Olkiluoto as a disposal site as provided in 
the construction licence application are sufficient 
for obtaining a construction licence. The require-
ments Posiva has set regarding the bedrock are 
very likely to be fulfilled by a large margin. Posiva 
has developed a rock classification system which 
it intends to further improve for the purpose of 
selecting intact rock volumes suitable for disposal 
and favourable in terms of post-closure safety.
7.2. Engineered barriers
Section 6: Handling of spent nuclear fuel and other 
nuclear waste, subsection 1
Spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste 
shall be conditioned and packed in accordance 
with disposal specifications. Waste packages shall 
be classified on the basis of their characteristics. 
Constraints and other quality specifications shall 
be defined for each class, necessary in terms of the 
operational safety of the nuclear waste facility and 
the post-closure safety of disposal, and which the 
waste packages are required to meet.
Section 9: Disposal operations, subsection 2
The disposal package containing spent nuclear 
fuel shall be designed so that no self-sustaining 
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chain reaction of fissions can occur, even under the 
disposal conditions.
Packaging of low- and 
intermediate-level waste
The facilities of Posiva generate radioactive op-
erational waste. Such operational waste is liquid or 
solid radioactive waste generated by encapsulation 
facility operations. Radioactivity of the waste aris-
es from the fission, corrosion or activation products 
of spent fuel.
The waste is classified into three types: waste 
dried in a barrel; dry, solid waste packaged in a bar-
rel, and scrap metal. Liquid waste is solidified into 
200-litre steel barrels, either by drying or by solidi-
fying using clay-based substances. The disposable 
waste is packaged into 200-litre barrels based on 
the level of radioactivity. The long storage period of 
the waste at the disposal facility before the facility 
is closed must be taken into account when select-
ing the waste packaging material and ensuring the 
accessibility of the waste containers, so that their 
condition can be monitored at the disposal facility.
In accordance with Section 11 of Government 
Decree 736/2008, the safety functions of engi-
neered barriers protecting short-lived waste shall 
prevent releases of disposed radioactive materials 
into the bedrock for a period of at least several 
hundreds of years.
The low- and intermediate-level waste disposal 
facility proposed by Posiva corresponds to the 
low- and intermediate-level waste disposal solu-
tion used by Finnish nuclear power plants. Based 
on user experiences, the proposed solution can be 
implemented in accordance with the requirements.
Disposal canister and engineered barriers
Spent nuclear fuel is encapsulated in the disposal 
canister. The gas- and watertight disposal canis-
ter has a copper overpack and a cast iron insert. 
Other engineered barriers include a buffer made of 
bentonite clay protecting the canister, a deposition 
tunnel backfill made of clay-based materials, and 
a concrete plug to seal the tunnel. More informa-
tion on closing the disposal facility is provided in 
Chapter 6 of this safety assessment. Posiva has 
specified safety functions for the engineered bar-
riers. Information on their conformity with the 
multibarrier principle is provided in Chapter 2.2 of 
this safety assessment.
Comprehensive, principle-level information on 
design criteria and principles related to post-
closure safety has been issued in the preliminary 
safety analysis report and safety case submit-
ted in connection with the construction licence 
application. Technical design requirements have 
been set for the engineered barriers. According 
to Posiva, the requirements are derived from the 
performance targets specified for the safety func-
tions. The design basis and requirements take into 
account the selected evolutions and related future 
conditions impacting the disposal system. The safe-
ty case assesses the performance of the engineered 
barriers after the closure of the disposal facility.
The connection between the safety functions, 
performance targets and design requirements of 
the engineered barriers must be clarified before 
submitting the operating licence application, so 
as to facilitate the assessment of the performance 
analysis. There remain deficiencies in demonstrat-
ing the performance of the engineered barriers 
and in the description of the development of the 
barriers during future evolutions. These need to be 
investigated and developed before submitting the 
operating licence application. Such development 
needs are related to, for example, the corrosion re-
sistance and mechanical durability of the copper in 
the disposal canister, the stability of the buffer and 
the tunnel backfill, the connection between swell-
ing pressure, swelling capacity and design require-
ments, the homogenisation of the backfill and leak-
age water management, and more comprehensive 
modelling calculations concerning the interaction 
of the barriers.
One of the design requirements for the disposal 
canister is that the spent fuel must remain sub-
critical and that all residual heat must exit the 
fuel. These design requirements have been taken 
into account in the dimensioning of the canister 
structures. Moreover, the long-term performance 
of the canister imposes constraints with regard to 
the quantity of humidity contained in the fuel rods. 
The fuel rods must be dried before encapsulation 
in order to remove excess humidity. The drying will 
be performed at the drying station in the encapsu-
lation facility’s fuel handling cell before the fuel is 
placed into the disposal canister. The other charac-
teristics of the fuel which will be placed inside the 
canister are determined according to the operation 
history of the fuel. A more detailed description of 
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the properties of the fuel is available in section 3.4 
of this safety assessment.
Enrichment, burn-up, operation history and 
cooling periods affect fuel reactivity. Posiva applies 
burn-up credit in analysing the criticality safety 
of the disposal canisters. In burn-up credit, the 
burn-up of the nuclear fuel constitutes a mitigating 
factor in criticality safety analyses. Loading curves 
are prepared as based on the criticality safety 
analyses. The curves show the average minimum 
burn-up of the required fuel element in relation 
to the enrichment of the fuel element. Loading 
curves are prepared as based on the assumption 
that the disposal canister is filled with similar fuel 
elements. Posiva primarily uses loading curves to 
ensure criticality safety. The majority of the fuel 
elements fulfil the requirements of the loading 
curves. Separate criticality safety analyses and 
loading designs can be prepared for the elements 
which do not fulfil the requirements.
Based on the criticality analyses submitted by 
Posiva, the criticality of the disposal canister can-
not be completely ruled out over the long term. 
In this respect, however, the analyses contain ex-
tremely conservative assumptions regarding the 
long-term evolution of disposal canister geometry, 
indicating that the recriticality of the disposed fuel 
is highly unlikely.
Posiva has supplemented the construction li-
cence application with a disposal concept develop-
ment programme containing research and devel-
opment plans. The disposal concept development 
programme mainly takes account of the deficien-
cies detected by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK). Posiva shall clearly pre-
sent the connection between performance develop-
ment needs and barrier safety functions.
The feasibility of the engineered barriers
The preliminary safety analysis report includes a 
description of the technical feasibility of the engi-
neered barriers intended for the disposal of spent 
fuel (materials, manufacturing, inspection, instal-
lation). Posiva has specified preliminary quality 
requirements for the various components of the 
disposal canister and for the weld joint as well as 
the requirements for the properties of the canis-
ter materials. Operational safety and post-closure 
safety have been taken into account in preparing 
the requirements. The post-closure safety of the 
disposal canister is based on the chemical resist-
ance of the copper overpack and the mechanical 
durability of the cast iron insert. Before the dis-
posal, the canister filled with spent nuclear fuel 
serves as partial radiation protection, and its task 
is to contain the radioactive substances.
Posiva has developed manufacturing methods 
for the disposal canister and has manufactured 
disposal canister components that fulfil the pre-
liminary quality requirements. Suppliers selected 
by Posiva are responsible for the manufacturing 
and assembly of the disposal canister components. 
After the spent fuel has been installed, the disposal 
canister is sealed in the encapsulation facility us-
ing friction stir welding.
In order to validate compliance with require-
ments, the manufacture and sealing of the disposal 
canister are monitored during the various process 
stages, using phase-specific inspections. Posiva has 
developed several non-destructive testing meth-
ods for the purpose of inspecting the quality of 
the disposal canister and its conformity with the 
requirements. Only canisters which fulfil the re-
quirements are transported to the disposal facility. 
Posiva has proposed launching the qualification of 
the manufacturing procedures for disposal canister 
structures in 2015. The development of the inspec-
tion methods for verifying the conformity with 
requirements of the disposal canister components 
has almost advanced to the qualification stage.
Posiva has also developed manufacturing and 
emplacement procedures for other engineered bar-
riers. Posiva and SKB have used bentonite and 
clay-based materials to manufacture buffer and 
backfill blocks. However, Posiva has not yet manu-
factured full-scale buffer blocks using its current 
reference method (isostatic pressing). Based on 
testing, Posiva has the technical readiness to man-
ufacture buffer and backfill blocks.
In order to inspect the quality and compli-
ance with requirements of the clay blocks, Posiva 
has presented the description of the inspection 
procedures in the preliminary safety analysis re-
port. The quality assurance procedure described 
by Posiva covers the entire production chain from 
material acquisition to the verification of the con-
formity of installation with requirements. Posiva 
has proposed quality control methods, particularly 
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with regard to method development needs in the 
testing of clay-materials, in a disposal concept de-
velopment programme submitted to STUK.
In the development of engineered barrier manu-
facturing procedures, Posiva has made the most 
progress with the disposal canister after having 
produced disposal canister components which fulfil 
the requirements. However, the processes of vali-
dating and inspecting the disposal canister and, in 
particular, the other engineered barriers still need 
to be developed. Posiva has prepared a disposal 
concept development programme, including plans 
regarding development targets in the manufactur-
ing of engineered barriers, ascertaining conformity 
with requirements, and inspection work.
Posiva has prepared prototypes of the canister 
transfer and emplacement vehicle and buffer in-
stallation machine in order to be able to test the 
installation/emplacement of the engineered barri-
ers. In 2014, Posiva started testing emplacement 
vehicles in an aboveground test hall in the Onkalo 
area. The prototype of the backfill emplacement 
machine is being produced, and according to cur-
rent plans testing will begin in early 2015. The 
production test of the plug sealing the deposition 
tunnel was launched in the Onkalo demonstration 
facilities in 2014. In the disposal concept develop-
ment programme, Posiva covers the objectives 
and schedules of the demonstrations related to 
the feasibility of the canister, the buffer and the 
backfill. Posiva’s first full-scale concept feasibility 
demonstration has been scheduled to correspond 
with the construction of the facilities, starting in 
2016 at the earliest, according to current plans. 
The objective of the installation tests is to demon-
strate that the components of the disposal system 
can be installed/emplaced in accordance with the 
set accuracy requirements.
Conclusion
The requirements of the Government Decree con-
cerning the design and the demonstration of long-
term performance of the nuclear waste packag-
es have been fulfilled at the construction licence 
stage. However, the design, feasibility and long-
term performance of the engineered barriers in-
volve development issues with regard to which 
Posiva has submitted a plan to STUK. STUK will 
inspect detailed conformity with safety require-
ments of the issues specified above in a timely 
fashion in relation to the implementation of the 
nuclear waste facility.
Posiva has described spent nuclear fuel han-
dling and packaging methods and has set the 
preliminary requirements for the waste packages. 
Posiva has performed long-span manufacturing 
procedure development work for engineered bar-
riers. However, development issues related to the 
manufacturing, verification of conformity with the 
requirements and inspection of the disposal can-
ister and, in particular, other engineered barriers, 
have to be solved before the detailed plans concern-
ing the components intended for disposal can be 
processed by the authorities and enter production.
With regard to the installation/emplacement of 
engineered barriers, Posiva has not yet shown that 
the disposal system components can be installed 
in accordance with the requirements. Posiva has 
submitted a plan to STUK concerning further in-
stallation/emplacement testing and a general plan 
for a full-scale test relevant to the entire disposal 
system. Posiva must demonstrate that the system 
components can be installed in accordance with 
requirements before initiating the construction of 
the deposition tunnels.
In the design of the disposal canister, the criti-
cality safety requirements caused by spent fuel 
have been taken into account. The long-term criti-
cality safety of the disposed fuel has been suf-
ficiently demonstrated at the construction licence 
stage using conservative criticality analyses. Prior 
to submitting an operating licence application, 
analysis of the long-term evolution of the geometry 
of the disposal canister must be continued and the 
consequences caused by criticality must also be 
examined.
The connection between the safety functions, 
performance targets and design requirements of 
the engineered barriers must be clarified by the 
time the operating licence application is submit-
ted. There remain deficiencies in demonstrating 
the performance of the engineered barriers and in 
the description of the development of the barriers 
during future evolutions. These need to be investi-
gated and developed before submitting the operat-
ing licence application.
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7.3. Post-closure safety analysis
Section 4: Long-term radiation impacts of disposal
Disposal of nuclear waste shall be planned so 
that radiation impacts arising as a consequence 
of expected evolution scenarios will not exceed the 
constraints given in subsections 2 and 3.
In any assessment period, during which the 
radiation exposure of humans can be assessed with 
sufficient reliability, and which shall extend at a 
minimum over several millennia:
1) the annual dose to the most exposed people 
shall remain below the value of 0.1 mSv; and
2) the average annual doses to other people shall 
remain insignificantly low.
During assessment periods after the period re-
ferred to above in subsection 2, average quanti-
ties of radioactive materials over long time peri-
ods, released into the living environment from the 
disposed nuclear waste, shall remain below the 
maximum values specified separately for each ra-
dionuclide by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK). These constraints shall be speci-
fied so that:
1) at a maximum, radiation impacts caused by 
disposal can be equivalent to those caused by natu-
ral radioactive materials in the Earth’s crust; and
2) on a large scale, the radiation impacts remain 
insignificantly low.
This chapter examines conformity with the 
constraints specified for long-term radiation im-
pacts and the release of radionuclides in the safety 
case prepared by Posiva. The acceptability of the 
biosphere analysis performed by Posiva will be 
checked within the context of examining compli-
ance with dose constraints. The analysis of long-
term radiation impacts covers the release and 
migration to the surface environment of radionu-
clides. More information is given in Section 14. In 
examining radiation impacts within the context of 
this safety assessment, an annual dose refers to 
the sum of the effective dose arising from external 
radiation within the period of one year, and of the 
committed effective dose from the intake of radio-
active substances within the same period of time 
in accordance with Government Decree 736/2008.
Radiation dose constraints
The radiation dose constraints specified in Section 
4 subsection 2 of Government Decree 736/2008 are 
further specified in Guide YVL D.5. In applying 
radiation dose constraints, the changes in the liv-
ing environment that arise from changes in ground 
and sea level must be taken into account. The cli-
mate type as well as human habits, nutritional 
needs and physiology can be assumed to remain 
unchanged. The guide determines the exposure 
pathways and groups of people which need to be 
analysed.
Posiva has analysed the doses from the radio-
nuclides released from the closed disposal facility 
to the most exposed individuals of the population 
and other exposed individuals over the course of 
the first 10,000 years after closure. The period of 
analysis covers a period of several thousands of 
years as required. The analysis accounts for chang-
es that arise from changes in ground and sea level 
in accordance with the regulations.
In accordance with Guide YVL D.5, the base 
scenario in the Posiva biosphere analysis is based 
on the assumption that the climate type and 
human habits, nutritional needs and physiology 
will remain unchanged. In the base scenario, the 
doses fall below the constraints specified in the 
Government Decree by a large margin. In addition 
to the base scenario, Posiva has analysed variant 
scenarios where the evolution is different from 
the base scenario. In the variant scenarios, the lo-
cal population are exposed to larger doses than in 
the base scenario, but the doses still fall below the 
constraints.
Release constraints
Guide YVL D.5 specifies the maximum average 
quantities of radioactive substances released 
into the living environment over long time peri-
ods given in Section 4 subsection 3 of Government 
Decree 736/2008. The nuclide-specific maximum 
constraints shall apply to releases of radioactive 
substances arising from the expected evolution sce-
narios that may migrate to the living environment 
after several thousands of years at the earliest. 
These releases of radioactive substances can be 
averaged over 1,000 years at the most. The sum of 
the ratios between the nuclide-specific releases of 
radioactive substances and the respective permit-
ted maximum values shall be less than one.
In accordance with the expected evolution sce-
narios, Posiva has calculated estimated radioactive 
releases from the disposal facility for the periods 
of time exceeding 10,000 years. The base scenario 
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is based on the assumption that the safety func-
tions specified for the barriers will be realised, 
with the exception of one disposal canister with a 
manufacturing defect. The maximum yields of the 
base and variant scenario analyses fall below the 
constraints by a factor of approximately 10,000. 
In the calculation cases describing the declined 
performance of the safety functions, the released 
doses fall below the constraints by a factor of ap-
proximately 1,000.
Conclusion
Posiva has submitted the annual doses and ra-
dioactive releases calculated according to analyses 
of the expected evolution scenarios and analyses 
describing the declined performance of the safety 
functions. Posiva has compared the results with 
the set dose and release constraints. The results 
fall below the constraints, complying with the re-
quirements of Section 4 of Government Decree 
736/2008.
Unlikely events impairing 
post-closure safety
Section 5: Consideration of unlikely events
The significance of unlikely events impairing post-
closure safety shall be assessed by evaluating the 
reality, probability and possible consequences of 
each event. Whenever possible, the acceptability of 
the expectancies of radiation impacts caused by 
such events shall be evaluated in relation to the an-
nual dose and release rate constraints of radioac-
tive materials, as referred to in section 4.
Guide YVL D.5 further specifies the require-
ments of Section 5. The unlikely events potentially 
impairing post-closure safety induced by natural 
phenomena to be considered shall at least include 
rock movements jeopardising the integrity of dis-
posal canisters. Unlikely events caused by human 
actions to be considered shall at least include the 
boring of a medium-deep water well at the disposal 
site and core drilling or boring hitting a disposed 
waste package. In such a case, it is assumed that 
the existence of the disposed waste is not known 
and that the incident may only occur 200 years 
following the closure of the disposal facility at the 
earliest.
Posiva has examined the following unlikely 
events impairing post-closure safety: rock move-
ments which may damage the disposal canisters, 
drilling hitting a disposal canister and the disposal 
facility, the boring of a medium-deep water well 
at the disposal site, and the rapid corrosion of the 
canister insert.
The impacts of rock movements have been 
examined in the periods 200 years, 40,000 years 
and 155,000 years after the closure of the disposal 
facility. In the first case, the doses have been as-
sessed using a simplified dose coefficient model. 
Radioactive release rates were estimated in the 
latter two cases. In the latter cases, an analysis 
was also conducted based on the assumption that 
the buffer erodes as a result of a rock movement. 
Posiva has supplemented the analysis with a prob-
abilistic analysis, in which the time of rock move-
ment was varied between 200 and 50,000 years.
The maximum annual dose to the most exposed 
individuals of the population arising from a rock 
movement which intersects one of the disposal can-
isters after 200 years from closure is approximate-
ly 3 mSv. In a probabilistic analysis, the expected 
annual dose falls below the constraint of 0.1 mSv. 
In the event of rock movements occurring after 
40,000 and 155,000 years, the release rates will fall 
below the constraints by approximately one order 
of magnitude, using the averaging provision of 
1,000 years permitted in the YVL guide.
Posiva has analysed six calculation cases where 
either both the emplacement rooms and the canis-
ters or one of these is hit by boring or core drilling. 
The analyses are based on the assumption that the 
boring will take place 1,000 years after the em-
placement rooms have been closed. The expected 
dose values have been calculated for the employees 
who can be assumed to be most exposed. The maxi-
mum expected annual dose, resulting from drilling 
hitting a canister, is approximately 3·10-3 mSv. The 
probability value used in the analysis was 10-7.
Posiva has not analysed drilling which may 
take place during a period of time between 200 
and 1,000 years after closure. Other possible con-
sequences, such as from residual radioactive sub-
stances at the boring site or a boring hole that 
remains open, have not been analysed. Posiva 
concludes that drilling may cause the release of 
considerable doses, but that the likelihood of some-
one unknowingly hitting the disposal facility by 
boring is very low. Based on this, Posiva has pro-
vided sufficient boring and core drilling analyses at 
the construction licence stage and there is no call 
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for requiring additional information concerning 
the consequences of earlier boring or other issues 
mentioned above.
Posiva has analysed the boring of a medium-
deep water well at the disposal site. The doses 
are estimated using dose conversion coefficients in 
calculations based on expected evolution scenarios, 
calculation cases which describe the impairment of 
safety functions, and in a calculation case describing 
the rapid corrosion of the canister insert. The maxi-
mum annual dose of approximately 4·10-3 mSv, in 
the last case, will take place approximately 17,000 
years after the disposal facility is closed.
The examination of the accelerated corrosion of 
the canister insert is based on the assumption that 
transport resistance is suddenly lost 15,000 years 
after closure. The consequent releases fall below 
the set constraints by approximately one order of 
magnitude.
Conclusion
Posiva has analysed unlikely events, including 
their probability and the consequent dose and 
radioactive release rates and expectation values. 
Posiva has compared the results with the set dose 
and release rate constraints. The requirements 
specified in Section 5 of the Government Decree 
have been fulfilled.
Safety case
Section 14: Long-term safety
Compliance with the requirements concerning 
long-term radiation safety, and the suitability of the 
disposal method and disposal site, shall be proven 
through a safety case that must analyse both 
expected evolution scenarios and unlikely events 
impairing post-closure safety. The safety case com-
prises a numerical analysis based on experimental 
studies and complementary considerations insofar 
as quantitative analyses are not feasible or involve 
considerable uncertainties.
Values which fall below the radiation exposure 
constraints for the most exposed people, as referred 
to in section 4 above, shall be proven by consider-
ing a community that derives nutrition from the 
immediate surroundings of the disposal site and is 
most exposed to radiation. In addition to impacts 
on people, possible impacts on flora and fauna shall 
be analysed.
The safety case shows that the post-closure 
safety requirements have been sufficiently fulfilled 
for obtaining a construction licence. However, the 
methodologies used – particularly the selection cri-
teria of the analysed evolution scenarios – require 
further development at the operating licence stage. 
Compliance with the dose and radioactive release 
constraints set for post-closure safety is shown us-
ing a computational safety analysis, which involves 
analysing the release and migration of radionu-
clides based on evolution scenarios compromising 
the safety of disposal. The computational safety 
analysis is consistent and has been systematically 
implemented.
STUK has commissioned independent compara-
tive calculations based on the calculation cases 
prepared by Posiva. The comparative calculations 
showed no significant deviations from the results 
presented by Posiva.
The safety analysis prepared by Posiva is based 
on deterministic computation, but has been supple-
mented with a probability-based sensitivity analy-
sis. The sensitivity analysis has been conducted 
using a selected number of computational cases. 
The analysis examines the release and migration 
of radionuclides into the bedrock. Significant safety 
analysis parameters have been identified in the 
sensitivity analysis, and the examination is suf-
ficient at the construction licence stage. In connec-
tion with the operating licence application, more 
comprehensive sensitivity analyses will need to 
be conducted using computational cases based on 
various scenarios and concerning the migration of 
radionuclides into, and within, the biosphere.
More specific requirements concerning the eval-
uation of human exposure as specified in Section 
14 subsection 2 of the Government Decree are giv-
en in Guide YVL D.5. The dose constraint for the 
most exposed individuals, 0.1 mSv per year, stands 
for the average individual dose in a self-sustaining 
family or small village community living in the 
environs of the disposal site, where the highest ra-
diation exposure arises through various pathways. 
In addition, assessment shall address the average 
annual doses to larger groups of people living near 
a large lake or at a coastal site.
The biosphere section of the safety analysis 
prepared by Posiva accounts for the existence of 
a small lake and the boring of a well in calculat-
ing the radiation dose to the most exposed indi-
viduals. In accordance with Guide YVL D.5, the 
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exposure pathways examined in the analysis are 
the use of contaminated water as household and 
irrigation water and for animal watering, as well 
as the nutritional use of contaminated natural 
products originating from terrestrial or aquatic 
environments or agricultural products. In addition 
to the most exposed group of individuals, Posiva 
has analysed potential doses to a more extensive 
group of people. From the assessment perspective, 
the biosphere model has not been documented in a 
fully transparent manner. However, the biosphere 
model developed by Posiva complies with the re-
quirements as a whole.
A systematic construction of scenarios used to 
manage the uncertainties in the evolution of the 
disposal system is one of the elements of the safety 
case. Posiva has constructed the repository system 
base scenario based on the assumption that one or 
a few disposal canisters have an initial manufac-
turing defect and the other barriers perform as ex-
pected, fulfilling the performance targets specified 
for their safety functions. According to Posiva, the 
variant scenarios have been constructed by identi-
fying incidental deviations leading to the release 
of radionuclides. The disturbance scenarios have 
been constructed by accounting for unlikely events 
impairing post-closure safety in accordance with 
Guide YVL D.5.
Posiva has defined scenarios as lines of evolu-
tion that may lead to failure of the canisters con-
taining the spent nuclear fuel and to the releases of 
radionuclides. In the operating licence application, 
Posiva must examine the possibility in evolutions 
deviating from the expected evolution that one 
or several performance targets are not met more 
systematically and comprehensively, and it must 
examine the quality non-conformances in other 
barriers besides the disposal canister more care-
fully. Such an analysis of variant and disturbance 
scenarios requires forming an understanding of 
the possible impairment of the safety functions 
outside the performance-target criteria.
Posiva has specified safety functions and perfor-
mance targets for the barriers. Posiva has defined 
the performance targets by means of a measurable 
or assessable characteristic of the barrier when-
ever possible. However, most performance targets 
lack a criterion defining this characteristic that is 
seen to ensure the performance of a safety func-
tion. Posiva does not clearly establish how it has 
determined the performance targets it has speci-
fied for the safety functions of the barriers.
The barrier performance analysis submitted by 
Posiva does not unequivocally support the speci-
fied performance targets due to the fact that clear 
grounds and criteria, in particular, are missing. 
Owing to this, it has been difficult for STUK to 
assess the sufficiency of the grounds for the per-
formance targets specified for the safety functions. 
Moreover, the connection between the expected per-
formance of the engineered barriers and the design 
of the disposal system remains somewhat unclear.
Posiva has improved the reliability of the safety 
case through complementary considerations, par-
ticularly with regard to the performance anal-
ysis. The complementary considerations include 
grounds that support the post-closure safety analy-
sis and cannot be directly quantitatively assessed, 
but which are relevant to the understanding of 
phenomena and as justification for various solu-
tions. According to Posiva, such considerations 
may include complementary qualitative analyses 
which have not been included elsewhere in Posiva’s 
quantitative safety case material. Complementary 
considerations may improve the reliability of the 
performance analysis and the safety case, but 
are not suitable for the quantitative reduction of 
uncertainties. The complementary considerations 
which improve the reliability of Posiva’s safety case 
can be deemed sufficient at this licence stage.
Protection of other living species
Guide YVL D.5 further specifies the requirements 
related to the possible impacts of the disposal on 
flora and fauna. Disposal of spent fuel shall not 
detrimentally affect species of fauna and flora. This 
shall be demonstrated by assessing the typical ra-
diation exposures of terrestrial and aquatic popu-
lations in the disposal site environment, assuming 
the present kind of living populations. These as-
sessed radiation exposures shall remain clearly 
below the levels which, on the basis of the best 
available scientific knowledge, would cause signifi-
cant detriment to any living population.
The method used by Posiva to assess the im-
pacts on other living species is state-of-the-art and 
adheres to good practices. Posiva has presented 
absorbed dose rates in flora and fauna. The high-
est dose rate in the base computational case is 
2.6·10-7 µGy/h for pike in a fresh water environ-
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ment. The highest dose rate out of all computation-
al cases is 1.3·10-4 µGy/h in ducks in a fresh water 
environment. In the light of current information, 
the estimated dose rates fall below the rates con-
sidered hazardous to healthy animal populations 
by a large margin.
Conclusion
Posiva has submitted a sufficiently comprehensive 
safety case at the construction licence stage. The 
results of the computational safety analysis and 
other data given in the safety case are sufficient to 
show compliance with the requirements.
Posiva’s method of constructing scenarios is 
sufficient at the construction licence stage, but it 
does not demonstrate that scenario analysis has 
systematically prepared for disposal system evolu-
tions significant for the assessment of safety. At 
the point of submitting the operating licence ap-
plication, Posiva’s method of constructing scenarios 
needs to be clearer than it is in the safety case 
included in the construction licence application 
material, to make it easier to assess the coverage 
of scenarios in terms of the possible evolutions of 
the disposal system. At the operating licence stage, 
clearer grounds than the current ones are required 
for the selection of the scenarios in the safety case. 
Posiva’s scenarios must then also show a more 
comprehensive preparedness for quality non-con-
formances in the barriers.
Posiva must combine the effects of low- and 
intermediate-level waste disposal into a scenario 
and safety analysis covering the entire disposal 
system by the operating licence stage.
Before submitting the operating licence applica-
tion, Posiva must define the performance targets 
specified for the safety functions of the barriers 
more clearly than in the construction licence appli-
cation. Each performance target must then be com-
plete with a criterion describing a measurable or 
assessable characteristic of a barrier which, when 
met, ensures the performance of a safety function.
7.4. Reliability of the safety case
Section 15: Reliability of the safety case
The input data and models utilised in the safety 
case shall be based on high-quality research data 
and expert judgement. Data and models shall be 
validated as far as possible, and correspond to the 
conditions likely to prevail at the disposal site dur-
ing the assessment period.
The basis for selecting the computational meth-
ods used shall be that the actual radiation exposure 
and quantities of radioactive materials released 
remain below the results of safety analyses, with a 
high degree of certainty. The uncertainties involved 
in the safety analysis, and their significance, shall 
be separately assessed.
The requirements of Section 15 of the 
Government Decree are further specified in an 
appendix to Guide YVL D.5 concerning the usable 
methods. The instructions also require that the 
safety case include an assessment of how reliably 
the safety requirements are fulfilled and of the 
most significant uncertainties affecting reliability.
The safety case and preliminary safety analysis 
report included in Posiva’s construction licence ap-
plication material examine post-closure safety. The 
key reports for determining the reliability of the 
safety case are the safety case synthesis, models 
and data, assessment of radionuclide releases, and 
performance assessment.
Posiva’s analyses and data are largely of suffi-
ciently high scientific quality and conservativeness 
at the construction licence stage.
In the safety case, Posiva has presented the 
safety functions and the open safety significant 
issues and the uncertainties involved. Posiva justi-
fies the safety of the disposal based on safety func-
tions.
Conceptual models are used to describe the 
safety functions and the factors affecting them. 
They serve a key role in forming an understand-
ing of the declined performance of the safety func-
tions and the scope of such declined performance. 
Posiva does not present conceptual models for all 
safety functions in the safety case material. The 
mathematical models and data can be deemed to 
be sufficiently explained at the construction licence 
stage. Posiva has constructed a group of scenarios 
and calculation cases based on them. To support 
the calculation cases, Posiva has presented supple-
mentary calculations and a probabilistic sensitiv-
ity analysis.
Posiva has used data management and qual-
ity management procedures to increase the reli-
ability of the safety case. However, inconsistencies 
have been detected in the data given in materials 
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compiled at different stages. For this reason, the 
uniformity of the data for the analyses needs to be 
improved, for example by “freezing” the used data 
sufficiently early in order to ensure it is harmoni-
ous in the safety case to be submitted together 
with the operating licence application.
Generally, the reliability of the data and the 
models can be deemed sufficient at the construc-
tion licence stage.
Even though the safety case submitted by 
Posiva can be deemed reliable, it requires further 
development. Elements which would facilitate as-
sessing the reliability of the safety case include a 
more understandable and less ambiguous descrip-
tion of barrier evolution, the identification of the 
parameters most important to safety and of the 
most significant barriers as well as a summary of 
the uncertainty analysis and a comparison of that 
analysis with the concept development programme.
Also, the methods related to preparing the 
safety case require further development before 
the operating licence application can be submit-
ted. Scenarios need to be constructed in a more 
systematic and comprehensive manner and the 
safety case description of the scenario construction 
process needs to be easier to follow. Safety func-
tions and performance targets must be specified 
so that the performance of the barriers and the 
scenarios derived from impaired performance can 
be assessed in a less ambiguous manner.
The structure and representation of the safety 
case need to be developed so that the fulfilment of 
the safety requirements can be verified more ef-
fortlessly.
The references made in the safety case need 
to be clear and the reference material must be ac-
cessible at the point of submitting the operating 
licence application.
The safety case must also cover the entire dis-
posal system, which means that the safety analysis 
concerning low- and intermediate-level waste must 
be linked to the safety case for the disposal of spent 
fuel.
Conclusion
Based on the review, the safety case is sufficiently 
reliable at the construction licence stage. However, 
before the operating licence application can be sub-
mitted, the performance and safety analyses re-
quire improvement, and the safety case needs to be 
modified in order to increase reliability.
In the safety case, Posiva does not always clear-
ly express its position on matters related to safety 
or justify the choices made. In the future, Posiva 
must present its conclusions and their rationale 
more clearly.
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8 Posiva’s plan for arranging the 
safeguards control necessary to prevent 
proliferation of nuclear weapons
Basis of nuclear material safeguards
Safeguarding nuclear material is based on in-
ternational treaties: the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/140), 
the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193), the 
additional protocol to the Safeguards Agreement 
(INFCIRC/193a8), and the Euratom Treaty. Each 
operator planning to use or currently using nuclear 
energy in Finland is, on its part, responsible for 
ensuring that Finland, in its capacity as a state, is 
capable of fulfilling its obligations under the rel-
evant international treaties.
In connection with submitting a construction 
licence application and in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 35 subsection 7 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, Posiva has submitted a 
description of the arrangements for the implemen-
tation of control necessary to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons to the Finnish Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority. In accordance with 
Section 118 b of the Nuclear Energy Decree, the 
planning, construction and operation of a nuclear 
facility shall be implemented so that the obliga-
tions concerning the control of nuclear material, 
as provided and defined in the Nuclear Energy 
Act and provisions issued thereunder as well as in 
the Euratom Treaty and provisions issued there-
under (such as European Commission Regulation 
302/2005), are met.
The plan prepared by Posiva covers the re-
quired issue on a general level, various options 
are put forward for some technical solutions, and 
references are made to future development work. 
The nuclear waste facility constructed by Posiva 
is globally the first of its kind, and the control 
measures implemented by IAEA and the European 
Commission are still partly unresolved. The control 
measures by IAEA and the Commission may affect 
the detailed designs of the nuclear waste facility, 
which means that Posiva cannot be required to 
submit a final plan on nuclear material safeguards 
at this stage.
Nuclear material safeguards by 
Posiva during construction and 
operation of the research facility
STUK has overseen the construction of the Onkalo 
research facility in accordance with the principles 
that govern the construction of a nuclear power 
plant. In accordance with its nuclear non-prolif-
eration manual, Posiva has submitted the data 
required for the oversight to STUK, and STUK 
has reviewed the data. In the same context, it was 
ascertained that Onkalo does not include unre-
ported facilities or functions significant to the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons. Posiva has submit-
ted the basic technical characteristics (BTC) of the 
facilities for regulation by IAEA and the European 
Commission and STUK has reported Posiva’s facil-
ity area in accordance with the additional protocol 
to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. IAEA and the 
European Commission have inspected the Posiva 
facility area and Onkalo and have issued reports 
related to the inspections. The reports did not con-
tain objections concerning Finland or Posiva.
Nuclear material safeguards after 
the closure of the disposal facility
The application prepared by Posiva does not com-
ment on safeguards after the closure of the disposal 
facility. In accordance with Section 11 of the decree 
on the enforcement of the Safeguards Agreement 
conforming to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nucle-
ar materials remain under the supervision of IAEA 
until it becomes practically impossible to retrieve 
them. The fuel disposed by Posiva can also be re-
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trieved after the closure of the disposal facility (ap-
pendix 17 of the construction licence application), 
though this would require considerable costs and 
labour input. Nuclear safeguards measures do not, 
therefore, end with operations, but shall contin-
ue at least until the expiration of the Safeguards 
Agreement. Spent fuel is not highly suitable nu-
clear waste owing to its properties. However, the 
usability of the disposed fuel for nuclear weap-
onry improves over the course of several thousands 
of years, which constitutes grounds for long-term 
IAEA supervision. In accordance with the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the nuclear waste management obli-
gation expires after the decommissioning of the 
nuclear facility, and the licensee has paid a lump 
sum to the State for the monitoring and control of 
the nuclear waste. The State shall be responsible 
thereafter for the nuclear waste management obli-
gations respective to the decommissioned nuclear 
facility.
Conclusion
The plan prepared by Posiva accounts for the 
known and expected safeguards needs and the 
measures required to enable these. No issues that 
may prevent Posiva from carrying out nuclear safe-
guards at the disposal facility have been detected 
in the plan prepared by Posiva.
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9 Emergency arrangements
General
The preliminary emergency plan is a document 
based on Section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree 
and must be submitted to STUK in connection 
with the construction licence application. In ac-
cordance with Section 1 of the Government Decree 
on Emergency Response Arrangements at Nuclear 
Plants (716/2013), the decree lays down provisions 
on emergency response arrangements at a nuclear 
power plant and shall apply, as necessary, to other 
nuclear facilities and to nuclear transport as re-
quired by the degree of the threat.
Emergencies cannot rise at the encapsulation 
facility during construction until spent fuel has 
been transported to the facility. However, Posiva 
has been preparing for potential emergencies at 
the operating nuclear power plant units of the 
power company Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) 
in Olkiluoto over a period of several years. The 
personnel working at the Onkalo construction 
site have received emergency response training. 
A safety plan has been prepared for the Onkalo 
construction site and places of assembly have been 
designated for possible evacuation. The construc-
tion site has also been taken into account in the 
emergency plan and instructions of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant and in the training and drills 
arranged by the TVO emergency response organi-
sation.
Planning of emergency 
response arrangements
The topic-specific report included in the prelimi-
nary safety report prepared by Posiva for the con-
struction licence application, entitled “Operational 
safety analysis of the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant 
and disposal facility”, includes an assessment of 
operational safety at the facilities and of the ra-
diation doses the facility employees and the local 
population are exposed to during normal operation 
and emergencies. Posiva will specify its estimates 
of the radiation doses released in the event of more 
serious accidents causing releases into the environ-
ment as well as of the need for protective measures 
at varying distances from the encapsulation and 
disposal facilities. The results will be observed in 
preparing an emergency plan for the operating li-
cence as well as an external emergency plan.
The emergency response arrangements pre-
pared by Posiva will be consistent with the opera-
tions, fire prevention and security arrangements of 
the facility as well as the external emergency plan 
prepared by authorities for responding to nuclear 
power plant accidents.
The preliminary emergency plan includes a 
description of the facilities, devices and equipment 
required for emergency response measures, includ-
ing reliable communication and alarm systems and 
a data transfer system for transmitting process 
parameters and radiation measurement results 
and weather information. The plan describes the 
estimation of the radiation situation, assessment 
of releases and formation of an assessment of the 
situation in the event of disturbances or accidents.
Posiva will ensure the safety of the personnel in 
emergency situations. The preliminary emergency 
response plan specifies places of assembly during 
the operating of the encapsulation and disposal fa-
cilities, personnel decontamination measures, and 
personal protective equipment and measurement 
equipment for radiation control. Posiva is not re-
quired to provide iodine pills for its personnel or 
the local population in the event of an accident, be-
cause fuel that has been stored for a long period of 
time only contains low doses of isotope iodine-129. 
Nevertheless, iodine pills have been reserved to 
prepare for accidents at the operating facilities in 
Olkiluoto.
The preliminary emergency response plan pre-
pared by Posiva specifies the management pro-
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cedures of the emergency response organisation, 
scope of the authority and responsibilities of the 
emergency response manager and line-up, areas 
of responsibility, operational capability, and re-
sources of the emergency response organisation. 
Posiva also intends to utilise other resources and 
infrastructures available to TVO in Olkiluoto for 
the purpose of maintaining emergency response 
operations. The distribution of responsibilities will 
be specified at the latest when Posiva applies for 
the operating licence. With regard to the persons 
responsible for the emergency response arrange-
ments, STUK has approved Posiva’s emergency re-
sponse arrangements coordinator. His/her deputy 
coordinator will be approved at the construction 
licence stage.
Preparedness
In accordance with the preliminary emergency re-
sponse plan, Posiva can commission its emergency 
facilities after the hoisting equipment building 
and the emergency response centre located in the 
building are completed and equipped for commis-
sioning. Before the operating licence is granted, 
the facilities, equipment and communication de-
vices will be tested at the test run stage in a joint 
operation drill organised together with the rescue 
authorities.
The preliminary emergency response plan in-
cludes a description of the emergency response 
training for Posiva’s emergency organisation and 
rehearsals organised for the TVO personnel partici-
pating in Posiva’s emergency response activities and 
of the process of preparing the emergency response 
plans. Before the commissioning of the facility and 
during the commissioning stage, regular internal 
and independent assessments will be conducted in 
order to ensure that the emergency response ar-
rangements function well. Other Posiva personnel 
and any personnel temporarily working in the area 
will receive emergency response training.
Action in an emergency situation
The preliminary emergency response plan includes 
a description of Posiva’s actions in an emergency 
situation as well as of communications, joint op-
erations and the classification of emergency situa-
tions, as well as notifications submitted to the au-
thorities based on the classifications. More specific 
action instructions are provided in the emergency 
response instructions. The plan presents the au-
thorisation and responsibilities of the emergency 
response manager as well as preparedness and 
action in the event of a threat to security. The plan 
also describes the procedures required to disman-
tle an emergency situation and to perform post-
event actions, in addition to the safety principles 
concerning transportation.
Measures pertaining to rescue operations
Posiva will participate in preparing the external 
emergency plan and organising related training 
to the extent that this is necessary. The accident 
analyses to be specified at the construction stage 
will be utilised in the preparation of the external 
emergency plan and in dimensioning action. At the 
commissioning stage, Posiva will participate in pre-
paring advance instructions to be distributed to the 
population together with the rescue officials. The 
notice will be sent to the local population and can 
be combined with the corresponding TVO notice to 
cover the entire Olkiluoto area. The plans related to 
rescue services will be presented in greater detail in 
connection with the emergency response plan and 
the operational instructions to be submitted with 
the operating licence application.
Statement of the Finnish 
Ministry of the Interior
Via its letter 1/H41501/2014 on 10 January 
2014, STUK has requested a statement from the 
Ministry of the Interior’s Department for Rescue 
Activities (Department for Rescue Services) con-
cerning Posiva’s preliminary emergency plan 
on 29 November 2013 (version 2) in accordance 
with Section 37 of the Nuclear Energy Decree 
and a request for a statement by the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. The Department 
for Rescue Services has submitted its statement 
(SMDno/2014/104, 24 February 2014) to STUK. 
According to the statement, the Department for 
Rescue Services, among other things, considers it 
worthwhile that Posiva should aim to utilise the 
existing TVO resources and infrastructure in pre-
paring for emergency situations, and stresses the 
importance of cooperation in notifying the popu-
lation, too. Moreover, the Department for Rescue 
Services considers cooperation between Posiva and 
the local rescue services and any parties partici-
pating in rescue activities an important element.
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Conclusion
STUK has reviewed the preliminary emergency 
plan and related updates submitted by Posiva in 
connection with processing the construction licence 
application. STUK has taken the statement of the 
Ministry of the Interior into account in its assess-
ment. Via its letter 3/H41501/2013 on 3 April 2014, 
STUK has approved the preliminary emergency 
plan prepared by Posiva. The planning of emergen-
cy arrangements and the plans related to emergen-
cy measures at the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant 
and disposal facility are sufficient.
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10 Security arrangements
Section 7: Physical protection and emergency plan-
ning and other comparable arrangements
Sufficient physical protection and emergency 
planning as well as other arrangements for limit-
ing nuclear damage and for protecting nuclear en-
ergy against illegal activities shall be a prerequisite 
for the use of nuclear energy.
More detailed requirements related to secu-
rity planning by the licensee are laid down in the 
Nuclear Energy Act, Government Decree 734/2008 
on the Security in the Use of Nuclear Energy and 
the STUK guides YVL A.11 (Security of a nuclear 
facility), A.12 (Information security management 
of a nuclear facility), D.2 (Transport of nuclear ma-
terials and nuclear waste) and in document Design 
basis threat for the use of nuclear energy and 
use of radiation (STUK decision 2/Y42217/2013). 
In processing the construction licence application 
materials, STUK has assessed the organisation of 
security arrangements with regard to the require-
ments listed above.
In accordance with paragraph 5 of Section 35 
subsection 1 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, pre-
liminary plans for the arrangements for security 
and emergencies shall be submitted to STUK. In 
accordance with subsection 2 of the same section, 
an applicant for a licence shall also provide the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority with any 
other reports that STUK considers necessary.
At various stages, Posiva has submitted to 
STUK documents concerning security arrange-
ments, the majority of which have been classified 
by STUK in accordance with paragraph 7 of sub-
section 1 of Section 24 of the Act on the Openness 
of Government Activities and Section 78 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act. This public safety assessment 
does not contain a detailed description of secu-
rity arrangements based on the grounds presented 
above.
STUK has approved documents which detail 
how the licence applicant intends to carry out 
the security arrangements under its responsibil-
ity during both construction and operation. The 
same security arrangements are not required dur-
ing operation as during construction, because the 
consequences of any illegal activities to people 
and the environment are considerably less sig-
nificant than during operation. This is due to 
the fact, for example, that no spent nuclear fuel 
has been used at the intended encapsulation and 
disposal facilities during construction. This risk-
aware, classifying approach is applied in assessing 
the sufficiency of the security arrangements in ac-
cordance with Section 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act. 
This has also been presented in the IAEA Nuclear 
Security Recommendations on Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, NSS 
13, INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5 as Fundamental Principle 
H: Graded Approach.
Based on the materials, Posiva has employed 
Design Basis Threat and risk analysis in the plan-
ning and assessment of the security arrangements, 
and has analysed the need for physical protec-
tion. The plans for a nuclear power plant present 
information security principles and various secu-
rity zones in accordance with the defence-in-depth 
principle, and observe the protection of important 
structures and systems.
Posiva has presented a plan for security ar-
rangements during construction, including the 
line-up and tasks, supervision and communication 
equipment, protective equipment and use-of-force 
equipment of a security organisation. With regard 
to security control, Posiva has described the pro-
cedures required to implement security control 
in accordance with related authorisation. Posiva 
has also presented the principles for the use of 
force and related procedures, trustworthiness pro-
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cedures, plans and grounds for the implementation 
of security arrangements, procedures for conduct-
ing affairs at the nuclear power plant, and for su-
pervising human and goods traffic. The materials 
also present an operational plan for an alarm and 
management centre, and measures for preparing 
for threats and submitting notices to STUK.
STUK is in the process of confirming the joint 
security standing order of Posiva and TVO in ac-
cordance with Section 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act. 
According to STUK, the standing order must enter 
into force before the construction work is started, 
in order to ensure sufficient security arrangements 
during construction. The standing order specifies 
the organisation and equipment of and use of force 
by the security organisation, among other things. 
It is an essential document, because a security 
standing order is a precondition for granting secu-
rity personnel the authorisation to act.
The administrative, technical and functional se-
curity arrangements, including information securi-
ty, require further development before construction 
can be started. These issues are discussed in the 
STUK decisions regarding the security arrange-
ments prepared by Posiva. The issues are not 
discussed in this safety assessment because the 
decision concerning security arrangements must 
be kept confidential and constitutes classified ma-
terial based on its contents.
Via its letter 2/H42217/2014 on 26 September 
2014, STUK has requested the Ministry of the 
Interior for a statement concerning the construc-
tion licence application documents related to secu-
rity arrangements by Posiva, based on paragraph 
3 of Section 37 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. The 
Ministry of the Interior has submitted to STUK 
its statement SMDno-2014-2458 on 27 October 
2014 (the statement is classified as “confidential” 
in accordance with protection level III described 
in subparagraph 7 of paragraph 1 of section 24 of 
the Act on the Openness of Government Activities, 
621/1999). STUK will consider the observations of 
the Ministry of the Interior in its decision concern-
ing security arrangements.
Conclusion
The sufficiency requirement concerning security 
arrangements, based on the Nuclear Energy Act, 
and the requirement concerning preliminary secu-
rity arrangements, based on the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, are fulfilled so that nothing in terms of se-
curity arrangements prevents granting a construc-
tion licence in accordance with sections 18 and 19 
of the Nuclear Energy Act. A precondition for be-
ginning the construction work is confirming the se-
curity standing order presented in this assessment 
and the fulfilment of the detailed security require-
ments specified in the decision issued by STUK. 
No further details of the requirements mentioned 
above can be given here, because the information is 
classified as confidential (subparagraph 7 of para-
graph 1 of Section 24 of the Act on the Openness 
of Government Activities) and Section 78 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act).
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11 Management system 
and safety culture
Safety culture
Section 19: Safety culture
When designing, constructing, operating and 
decommissioning or closing a nuclear waste facil-
ity, a good safety culture shall be maintained. In 
its decisions and operations, the management of 
the organisation concerned shall demonstrate its 
commitment to procedures and solutions promot-
ing safety. Personnel shall be motivated to perform 
responsible work, and an open working atmosphere 
shall be promoted in the working community in 
order to encourage the identification, reporting and 
elimination of factors endangering safety. Personnel 
shall be given the opportunity to contribute to the 
continuous enhancement of safety.
STUK has assessed the organisation and safety 
culture of Posiva through, for example, document 
reviews and inspections and interviews conducted 
at the facility site, and by oversight of the construc-
tion of the underground Onkalo research facility. 
External safety culture assessment expertise has 
been utilised to support the assessment. The over-
sight and inspections conducted by STUK covered 
Posiva’s procedures for guiding its suppliers in the 
development and maintenance of a good safety cul-
ture. STUK has also inspected some of Posiva’s sup-
pliers. One of the objectives of such inspections was 
to assess the safety culture of these organisations.
STUK has also assessed the documents re-
lated to safety culture submitted by Posiva. Such 
documents include the Posiva management system 
manual, a safety management and safety culture 
report, a construction quality management report, 
code of safety culture team, construction project 
quality plan, and project plans. Below are the ob-
servations based on the documentary review.
Posiva requires all organisations participating 
in the nuclear waste facility project to have clear 
principles and objectives, determined and con-
firmed by their administrative boards, which en-
sure that actions appropriately observe any factors 
affecting safety in accordance with the significance 
to safety of that factor. Posiva specifies the objec-
tives and goals determined by the management of 
Posiva in its management system manual. Posiva 
also requires that the identification of factors af-
fecting safety, and safety itself, are prioritised in 
all activities in situations where decisions need to 
be made between safety and other factors, such as 
factors related to schedule and production.
The objective of the Posiva management system 
is to ensure that operations comply with require-
ments and to meet the company’s strategic goals, 
support a good safety culture, manage risks and, 
above all, ensure conformity with safety and quali-
ty requirements. Within the context of the manage-
ment system, safety means nuclear and radiation 
safety, post-closure safety and industrial safety. 
The management of safety and quality have been 
combined into a single complex under the manage-
ment system. Posiva has included the continuous 
improvement of safety as a nuclear and radiation 
safety objective.
In terms of action policy, the management of 
Posiva have specified the establishment and main-
tenance of a good safety culture in all company 
operations as one of the company’s organisational 
objectives. Moreover, the Posiva management sys-
tem manual specifies that the company manage-
ment must demonstrate commitment to solutions 
promoting safety through decisions and actions. 
According to Posiva, a good safety culture also 
entails offering the personnel the opportunity to 
participate in the continuous improvement of the 
management system as well as an open work com-
munity atmosphere, which encourages the identifi-
cation, reporting and elimination of factors threat-
ening safety.
Safety culture is one of the themes of the Posiva 
induction training for permanent personnel, fixed-
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term employees and the employees of Posiva sup-
pliers performing work for Posiva. A particular 
objective of the training is understanding the 
significance of one’s work input to safety. The train-
ing must be repeated at three-year intervals. In 
safety-classified assignments not performed at the 
facility site, suppliers are required to familiarise 
their personnel and subcontractors with the as-
signment requirements and procedures. Personnel 
safety culture training is one of the requirements. 
Training sessions need to be recorded so that 
Posiva may verify that the required training has 
been organised as necessary. Posiva will deliver 
safety culture-related training materials to the 
subcontractors as necessary. Posiva assesses the 
safety culture of the suppliers through audits, sup-
plier oversight, reviews and follow-up meetings.
Posiva aims to provide safety culture-related com-
munications on a monthly basis in personnel meet-
ings and supervisor meetings. Posiva is in the process 
of systematically developing its internal communi-
cations. The future internal communication chan-
nels and tools offer new opportunities for safety 
culture communications, too. STUK requires Posiva 
to ensure that the significance of a safety culture is 
enhanced through regular internal communications.
 Posiva has submitted to STUK a report includ-
ing a description of the current state of its safety 
culture and of the measures intended to further 
improve the safety culture. Posiva has monitored 
the state of the safety culture through self-assess-
ments and internal reviews as well as through 
the aid of external appraisers. In 2010, a separate 
work group assessed the occupational safety activi-
ties at Posiva. Posiva has investigated the current 
state of the organisation’s safety culture by com-
missioning a special report from VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland in 2013.
In the report, Posiva specifies short- and long-
term measures for the monitoring, assessment and 
further improvement of their safety culture. Posiva 
has established a separate safety culture team 
to promote safety culture. An external supplier 
well-versed in safety culture supports the team. 
However, the inspections conducted by STUK have 
shown that so far, Posiva’s measures are individual 
development and monitoring activities, and are 
not governed by a target-oriented long-term plan. 
Posiva has been intending to prepare a safety 
culture programme but does not have a detailed 
schedule for the completion and commissioning of 
the programme. STUK requires Posiva to prepare 
and launch a permanent safety culture programme 
by 30 April 2015.
In addition to document checks, STUK has 
verified Posiva’s safety culture through inspec-
tions based on a separate inspection programme. 
The inspections have been targeted at Posiva’s key 
operations, including management, construction 
preparations, quality assurance, design, supplier 
management, requirement management, informa-
tion security and safety culture. The inspections 
have entailed searching for indications of the or-
ganisation’s attitude concerning, for example, the 
primary nature of safety, understanding the safety 
implications of one’s work, non-conformance man-
agement, and management and personnel commit-
ment to safety.
STUK has overseen the construction of the 
Onkalo research facility. Oversight has been car-
ried out because the facilities will constitute part 
of the disposal facility. Oversight has been based 
on inspections, monitoring visits to the research fa-
cility and follow-up meetings. The experiences and 
observations accumulated during the oversight ac-
tivities have been used to support decision-making 
in assessing the state of safety culture at Posiva.
Conclusion
Based on the assessments, control and inspections 
carried out by STUK, Posiva and its suppliers have 
the resources and preparedness to implement the 
nuclear power plant construction project in accord-
ance with good safety culture. According to STUK’s 
estimation, Posiva management and personnel 
have demonstrated commitment to high safety 
standards in practice.
Safety and quality management
Section 20: Safety and quality management
Organisations participating in the design, con-
struction, operation and decommissioning or clo-
sure of a nuclear waste facility shall employ a man-
agement system for ensuring the management of 
safety and quality. The objective of the management 
system is to ensure that safety is prioritised without 
exception, and that quality management require-
ments are commensurate with the significance to 
safety of the activity. This management system shall 
be systematically assessed and further developed.
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Safety and quality management shall cover all 
activities influencing the safety of the nuclear waste 
facility. For each function, requirements significant 
in safety terms shall be identified, and the planned 
measures described in order to ensure compliance 
with requirements. The processes and procedures 
shall be systematic and based on instructions.
Systematic procedures shall be in place for 
identifying and correcting deviations significant in 
safety terms.
The licensee shall commit and oblige its employ-
ees and suppliers, subcontractors and other part-
ners contributing to safety relevant activities to en-
gage in systematic safety and quality management.
Posiva has integrated quality, environment and 
safety management into a single complex under 
its management system, within the framework 
of which safety management is systematically 
performed. The system allows identifying risks 
affecting nuclear waste management at the op-
erational planning stage and targeting the focus of 
quality and safety management at those elements 
which are most significant to safety. In accordance 
with the requirements of the management system, 
safety overrides economic motives in all Posiva 
operations.
The Posiva management system is based on 
international quality standards and observes the 
requirements of the YVL guides and IAEA stand-
ard GS-R-3 concerning management systems, qual-
ity assurance and quality management. Within 
the context of the system, Posiva has specified the 
objective that all organisations affecting the safety 
of the design, construction and commissioning of 
the nuclear waste facility must apply the quality 
standards in question as well as the YVL guides 
and IAEA standard in their quality management 
systems and supplier-specific quality plans.
Posiva has regularly commissioned external, 
independent assessments of its management sys-
tem. Posiva has appropriately processed the non-
conformances and recommendations specified in 
the assessments in accordance with the non-con-
formance management procedure.
Posiva employs management system processes 
to direct its operations in accordance with its 
strategy. The purpose of its operations is to begin 
disposal in 2022. The processes developed for line 
organisation activities have been divided into man-
agement, main and support processes. The main 
processes Posiva intends to use to reach the set 
goal are disposal solution management and dis-
posal solution implementation.
The project process description presents the 
processes Posiva has developed for the nuclear 
waste facility construction project.
According to STUK’s estimations, the manage-
ment system and project processes have been de-
signed and implemented in accordance with the re-
quirements in the YVL guides. Posiva monitors the 
implementation and effectiveness of the processes 
through management reviews.
The procedures governing the line organisation 
and project operations at Posiva have been com-
piled into a set of manuals covering different areas. 
The manuals include e.g. a research and develop-
ment manual, a procurement manual, a design 
manual, a production manual and a construction 
manual. According to STUK’s assessment, Posiva 
has prepared, approved and implemented the in-
structions in the manuals sufficiently extensively 
for construction operations.
STUK requires the licensee to prepare instruc-
tions concerning procedures related to determining 
the quality and quality assurance requirements 
of products and operations. Posiva has prepared 
instructions in order to ensure the allocation of the 
available resources to the products and operations 
which are most significant for safety. According to 
the instructions, a key factor in the processing of 
the quality and quality assurance requirements 
of products and activities is their importance to 
nuclear and radiation safety. However, the sig-
nificance of products and activities to the different 
aspects of corporate safety will also be observed in 
specifying the requirements.
Posiva has prepared instructions for non-con-
formance management during projects. The in-
structions concerning reports on non-conformances 
detected by suppliers are given in the supplier re-
quirements. All processing related to non-conform-
ances is recorded in the Posiva system. The system 
is used to classify and group non-conformances. 
The supplier is required to attach the materials 
related to non-conformances to the final documen-
tation.
Posiva’s training programme includes a compul-
sory course for all Posiva’s permanent and fixed-
term personnel and external company personnel 
performing work for Posiva. The objective of the 
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training is to cover the key contents of the manage-
ment system. The course offers a general under-
standing of, for example, the management system 
and its structure and continuous improvement and 
Posiva’s quality objectives. The course covers, for 
example, the identification of non-conformances 
related to procedures, human factors, suggestion 
schemes and official regulations. Posiva distrib-
utes information on the management system and 
changes in the system to its personnel through 
internal briefings and the Posiva Intra system as 
necessary.
In early 2013, STUK launched an inspection 
programme to be completed during the processing 
of Posiva’s construction licence application. The 
purpose of the programme was to assess Posiva’s 
procedures for the construction of a safe, high-
quality nuclear power plant. The objective of the 
inspections was to verify the quality assurance 
procedures presented in the application documents 
prepared by Posiva, as well as the performance of 
those procedures. A total of 17 inspections were 
carried out in accordance with the programme, 
some of which were targeted at Posiva’s suppliers, 
whose operations are significant to nuclear and ra-
diation safety. The aim of the inspections was to as-
sess the control and regulation Posiva carries out 
concerning its suppliers, and the performance and 
effectiveness of the related procedures. STUK pre-
sented a total of 70 requirements of varying levels 
of safety significance for the purpose of further im-
proving Posiva’s operations. Subsequently, Posiva 
has planned and implemented corrective measures 
in response to all the requirements which are rel-
evant for the operations of the organisation and for 
launching construction activities.
Conclusion
To sum up, STUK mentions that Posiva’s man-
agement system, including the processes and soft-
ware, have been developed and introduced into use 
in accordance with the quality management re-
quirements specified by STUK in the YVL guides. 
Compliance with the management system gives 
Posiva the capability and resources to manage the 
quality and safety of the design, construction and 
commissioning of the nuclear power plant. The 
measures carried out by Posiva in order to identify, 
clarify and process operational and product non-
conformances fulfil STUK’s requirements. Posiva is 
improving the management system as structured. 
STUK has approved Posiva’s management system 
manual. In the future, Posiva must submit all ma-
jor changes to the manual for approval by STUK.
Lines of management, 
responsibilities and expertise
Section 21: Lines of management, responsibilities 
and expertise
The lines of management in the organisation of 
a nuclear waste facility, alongside the positions and 
related responsibilities of employees, shall be de-
fined and documented. The organisation shall have 
access to the professional expertise and technical 
knowledge required for the safe operation of the nu-
clear waste facility and long-term safety of nuclear 
waste disposal.
Duties significant to safety shall be designated. 
Training programmes shall be prepared for the 
development and maintenance of the professional 
skills of the persons working in these positions, and 
adequate command of the functions in question 
must be verified.
The organisational structure and the duties, 
authorities and responsibilities of the personnel, as 
well as the procedures related to decision-making 
concerning the operations of the nuclear waste 
facility, shall be documented in an organisation 
manual prepared by Posiva. Posiva shall prepare 
administrative for the operation stage rules in ac-
cordance with Guide YVL A.4 and submit them to 
STUK for approval in connection with applying 
for an operating licence. The administrative rules 
shall determine the duties, authority and respon-
sibilities of the designated responsible manager 
of a nuclear facility, his/her deputy and the rest of 
the personnel needed for operation of the nuclear 
facility.
Posiva shall define the duties important to safe-
ty by recording the related areas of responsibility 
and main duties in the task descriptions. The task 
descriptions shall also include related competence 
requirements. Posiva must also specify when per-
sonnel members are required to demonstrate their 
competence and professional skills before taking 
on duties important to safety, and at regular inter-
vals as necessary.
Posiva selects personnel and provides train-
ing with the objective of recruiting a suitable and 
competent personnel. Training measures at Posiva 
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are based on the principle of preparing a personal 
training plan for each Posiva employee on the basis 
of a development plan prepared in connection with 
development discussions. The organisational pro-
cedures for managing personnel recruitment and 
the preparing, implementation and monitoring of 
competence and skills requirements are specified 
in the Posiva management system. The manage-
ment system also presents measures for the main-
tenance of further development of skills.
Conclusion
Based on STUK’s assessment, Posiva has specified 
sufficient arrangements for the recruitment and 
training of its personnel and organisation, with 
which Posiva plans to ensure the personnel have 
sufficient professional skills for the safe operation 
of the nuclear facility. In addition to basic train-
ing, detailed personnel training plans are used to 
ensure sufficient for refreshing and updating train-
ing.
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12 Other requirements
12.1 Ageing management
Posiva has submitted a preliminary report on the 
plan for the principles of ageing management in 
connection with the construction licence applica-
tion.
The plan presents the principles of encapsula-
tion and disposal facility ageing management. The 
plan also describes a plan for preparing an ageing 
management programme and attaching it to the 
operating licence application.
The plan of principles will be applied in select-
ing design solutions for the facilities; assessing 
the need and appropriate schedules for major 
structural modifications; collecting and processing 
user-based information related to the ageing of 
systems, structures and equipment; planning the 
surveillance and maintenance of functional and 
reliable systems, structures and equipment; as-
sessing modification schedules and the connection 
between different modification work in planning 
modifications and periodic inspections; and per-
forming various assessments related to the ageing 
management programme.
The plan specifies the organisational distribu-
tion of ageing management responsibilities as well 
as ageing management procedures. The basic prin-
ciple is the objective of maintaining the encapsula-
tion and disposal facility in the condition required 
by the design basis throughout its service life by a 
sufficient margin. The procedures are divided into 
preparing for ageing through planning, procure-
ment and production, and preparing for ageing 
through operations.
The plan for principles also presents the princi-
ples for the qualification of the facility parts.
Conclusion
Posiva describes the principles of ageing manage-
ment at the encapsulation and disposal facility on 
a very general level. The plan of principles for age-
ing management at the encapsulation and disposal 
facility complies with the requirements of Guide 
YVL A.8. The ageing management programme at-
tached to the operating licence application must 
describe the practical implementation of the plan 
of principles for ageing management.
12.2 Ensuring the implementation 
of regulatory control by STUK
Section 19 of the Nuclear Energy Act
7) the applicant's arrangements for the imple-
mentation of control by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) as referred to in para-
graph 3 of section 63 subsection 1, in Finland and 
abroad, and for the implementation of control as 
referred to in paragraph 4 of section 63 subsection 
1 are sufficient;
Section 63: Supervisory rights
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) shall be entitled, in order to carry out the 
supervision required under this Act, and by the 
provisions issued hereunder and by Finland's in-
ternational treaties in the field of nuclear energy, to:
1) inspect and control operations referred to in 
paragraphs 1–6 of section 2 subsection 1, and in 
paragraph 2 of section 2 subsection 2, and for this 
purpose have access to any place where such an op-
eration is being carried out, as well as to carry out 
measurements required for supervision, to take and 
to receive samples and to install equipment neces-
sary for such supervision; (23 May 2008/342)
2) oblige the licence applicant to arrange entry 
for the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) to carry out inspections and measurements 
and to take samples on the premises where, accord-
ing to the application, the operation referred to in 
paragraphs 1–6 of section 2 subsection 1 would be 
carried out; (23 May 2008/342)
3) require that nuclear fuel or the buildings and 
equipment intended as parts of the nuclear facility 
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be manufactured in a manner approved of by the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), 
and oblige the licensee or licence applicant to ar-
range for STUK sufficient opportunity to control 
manufacture of the fuel or such buildings or equip-
ment;
4) receive necessary information and be provid-
ed with the plans and contracts and their grounds 
concerning the fabrication, quality control or pro-
cessing of nuclear materials, nuclear waste, the nu-
clear facility and its structures and equipment, as 
well as any material, device and equipment referred 
to in paragraph 5 of section 2 subsection 1 (23 May 
2008/342).
According to Section 19 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, one of the conditions for granting a con-
struction licence is that the applicant has made 
sufficient arrangements for the implementation 
of control by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK) in Finland and abroad as speci-
fied in paragraph 3 of Section 63 subsection 1, and 
for the implementation of control as specified in 
paragraph 4 of section 63 subsection 1.
In accordance with Section 35 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, Posiva has submitted a report on 
the arrangements for the implementation of con-
trol to STUK. In the report, Posiva describes the 
official measures concerning the official processing 
of documents related to equipment, structures and 
systems important to safety as well as the assess-
ment and approval of the design and manufactur-
ing organisations. Moreover, the report describes 
the official measures related to manufacture con-
trol, and event investigation by STUK. In the 
report, Posiva also specifies the preparation meas-
ures it has carried out to implement the practical 
arrangements required for regulation by STUK.
Within the framework of the control arrange-
ments formulated by Posiva, the holder of the 
licence must, before implementation, obtain ap-
proval from STUK for the general safety concepts 
at the nuclear facility and for the detailed system, 
equipment and structure designs important to 
safety. In addition to the approval, the holder of 
the licence must provide STUK with the possibility 
to ensure that the design, manufacture, installa-
tion and commissioning processes of the intended 
nuclear facility components important to safety 
comply with STUK’s requirements.
In accordance with the requirements of the YVL 
guides, Posiva shall apply for STUK’s approval for 
the design and manufacture organisations or sub-
mit a related report to STUK. These measures are 
included in the agreements made with suppliers. 
Posiva will submit the quality manuals concerning 
the management of suppliers essential for the pro-
ject to STUK for information. Posiva’s procedures 
account for the participation of STUK in Posiva 
audits of the operations of suppliers important to 
safety as necessary.
According to the report, arrangements have 
been made so that STUK can observe and control 
type and other tests conducted, using test equip-
ment, to examine the design requirements and 
related compliance in systems, equipment and 
structures. The control targets include the demon-
stration tests conducted at the disposal facility.
Sufficient control rooms complete with the prop-
er equipment, including information systems, must 
be provided for the later control of construction, 
installation and commissioning by STUK at the fa-
cility site. STUK will detail these rooms and equip-
ment later in connection with launching nuclear 
facility construction control at the facility site.
The arrangements for control by STUK have 
been integrated into Posiva’s procedures and agree-
ment documents. Based on the agreement docu-
ments, the requirements will be transferred along 
the supply chains related to product procurement. 
There have been no problems so far with providing 
STUK access to control structure and equipment 
production on site and to conduct inspections of 
Posiva’s suppliers.
Conclusion
The arrangements made to allow regulation by 
STUK as described in the report prepared by 
Posiva are sufficient. However, all parties need to 
share an understanding of the approval required 
for different documentation before equipment con-
struction can be started and of the role of STUK 
as a control authority. For this reason, Posiva has 
trained its personnel concerning the regulatory 
measures and rights of STUK.
12.3 The retrievability of the 
disposed spent nuclear fuel
According to the Government decision-in-principle 
made in 2001 concerning the disposal of spent fuel, 
the organisation responsible for the project shall 
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present specified, sufficiently detailed reports con-
cerning the opening of the disposal facility as well 
as factors which may affect the opening of the 
facility, in addition to the technology and safety 
criteria of opening the facility, before obtaining a 
construction licence. An up-to-date estimate of the 
costs of opening the facility is also required. The 
plans must ensure that post-closure safety shall 
not be impaired as a result of enabling opening and 
retrievability. The disposal is meant to isolate the 
spent fuel from living species, and the aim is not to 
facilitate opening the facilities.
The Government decision concerning the dis-
posal of spent fuel (478/1999) which was valid 
at the time of making the decision-in-principle 
required that the disposal facility can be opened 
if the option becomes expedient as a result of 
technical progress. The Government decision has 
been replaced with the Government Decree on 
the safety of disposal of nuclear waste (736/2008), 
which does not impose requirements related to 
opening the disposal facility. In the design of the 
disposal, Posiva has taken the requirement of the 
decision-in-principle concerning re-openability and 
the retrievability of the nuclear waste that has 
been disposed of into account.
In the construction licence application for the 
Olkiluoto encapsulation and disposal facility, 
Posiva has described the principle governing the 
opening of the disposal facility and the retrieval of 
the disposal canisters at the various disposal stag-
es and after closure of the disposal facility. Posiva 
has submitted to STUK as part of the preliminary 
safety analysis report a description concerning 
the opening of the disposal facility and the related 
work stages.
The retrieval of the disposal canisters is based 
on a period of time during which the canisters can 
be assumed, with a high degree of certainty, to 
have remained tight. The disposal concept princi-
ple presented by Posiva allows for the opening of 
the facilities at various stages of the project with-
out compromising the safety. The iron-copper dis-
posal canister has been designed to remain tight 
for a very long period of time, allowing for retrieval 
without the risk of radioactive contamination. The 
disposal facilities to be excavated in rock will en-
dure even technical opening measures. Together 
with SKB, Posiva has developed canister retrieval 
technology and has tested the removal of the ben-
tonite clay surrounding the canister using saline 
water. According to STUK’s review, the technique is 
suitable for the removal of bentonite and has been 
sufficiently demonstrated to function.
In the construction licence application, Posiva 
discusses factors related to the retrieval of the 
canisters which need to be observed should the 
decision be made to open the deposition tunnel in 
the future. Such factors include a rise in rock tem-
perature due to residual heat and radiation protec-
tion for the employees participating in the opening 
process, and the retrieval of the canisters.
Conclusion
Posiva has included a report concerning the open-
ing of the disposal facilities and an estimate of 
the related costs in the construction licence ap-
plication. Technically, the facilities can be opened 
and the disposal canisters safely retrieved using 
current work methods. Posiva has developed a 
retrieval technique together with SKB and has 
submitted a description of the functionality of the 
technique. According to STUK, the nuclear waste 
to be disposed can be technically retrieved, and 
the retrieval option does not jeopardise the post-
closure safety of the disposal.
12.4 An alternate horizontal disposal 
solution for spent fuel (KBS-3H)
In the construction licence application submitted 
to the Government concerning the Olkiluoto en-
capsulation and disposal facility, Posiva applied for 
permission for a horizontal canister disposal solu-
tion (KBS-3H) in addition to a vertical disposal so-
lution (KBS-3V), and requested permission for the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority to approve 
the modifications to the proposed design solutions.
In the horizontal disposal solution, the disposal 
canisters and surrounding bentonite buffers are 
situated in horizontal holes drilled at the disposal 
depth. Posiva has been developing the horizontal 
disposal solution together with SKB since 2002. 
In the KBS-3H solution, the disposal canisters 
are packed into a perforated protective cylinder 
together with a bentonite buffer before disposal. 
The emplacement packages are situated in hori-
zontal disposal holes no longer than 300 metres in 
length, using an emplacement device. The design 
of the disposal canisters and bentonite buffers cor-
responds to that of the vertical disposal solution. 
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According to Posiva’s assessment, the potential 
benefits of the KBS-3H solution are the more ef-
fortless quality management of the canister and 
buffer emplacement, fewer disturbances in the 
rock conditions and the environment at the dispos-
al site as the result of a lower excavation volume, 
and reduced costs owing to less excavation and a 
lower tunnel filling volume. No separate deposi-
tion tunnels are required in the KBS-3H solution, 
which means that there is no need to fill the depo-
sition tunnels required in the vertical solution. At 
this point, one of the possible weaknesses of the so-
lution compared with vertical disposal is the risk of 
uneven buffer material distribution owing to water 
leakage in the long horizontal hole, which may af-
fect buffer density and, thereby, performance. The 
horizontal solution may also be more sensitive to 
rock faulting caused by an earthquake. Drilling the 
long horizontal tunnel required for the KBS-3H 
solution is technically more challenging.
In the period from 2003 to 2007, Posiva pre-
pared a comprehensive safety assessment of the 
KBS-3H solution, including an assessment of the 
differences of the solution options and the safety 
of the horizontal disposal solution. STUK has as-
sessed the comprehensive KBS-3H safety case and 
has submitted the conclusions of the assessment to 
Posiva in 2009 (H221/4, 15 October 2009). After the 
comparison report in 2008, Posiva’s development 
measures have focused on the further investigation 
of identified safety issues and the technical devel-
opment of the horizontal disposal solution. Neither 
the assessment completed by STUK in 2009 or the 
review of the construction licence application ma-
terials for the Olkiluoto encapsulation and disposal 
facility showed any reason to assume that the pro-
posed horizontal disposal solution could not fulfil 
the safety requirements set in the Government de-
cree (736/2008). However, Posiva has not yet sub-
mitted comprehensive safety materials to STUK 
to serve as a basis for assessing conformity with 
safety requirements in detail.
Posiva has conducted tests related to the tech-
nical feasibility of the KBS-3H solution in the 
Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory in Sweden together 
with SKB. They drilled a 95-metre-long horizontal 
hole for the purpose of testing the placement of 
the emplacement package. In its most recent nu-
clear waste management programme (YJH-2012), 
Posiva presented a plan for obtaining a sufficiently 
high level of technical development and safety as-
sessment for implementing the solution. As part 
of the construction licence application materials, 
Posiva submitted to STUK a report on the current 
state of the KBS-3H solution, including develop-
ment targets and on-going development work. Key 
research and development targets include:
•	 The	production,	transport	and	emplacement	of	
the components according to requirements
•	 Testing	 the	drilling	 of	 the	 long	horizontal	dis-
posal hole (300 m) in accordance with require-
ments, and verifying related conformity
•	 Developing	a	bentonite	buffer	production	tech-
nique and demonstrating its performance
•	 Preparing	 rock	 classification	 criteria	 for	 the	
horizontal disposal holes
•	 Assessing	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 phenomena	
and processes affecting the long-term perfor-
mance of the horizontal disposal solution in 
various ways, such as bentonite erosion caused 
by groundwater, or rock movements.
In its most recent nuclear waste management pro-
gramme and its response to STUK’s statement con-
cerning the YJH-2012 programme, Posiva proposed 
completing a comprehensive comparative assess-
ment of the vertical and horizontal solutions in 
2016. A precondition for modifying the disposal 
solution is that Posiva obtains advance approval 
from STUK for the plans and documents approved 
by STUK and affected by the change (Section 112 of 
the Nuclear Energy Act). At the construction stage 
preceding the operating licence for the disposal 
facility, the modification requires the submission of 
the necessary updated documents and safety case 
for approval by STUK in accordance with Section 
35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. Posiva must also 
demonstrate the feasibility of the horizontal dis-
posal solution with a sufficiently high degree of 
certainty before beginning to drill the long disposal 
holes. The modification of the disposal method at 
the construction stage would be highly likely to 
postpone the intended starting date of disposing 
the spent fuel.
Conclusion
In addition to the vertical disposal solution, Posiva 
has proposed a horizontal disposal solution based 
on the same safety principles. Both options are 
subject to the same safety requirements governing 
76
STUK-B 196 STUK’S SafeTy aSSeSSmenT of PoSiva’S conSTrUcTion licence aPPlicaTion
the disposal of nuclear waste. STUK has not ob-
served a reason why the horizontal disposal solu-
tion could not fulfil the set requirements.
Posiva has proposed to complete an assessment 
of the vertical and horizontal solutions in 2016 
in order to be able make a decision about future 
measures. Because the horizontal disposal solu-
tion may also fulfil the set safety requirements in 
STUK’s understanding, the modification can be 
processed in accordance with Section 112 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree as a modification and part 
of the construction licence to be granted. The modi-
fication of the disposal method at the construction 
stage would be quite likely to postpone the intend-
ed starting date of disposing the spent fuel.
12.5 Transportation
Transporting spent nuclear fuel is part of the use 
of nuclear energy in accordance with the Nuclear 
Energy Act. According to the Nuclear Energy Act, 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority is re-
sponsible for regulating the transportation and 
approving the transportation plans. Transporting 
spent nuclear fuel must adhere to the applicable 
legislation and regulatory requirements. The safe-
ty of the transports must be ensured through care-
ful planning and safety analyses. The safety princi-
ples set in the legislation governing nuclear energy 
apply to transporting nuclear fuel. In accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Decree, the transport 
cannot be commenced until STUK has ascertained 
that the transport arrangements, security arrange-
ments and emergency planning meet the require-
ments set for them.
Posiva has included a report on the transporta-
tion of spent nuclear fuel in the construction licence 
application. The report includes an examination of 
the risk management related to the transportation. 
Posiva has also submitted to STUK a preliminary 
report on the transportation arrangements and a 
preliminary plan for the security arrangements 
during transportation.
Conclusion
STUK has assessed Posiva’s plans in terms of the 
feasibility of the spent fuel transportation arrange-
ments. Based on Posiva’s plans, the spent fuel 
transportations are feasible. STUK will ascertain 
conformity with transport safety requirements 
through a separate transport authorisation pro-
cess. In connection with applying for an operating 
licence, Posiva shall submit a report on the trans-
port arrangements and also describe the related 
security arrangements in a nuclear waste trans-
port plan, in accordance with Guide YVL D.2.
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13 Summary
Posiva has submitted the safety materials required 
in Section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
Section 16 of the Government Decree 736/2008 to 
STUK in connection with submitting a construc-
tion licence application. The submitted materials 
are sufficient for granting a construction licence. 
However, a review conducted by STUK raised is-
sues on which Posiva will specify before construct-
ing the encapsulation and disposal facility or fur-
ther develop before submitting an operating licence 
application.
The encapsulation and disposal facilities de-
scribed by Posiva in the construction licence appli-
cation are to a large extent unique and represent 
the first facilities of their kind. While the facilities 
are for the most part based on tested and studied 
technology, no experience related to the construc-
tion of similar facilities is available in Finland or 
other countries. Likewise, highly restricted experi-
ences are globally available related to designing 
and ascertaining the post-closure safety of the 
facilities.
YVL guides and international regulations con-
cerning disposal safety are currently more general 
in nature than requirements concerning other nu-
clear facilities, supporting a step-by-step approach 
in the project. Issuing technical specifications has 
not been deemed expedient in the absence of expe-
rience-based data on factors affecting safety.
The updated YVL guides issued by STUK have 
affected the preparation and inspection of the con-
struction licence application materials. The guides 
have been updated to better account for all nuclear 
facilities. Even though they were published after 
Posiva had submitted the construction licence ap-
plication, the encapsulation and disposal facil-
ity construction licence application materials have 
been prepared according to the YVL guide drafts 
made available to Posiva.
Because of the reasons listed above, an incre-
mental approach is reasonable in designing and 
ascertaining the safety of Posiva’s encapsulation 
and disposal facility. The construction licence ap-
plication materials present the key safety princi-
ples and design requirements and show conform-
ity with the safety requirements concerning the 
encapsulation and disposal facility, and require 
no further changes. The specific properties of the 
disposal site and the performance of the disposal 
system still involve assumptions and uncertain-
ties which can be verified or reduced based on a 
research and monitoring programme covering ad-
ditional information acquired during the construc-
tion of the disposal facility, on the actual disposal 
facility construction process, and on the operation 
of the disposal facility. The programme entails 
monitoring the disposal site and the engineered 
barriers as well as long-term testing as necessary. 
Such a gradual approach also conforms to the prin-
ciples of the international guidelines on nuclear 
waste management.
In its decisions submitted to Posiva, STUK has 
specified how Posiva must specify the processes of 
designing the facility and ascertaining the safety 
of the facility at the construction stage and in the 
operating licence materials.
In the safety assessment, STUK has presented 
conclusions related to compliance with the re-
quirements set in Government decrees 736/2008, 
734/2008 and 716/2013 as well as factors which 
must be considered in the construction of the 
nuclear facility and in the preparation of the op-
erating licence application materials. The criteria 
for granting the construction licence are given in 
Section 19 of the Nuclear Energy Act. Below are 
the paragraphs of Section 19 which fall under the 
responsibility of STUK, and the conclusions based 
on the safety assessment are presented after them.
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1) if plans concerning the nuclear facility meet 
the safety requirements laid down in this Act, and 
appropriate account has been taken of the safety 
of workers and the population when planning the 
operations in question;
2) if the location of the nuclear facility is ap-
propriate with respect to the safety of the planned 
operations and environmental protection has been 
taken into account appropriately when planning 
operations;
3) if physical protection has been taken into ac-
count appropriately when planning operations;
5) the methods available to the applicant for 
arranging nuclear waste management, including 
disposal of nuclear waste and decommissioning of 
the facility, are sufficient and appropriate;
7) the applicant's arrangements for the imple-
mentation of control by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) as referred to in para-
graph 3 of section 63 subsection 1, in Finland and 
abroad, and for the implementation of control as 
referred to in paragraph 4 of section 63 subsection 
1 are sufficient;
8) if the applicant has the necessary expertise 
available;
10) if the applicant is otherwise considered to 
have the prerequisites to engage in operations safely 
and in accordance with Finland's international 
contractual obligations.
Operational safety of the encapsulation 
and disposal facility
The Olkiluoto encapsulation and disposal facili-
ties proposed by Posiva are designed to fulfil the 
requirements on operational nuclear and radiation 
safety in the facilities. The encapsulation plant, 
and the disposal facility as necessary, adhere to the 
defence in depth principle. The structural safety 
of the facilities has been ensured using consecu-
tive barriers comprising, in accordance with the 
handling stage of the spent nuclear fuel, a nuclear 
fuel cladding, transportation cask or disposal can-
ister, and the structures of the encapsulation and 
disposal facilities. In terms of operational safety, 
passive solutions are used to manage the removal 
of residual heat and the criticality safety of the 
fuel. Functions which are important to radioac-
tive substance management include nuclear fuel 
processing functions and filtering exhaust air to 
prevent the spreading of radioactive substances. 
Both functions in the encapsulation and disposal 
facilities are single failure tolerant. Before begin-
ning the construction of the encapsulation and dis-
posal facilities and the manufacturing of related 
equipment, Posiva must specify the related design 
requirements which require approval from STUK 
before construction of the facilities can be started.
Posiva has prepared for operational occurrences 
and accidents at the encapsulation and disposal 
facilities in accordance with safety requirements. 
Posiva has analysed possible operational occur-
rences and accidents at the facilities and prepared 
for these by adhering to the principles of redun-
dancy, diversity and separation in accordance with 
the defence in depth principle in designing the sys-
tems which implement safety functions.
Posiva has presented analyses concerning the 
release and radiation doses due to normal opera-
tion and operational occurrences and assumed ac-
cidents at the encapsulation and disposal facilities. 
The radiation doses due to the operation of the 
encapsulation and disposal facilities fall below con-
straints set to radiation exposure in Government 
Decree 736/2008. The emergency arrangements 
required during the operation of the encapsula-
tion and disposal facilities have been dimensioned 
based on estimated radiation exposures.
The disposal system and post-
closure safety of disposal
Posiva has been developing the KBS-3 concept de-
scribed above together with the Swedish Svensk 
Kärnbränslehantering AB over a period of several 
decades. The fabricability of the system compo-
nents has been demonstrated sufficiently for ob-
taining a construction licence through component-
specific manufacturing tests. Likewise, the feasi-
bility of the rock facilities has been demonstrated 
with the demonstration facilities constructed in 
the underground research facility in Olkiluoto. 
Assessing the reliability of the classification sys-
tem related to the implementation of the rock fa-
cilities is important during the first construction 
phase. Posiva and SKB have jointly tested the in-
stallation of the disposal canister and the emplace-
ment of the buffer and tunnel backfill, in compli-
ance with requirements in the Äspö Hard Rock 
Laboratory in Sweden. Posiva has also launched 
disposal system component installation tests in the 
Onkalo facilities. The installation tests are meant 
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to demonstrate that the components of the dis-
posal system can be installed in accordance with 
the set accuracy requirements. In accordance with 
the decision-in-principle issued in 2001, Posiva has 
constructed an underground research facility that 
is designed to serve as part of the disposal fa-
cility. Posiva has complied with the requirements 
concerning nuclear facilities in constructing the 
underground research facility, and STUK has su-
pervised the construction of the research facility as 
based on the supervision measures applied to the 
construction of a nuclear facility.
Post-closure safety of Posiva’s disposal facility 
is based on two objectives to be implemented with 
complementary barriers. The primary objective is 
to contain the radioactive substances from the bed-
rock. The disposal canister has a key role in this. It 
is protected by clay material emplaced around it as 
well as the bedrock surrounding the disposal facil-
ity and by separating the disposal facility from the 
surface environment. The bedrock and the closure 
of the disposal facility create favourable and fore-
seeable conditions for the engineered barriers. The 
second objective of the barriers is to isolate and 
retard the migration of any released radionuclides 
to the surface environment.
To demonstrate post-closure safety, Posiva has 
presented an analysis of the expected and deviat-
ing evolutions and possible disturbances in the 
disposal system, as well as the adjacent environ-
ment in the licence application material. Based 
on the scenario analysis, Posiva has selected the 
most important evolutions leading to the release 
of radionuclides and analysed the resulting radia-
tion doses to individuals as well as to other living 
environment and the radionuclide releases into 
the living environment. The results of the analyses 
fall below the constraints specified in Government 
Decree 736/2008 for radiation doses and releases of 
radioactive substances.
By taking into consideration the development 
needs found in the review of the facility's post-
closure safety case, the clarity, traceability and 
reliability of the safety case can be improved. In 
connection with the review, STUK has presented 
the development needs to Posiva in the form of a 
separate decision requiring that the development 
needs are taken into account in the operating li-
cence application materials.
The site of the encapsulation 
and disposal facility
The proposed site has been found suitable as a 
disposal site in the decision-in-principle in 2001. 
Based on the decision-in-principle, the project 
was granted permission to proceed with the con-
struction of the underground rock characterisa-
tion facility and with more detailed site-specific 
investigations. After the decision-in-principle was 
issued, the underground rock characterisation 
facility Onkalo has been constructed at the site 
and investigations of the site have been continued. 
Considerably more knowledge of the site has been 
accumulated since the making of the decision-in-
principle.
The research and very long-term analyses of 
the evolution of the disposal site are sufficient for 
granting a construction licence and have not raised 
issues which would suggest that the disposal site is 
unfavourable in terms of post-closure safety. Based 
on the research and analyses, we can conclude that 
the properties of the rock are suitable for imple-
menting the disposal as proposed. The disposal 
depth of spent nuclear fuel, 400 to 450 metres, 
complies with the decision-in-principle issued con-
cerning the Olkiluoto disposal facility, as well as 
the safety requirements set by STUK. The disposal 
depth has been selected with due attention to post-
closure safety and to sufficient protection against 
aboveground and human activities.
Based on continuing research, the site of the 
nuclear facility is appropriate with respect to the 
operational and post-closure safety of the planned 
operations, and environmental protection has been 
taken into account appropriately when planning 
operations.
Nuclear waste management and 
decommissioning of the nuclear facility
While Posiva operates the nuclear facility and dur-
ing the decommissioning of the nuclear facility, 
all low- and intermediate-level nuclear wastes are 
generated through processing fuel at the facility. 
Posiva has presented sufficient and appropriate ar-
rangements and plans for handling and disposing 
nuclear waste generated during operations and for 
decommissioning the facility to obtain a construc-
tion licence.
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Security of the nuclear facility
Posiva has employed Design Basis Threat principle 
and risk analysis in the planning and assessment 
of security arrangements and has analysed the 
need for physical protection. The application mate-
rials describe the principles, measures, plans and 
intended information security principles related 
to security arrangements. The actual plans for the 
nuclear facility present the various security zones 
in accordance with the defence-in-depth principle, 
and observe the protection of structures and sys-
tems important to design.
Posiva has presented a plan for the security 
arrangements of the nuclear facilities during con-
struction, including line-up and tasks, supervision 
and communication equipment, protective equip-
ment and use-of-force equipment of the safety 
organisation. Posiva and TVO have also submitted 
a joint security standing order for approval. The 
standing order must become valid before Posiva be-
gins the construction of the nuclear waste facility.
The Posiva management system 
and available expertise
STUK has assessed the competence of Posiva’s per-
sonnel and of the external expertise available to 
Posiva in connection with processing the construc-
tion licence application through document reviews 
and a separate inspection programme. Based on 
these, STUK has ascertained that Posiva has the 
use of sufficient and extensive expertise for the 
construction of a nuclear waste facility.
STUK has approved the management system 
manual describing the management system em-
ployed by Posiva. In the management system 
manual, Posiva stresses the priority status of 
safety in all activities as well as the creation and 
maintenance of a good safety culture. The goal is 
for the personnel to be aware of the significance of 
their work to safety. Posiva assesses the manage-
ment system and the operations of the organisa-
tion regularly with the objective of continuously 
improving operations.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority’s regulatory requirements
The arrangements and measures described in the 
report submitted by Posiva in order to ensure regu-
latory possibilities have been ascertained to be suf-
ficient at the construction licence stage. STUK has 
issued a decision to approve the report concerning 
arrangements for regulatory possibilities, submit-
ted by Posiva in connection with the construction 
licence. Posiva has carried out personnel training 
concerning practical arrangements for regulatory 
measures, in accordance with the requirements of 
the decision issued by STUK. Based on this, Posiva 
has carried out sufficient and appropriate arrange-
ments for ensuring the implementation of regula-
tory measures.
Other reports
Posiva has included a report concerning the open-
ing of the disposal facilities and an estimate of the 
related costs in the construction licence applica-
tion. Technically, the facilities can be opened and 
the disposal canisters safely retrieved using cur-
rent work methods. According to STUK, the nucle-
ar waste to be disposed can be technically retrieved 
and the possibility for the opening of the facilities 
does not jeopardise the post-closure safety of the 
disposal.
In addition to the vertical disposal solution, 
Posiva has proposed a horizontal disposal solution 
(KBS-3H) based on the safety principles described 
in the construction licence application materials. 
STUK is not aware of any reason why the horizon-
tal disposal solution could not fulfil the set require-
ments. STUK may process the modification at the 
separate request of Posiva according to Section 112 
of the Nuclear Energy Decree. A modification made 
at the construction stage of the disposal facility 
would be highly likely to postpone the intended 
starting date of the disposal.
In the construction licence application, Posiva 
has presented a report concerning the transpor-
tation of the spent nuclear fuel as well as a pre-
liminary report to STUK concerning the transport 
arrangements and related security arrangements. 
The spent nuclear fuel can be transported based 
on the plans prepared by Posiva. The safety of 
the transport will be separately ascertained. In 
accordance with the Nuclear Energy Decree, the 
transport cannot be commenced until STUK has 
ascertained that the transport arrangements and 
the required security and emergency planning ar-
rangements meet the requirements set for them.
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Conformity with general principles 
and requirements related to safety
In addition to conformity with sections 18 and 19 
of Nuclear Energy Act assessed at the construc-
tion stage, general guidelines related to the use 
of nuclear energy are given in sections 5–7 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree:
Section 5: The use of nuclear energy, taking into 
account its various effects, shall be in line with the 
overall good of society.
Section 6: The use of nuclear energy must be 
safe; it shall not cause injury to people, or damage 
to the environment or property.
Section 6 a: Nuclear waste generated in connec-
tion with or as a result of the use of nuclear energy 
in Finland shall be handled, stored and perma-
nently disposed of in Finland […], and
Section 7: Sufficient physical protection and 
emergency planning as well as other arrangements 
for limiting nuclear damage and for protecting 
nuclear energy against illegal activities shall be a 
prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy.
Decisions-in-principle made by the Government 
have ascertained that the nuclear fuel disposal de-
signed to take place in Olkiluoto is in line with the 
overall good of the society, in addition to which the 
disposal is a precondition for the safe use of nuclear 
energy in the long term. The nuclear waste facility 
proposed by Posiva is part of nuclear waste manage-
ment in accordance with Section 6 a of the Nuclear 
Energy Act. STUK has presented its conclusions 
concerning compliance with the requirements of 
Section 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act in a statement.
As its conclusion, STUK ascertains compliance 
with the requirements set in sections 18 and 19 of 
the Nuclear Energy Act and the principles set in 
sections 5–7. The encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel proposed by Posiva 
can be constructed so that it is safe. The plans pre-
sented by Posiva are sufficient and appropriate for 
obtaining a construction licence with due attention 
to the following observations and restrictions:
•	 Posiva	 has	 submitted	 a	 plan	 concerning	 the	
specification of the nuclear waste facility sys-
tem design to STUK. According to this plan, 
STUK will supervise the design progress and 
ascertain its sufficient level before the construc-
tion of the facilities.
•	 Posiva	 has	 submitted	 a	 plan	 for	 installation	
testing the components of the disposal system 
to STUK. Based on the tests, STUK will as-
certain that the system can be installed before 
the excavation of the deposition tunnels can be 
started.
•	 Posiva	must	demonstrate	 the	reliability	of	 the	
rock classification system in connection with 
constructing the first deposition tunnels. STUK 
will ascertain the performance of the rock clas-
sification system as part of regulating the posi-
tioning and rock construction of the first deposi-
tion tunnels.
•	 Posiva	has	submitted	a	disposal	concept	devel-
opment programme concerning the barriers to 
STUK. The programme covers the development 
targets pointed out by STUK in the safety as-
sessment. STUK shall supervise the progress 
of development work in accordance with the 
programme during the interval between the 
construction and operating licences.
•	 Before	the	construction	of	the	low-	and	interme-
diate-level waste disposal room can be started, 
Posiva must submit more specific plans to STUK 
concerning the low- and intermediate-level waste 
disposal rooms to be located in the disposal facil-
ity and a more detailed estimate of the joint im-
pacts of the different types of nuclear waste to be 
disposed in Posiva’s disposal facility.
•	 The	joint	security	standing	order	of	Posiva	and	
TVO must be confirmed before construction 
work can be started.
•	 The	 details	 of	 the	 security	 arrangements	
planned for the construction period must be 
specified before construction begins. More spe-
cific requirements related to these issues are 
given in a confidential STUK decision (para-
graph 7 of Section 24 subsection 1 of the 
Act on the Openness of Government Activities, 
621/1999).
STUK’s safety assessment concerning the safety of 
the Olkiluoto encapsulation and disposal facility 
and the Posiva project remains valid, even if the 
TVO facility unit Olkiluoto 4 does not advance to 
the construction licence application stage and the 
spent nuclear fuel from Olkiluoto 4 is excluded 
from the construction licence granted to Posiva. 
Not implementing the Olkiluoto 4 project would 
reduce the quantity of the spent fuel requiring dis-
posal, and would reduce the surface area and rock 
volume required for disposal.
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Statement from the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Safety
Posiva Oy’s construction licence application 
for the construction of an encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility at Olkiluoto 
for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel
With reference to the request for a statement 
by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) (20/H42212/2014, 11 December 2014), 
the draft statement by STUK and the safety as-
sessment, the Advisory Commission on Nuclear 
Safety issues the following statement regarding 
the construction licence application for a spent nu-
clear fuel encapsulation plant and disposal facil-
ity. During its meeting on 11 December 2014, the 
Commission received a presentation on STUK’s 
draft statement on the construction licence appli-
cation and the related draft safety assessment. 
Furthermore, during earlier meetings in the au-
tumn of 2014, the Commission has received pres-
entations on STUK’s opinions on matters related 
to the assessment of the construction licence ap-
plication. The Commission is familiar with STUK’s 
draft proposal (1/H42212/2013) and the related 
draft safety assessment (11 December 2014).
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) has requested the Commission to pay spe-
cific attention on:
•	 whether	the	regulations,	requirements	and	ob-
jectives concerning safety are up to date with 
regard to issuing a construction licence
•	 whether	 safety,	 security	 arrangements,	 emer-
gency arrangements and nuclear safeguards 
have been taken into consideration to a suf-
ficient level of detail and by applying sufficient 
expertise
•	 whether	 the	 results	 of	 the	 assessment	 are	 ac-
ceptable.
Furthermore, STUK has requested the Commission 
to include in its statement any other aspects con-
cerning the construction licence application and 
the safety assessment.
Overview of the plant project
The aspects concerning the disposal of spent nu-
clear fuel have already been discussed quite exten-
sively within the scope of international co-opera-
tion on multiple forums and in national develop-
ment projects. In Finland, the need for creating a 
long-term development programme with interim 
goals for nuclear waste management and disposal 
was already expressed at early stages of the op-
eration of the current Finnish nuclear power plant 
units. In November 1983, the Government issued 
a decision in principle regarding research, inves-
tigation and planning objectives in terms of nu-
clear waste management. The decision presented 
specific target schedules for the different stages 
of preparing for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
They included a requirement to carry out detailed 
disposal site surveys for the disposal of spent nu-
clear fuel and a requirement to select, by the end of 
2000, a disposal site that meets the safety and en-
vironmental protection criteria. Furthermore, the 
decision required the licensees to prepare the plans 
necessary for the construction licence application 
for an encapsulation plant and disposal facility, al-
lowing a presentation to the regulatory authorities 
by the end of 2010. In 2003, the overall schedule 
for the construction of the encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility was specified by a decision of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, which stated that 
the construction licence application must be sub-
mitted by the end of 2012.
Additionally, concerning nuclear waste man-
agement, the 1983 decision required the licensees 
to annually present to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, together or individually, a plan of the 
research and investigation work scheduled for the 
next calendar year and an account of the work car-
ried out in the previous year for regulatory purpos-
es. The current regulations require a presentation 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
every three years. The Ministry of Trade and 
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Industry (replaced by the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy as of 2008) and STUK have as-
sessed the power companies’ and Posiva Oy’s plans 
and the documentation concerning the status of 
research and development projects. On the basis on 
these assessments, STUK and the Ministry have 
presented requirements for the planned further 
research.
In December 2012, Posiva Oy submitted to the 
authorities for assessment a detailed documenta-
tion concerning the construction licence applica-
tion. In international comparison, Finland is at 
the forefront in projects that aim at a practical 
implementation of the disposal of spent nucle-
ar fuel. Posiva and other Finnish organisations 
have worked in extensive co-operation with their 
Swedish counterparts, which has improved the 
scope of the projects. However, in Sweden, the com-
missioning of a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility 
is scheduled for a later timeframe than the current 
implementation schedule of Posiva Oy.
Posiva as an operator, organisation 
and resources, management system, 
safety culture and management 
of safety and quality
The Commission shares STUK’s understanding 
that Posiva employs sufficient and extensive ex-
pertise concerning the construction of a nuclear 
waste facility. However, before the commissioning 
stage and at early stages of operation it must be 
ensured that, in spite of the organisational changes 
in early 2015 (between Posiva and TVO), Posiva 
has sufficient prerequisites to maintain and de-
velop the competence of its personnel for further 
improving the security of the constructed facility. 
The Commission also shares STUK’s opinion that 
Posiva’s management system, its processes and in-
structions have been developed and implemented 
in accordance with the quality management re-
quirements presented in the YVL Guides. With its 
management system, Posiva is considered to have 
the ability and readiness to ensure quality and 
safety during the planning, construction and com-
missioning of a nuclear waste facility.
The Commission shares STUK’s opinion that 
Posiva and its suppliers have the prerequisites and 
readiness to maintain a good safety culture when 
implementing the nuclear waste facility construc-
tion project. STUK finds that Posiva’s management 
and personnel have demonstrated on a practical 
level their commitment to a high level of safety. 
STUK also finds that, in terms of ensuring the safe 
operation of the nuclear waste facility, Posiva has 
sufficient arrangements in place for establishing 
and training the organisation and the necessary 
personnel.
Status of regulations, requirements and 
objectives concerning safety with regard 
to issuing a construction licence
Already before Posiva Oy submitted an applica-
tion for a Decision-in-Principle in May 1999, 
Government Decision 478/1999 had confirmed 
the essential safety requirements concerning the 
safety of disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The re-
quirements specify that “In any assessment period, 
disposal shall not cause health or environmental 
effects that would exceed the maximum level con-
sidered acceptable during the implementation of 
disposal.” At an early stage, more detailed regula-
tions were included in STUK’s guides “Long-term 
safety of disposal of spent nuclear fuel” (YVL 8.4) 
and “Operational safety of a disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel” (YVL 8.5), which came officially 
into force on 1 December 2001. At the next stage, 
Government Decree 736/2008, which replaced 
Government Decision 478/1999, was prepared. 
This Decree still remains in force. The Decree spec-
ifies the general requirements, whereas the more 
detailed requirements are presented in guide YVL 
D.5 (Disposal of Nuclear Waste), whose final ver-
sion entered into force as of 1 December 2013. 
However, when preparing its construction licence 
application, Posiva had access to a nearly finalized 
draft of YVL D.5.
In Finland, the development of regulations con-
cerning the safety of the disposal of nuclear waste 
has advanced significantly faster and has reached 
a more detailed level than in most other countries. 
International organisations such as EU, IAEA and 
OECD/NEA have discussed the safety require-
ments for the disposal of nuclear waste on quite 
a general level. International assessments of the 
Finnish country reports that have been prepared 
within IAEA’s Joint Convention have found that 
the Finnish implementation and plans for nuclear 
waste management meet the common interna-
tional requirements. IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) assessment has found that 
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STUK’s operations and national arrangements 
meet IAEA’s requirements.
The Commission finds that the regulations, re-
quirements and objectives concerning safety are up 
to date with regard to issuing a construction licence.
Safety principles of the disposal system
The Commission shares STUK’s understanding 
that, when planning an encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility, Posiva has taken into account the 
decrease of the activity of spent nuclear fuel by 
means of interim storage and planned the lifetime 
stages of the disposal facility (construction, dispos-
al operations and closure) in a way that contributes 
to long-term safety. The selection of the disposal 
depth takes into account long-term safety and pro-
vision of sufficient protection against above-ground 
phenomena and human activities.
The safety functions of the disposal system pre-
sented by Posiva (disposal canister, buffer material 
surrounding the canister, tunnel filling, closure of 
facilities and the host rock that acts as a natural 
barrier) follow the multi-barrier principle. The 
Commission shares STUK’s opinion that, in the op-
erating licence phase, the descriptions of the safety 
functions must indicate in more detail the factors 
that affect the performance of each barrier.
During the operation of the disposal facility, the 
performance of the engineered barriers shall be 
monitored before the final closure of the facilities 
in accordance with Government Decree 736/2008, 
Section 9. Section 10 of this Decree includes an 
ambiguous reference to ensuring long-term safety 
with follow-up monitoring, which could be inter-
preted to refer to post-closure monitoring. This, 
however, would be in conflict with the principle 
presented in Section 7h of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
according to which the disposal of nuclear waste 
in a manner intended as permanent does not re-
quire surveillance of the disposal site for ensuring 
long-term safety. There is enough time for quite ex-
tensive follow-up monitoring during the operation 
stage before the final closure of the disposal facility 
as the first disposal tunnels will be closed up to a 
hundred years before the closure of the entire dis-
posal facility. Monitoring during construction and 
before closure should consider the possible changes 
in the properties of the host rock and groundwater. 
Posiva has presented a plan for monitoring opera-
tions during construction.
The Commission shares STUK’s opinion that 
the monitoring of engineered barriers before the 
closure of the disposal facility still requires further 
development in terms of monitoring technology 
and the object of monitoring as well as the applica-
ble requirements by the authorities.
Planning of the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility with 
regard to operational safety
The nuclear fuel encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility is a nuclear facility. When planning the 
safety of the facility, Posiva has applied the prin-
ciple of defence-in-depth and defined three safety 
functions: management of radioactive materials, 
management of reactivity and removal of residual 
heat. The safety functions are the same as for nu-
clear power plants, but the fuel handling conditions 
are different. The amount of fuel present at a given 
time is considerably lower compared to a power 
plant and the fuel is not subjected to high pres-
sures or temperatures. Fuel creates less residual 
heat than in power plants and, therefore, residual 
heat can be removed by passive means without 
a power source. As the facility does not intend to 
bring fuel into a critical state for achieving a chain 
reaction, subcriticality can be ensured by reliable 
structural means. Criticality of fuel would require 
the simultaneous occurrence of several diverse and 
highly unlikely accident conditions. However, un-
like in a power plant, fuel assemblies are handled 
(e.g. when drying) and lifted in the air uncovered, 
which requires utmost care in order to prevent any 
damage. Due to the management of radioactive 
materials, all the stages of the process take place 
in closed, sealed facilities, whose ventilation sys-
tems enable filtering during normal and accident 
conditions. All processes are remote-controlled for 
the purposes of radiation protection of the person-
nel.
There is no international experience available 
on similar plants. There is, however, experience in 
handling spent nuclear fuel in reprocessing facili-
ties, for example.
The sealed canisters are transported from the 
interim storage at the encapsulation plant to the 
disposal facility with a canister lift and transfer 
and installation vehicles. The canister is protected 
on vehicles with a combined mechanical and ra-
diation shield. The design of the process enables 
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returning canisters from any stage to the encapsu-
lation plant for additional processing in case they 
become damaged.
Disturbances and accidents
The essential operational functions of an encap-
sulation plant and disposal facility include dif-
ferent lifting and transfer functions. Nearly each 
piece of equipment designed for these functions is 
unique, but they all are based on proven technolo-
gy. Functions whose failure could result in releases 
of radioactive substances or radiation exposure of 
personnel at the facility have been ensured against 
a single equipment failure.
Of the safety functions, maintaining the subcrit-
ical state of fuel (i.e. preventing a chain reaction) 
and residual heat removal are based on inherent 
safety features and do not require a power source. 
Similarly, the handling functions are designed such 
that the equipment stops in a controlled state in 
case the power source is lost.
The potential disturbances of operational func-
tions as well as internal and external threats have 
been analysed in terms of nuclear and radiation 
safety. The designs make provisions for essential 
disturbances: drops of loads, fires, collapsing struc-
tures and flooding. The design basis analyses have 
used both experimental and computational meth-
ods. The analyses focus on conditions that could 
result in releases of radioactive substances.
The amount of radioactive materials that could 
be released at the different stages of encapsula-
tion and disposal depends on the properties of the 
handled nuclear fuel. Power plant operators have 
archived individual data for each fuel assembly, 
which enables planning how each disposal canister 
is filled in a way that radiation dose rates, heat 
generation and criticality safety can be managed. 
This information will be archived into the Posiva 
database in full. However, safety calculations will 
use a conservative assumption that a disposal can-
ister that becomes damaged contains the highest 
possible quantity of radioactive materials. It is also 
assumed that all of the fuel in the canister becomes 
damaged and the contained radioactive materials 
are released at a conservatively estimated rate 
that does not underestimate the source term of the 
radioactive materials in any case. However, STUK 
requires that Posiva provides a more specific value 
for the release rate at a later time before its operat-
ing licence application because this value also has 
an essential impact on demonstrating long-term 
safety.
The design of a nuclear waste facility takes into 
account the minimising of the radiation doses to the 
personnel and to the environment. The rooms of the 
facility will be classified into radiation protection 
zones with the related access prevention and control 
arrangements. The thickness of the handling cham-
ber walls has been dimensioned in a manner to pro-
tect the personnel controlling the processes remote-
ly. The canister transport vehicle is equipped with a 
separate radiation shield for the canister. Releases 
into the environment are tracked by continuously 
operating monitoring systems and sampling. The 
design of the encapsulating plant includes effective 
filtering and cleaning systems for releases of radio-
active substances that are assumed to enter into the 
rooms of the plant as well as a processing system for 
any generated waste.
In addition to the safety analyses, a probabil-
istic risk assessment (PRA) has been prepared for 
the design phase of the nuclear waste facility. The 
PRA uses preliminary design information, general 
data on equipment reliability, conservative esti-
mates and expert judgement. During the operation 
of the plant, significant releases can only occur if 
a fuel assembly becomes damaged and, simulta-
neously, ventilation filtering fails. The most sig-
nificant initiating event would be dropping a can-
ister during handling at the encapsulation plant. 
However, even in this case filtering would limit the 
release, and, basically, the failure of the ventilation 
filtering could only be caused by a human error 
during the maintenance of the filtering system. 
Posiva has also investigated the consequences of 
such simultaneous events even though their analy-
sis is not required due to their low probability.
Posiva has presented risk management calcula-
tions also for the transport of nuclear fuel. STUK 
estimates that they can be implemented according 
to Posiva’s plan. Separate licences for transports 
will be issued at a later time.
STUK has systematically assessed Posiva’s op-
erational plans for the nuclear waste facility and 
the analyses they are based on in terms of achiev-
ing the principle of defence-in-depth and the speci-
fied safety functions. STUK has found the plans 
and the radiation protection arrangements to be 
sufficient.
86
STUK-B 196
However, the high reliability of filtering systems 
and access prevention and control arrangements 
that prevent the personnel from accessing closed 
facilities during the operation of the encapsulation 
plant must be ensured as design work progresses.
STUK has also assessed the safety and seismic 
classification that Posiva has proposed for the 
nuclear waste facility and found it to be sufficient 
at this time. However, due to the novel type of the 
plant, STUK states that Posiva must continue as-
sessing the safety significance of the system com-
ponents and structures and modify the classifica-
tions as necessary.
The Commission agrees with the above conclu-
sions.
Construction of the nuclear waste facility
According to Posiva’s design, the above-ground 
nuclear waste facility comprises an encapsulation 
plant and other buildings that are necessary for 
supporting the operational activities of the facility, 
for example. The design and location of the encap-
sulation plant take into account the potential in-
ternal and external threats to the plant. Amongst 
these threats the structural design is most affected 
by postulated earthquakes, extreme weather phe-
nomena, aircraft collisions, explosions and fires.
Radiation protection of the operating personnel 
is a significant individual factor that affects the 
dimensioning of the structures. According to the 
plans, it will be implemented by massive concrete 
structures that surround the facilities for han-
dling fuel and canisters. The encapsulation plant 
building will be designed in accordance with the 
requirements of EN standards and their related 
national Finnish appendixes. The plant's facilities 
that are likely to be the subjects to the surface 
contamination will use stainless-steel coating to 
facilitate decontamination. Other rooms subject to 
sporadic contamination will similarly use a coating 
that facilitates decontamination. 
The buildings for the encapsulation plant and 
other above-ground structures will use technol-
ogy proven in the construction of nuclear facilities, 
which can be implemented in accordance with the 
requirements presented in the YVL Guides.
The disposal functions in underground facili-
ties must be separated from the excavation and 
construction work of the disposal facility such that 
excavation and construction work cannot have any 
harmful impact on the operational safety of the 
facility or the long-term safety of disposed waste. 
Furthermore, the layout, excavation, construction 
and closure of underground facilities must be im-
plemented such that the host rock retains, to the 
highest possible degree, its characteristics deemed 
important in terms of long-term safety.
When planning the locations of the facilities, 
Posiva avoids rock joints and geological and hydro-
geological zones that may have adverse effects to 
long-term safety. This is in order to control the dis-
turbance to the host rock from construction within 
the set targets. For this purpose, Posiva has devel-
oped a Rock Suitability Classification (RSC), which 
is used as a basis for determining the locations 
according to the criteria set for each phase, all the 
way to each individual disposal hole. Posiva must 
further develop the Rock Suitability Classification 
for the needs of long-term safety and optimal posi-
tioning and use of facilities.
As outlined in the Decision-in-Principle, Posiva 
has constructed Onkalo, an underground research 
facility, which will be a part of the planned under-
ground disposal facility. Onkalo comprises some of 
the above-ground connections and technical facili-
ties. Onkalo’s design and construction are subject 
to the same requirements as the disposal facility, 
and STUK’s regulatory control over the work at 
Onkalo is equivalent to the regulatory control of 
the construction of a nuclear facility. The excava-
tion for Onkalo is nearly complete and Posiva is 
in the process of reviewing Onkalo’s result docu-
mentation that indicates regulatory compliance of 
Onkalo’s construction.
The Commission agrees with STUK’s assess-
ment that the underground disposal facility can 
be built in the manner that the disturbance to the 
bedrock and groundwater environment from the 
construction can be controlled. The Commission 
finds, however, that Posiva must further develop 
its Rock Suitability Classification as it applies the 
method when determining the locations of the dis-
posal tunnels and individual disposal holes. STUK 
also finds that the rock construction methods and 
materials must be developed further so that Posiva 
can demonstrate the regulatory compliance of the 
underground facilities.
As required for quality management and in-
termediate assessment during construction, the 
facility must be constructed in compliance with 
STUK-B 196
87
the approved plans and procedures. Moreover, the 
licensee must ensure that also the plant supplier 
and subcontractors producing services and prod-
ucts important in terms of safety perform in an 
appropriate manner. Posiva requires high quality 
and a good safety culture from the suppliers that 
participate in the construction. As Posiva has over-
all responsibility for the project, it must prepare a 
separate plan for the management and organisa-
tion of all construction work.
Posiva’s quality assurance in terms of construc-
tion follows Posiva’s management system. Posiva’s 
management system is subject to specific proce-
dures for the construction of nuclear facilities, such 
as the planning, control and management, assur-
ance and continuous improvement of quality and 
organisation of work. These issues are presented 
in the street plan of the facility project, which 
specifies the processes, procedures and instructions 
applicable to the project. According to Posiva, the 
quality group of the safety unit (QA) acts indepen-
dently of the organisation responsible for the dif-
ferent stages of construction and ensures that the 
construction work follows Posiva’s management 
system as well as the relevant plans, requirements 
and instructions. According to the Commission, 
it is very important to ensure that the facility is 
constructed according to the approved plans and 
procedures.
The Commission agrees with STUK’s assess-
ment that Posiva has developed and implemented 
sufficient procedures for control and supervision 
regarding the construction of the nuclear waste 
facility. By complying with the procedures, it is 
possible to ensure that the nuclear waste facility 
and its systems, components and structures are 
designed, manufactured, built, installed and com-
missioned in accordance with the approved plans 
and procedures.
Commissioning and operation of 
the nuclear waste facility
In connection with the commissioning of the nu-
clear waste facility, the licensee shall ensure that 
the systems, structures and components and the 
facility as a whole operate in the planned manner. 
Furthermore, it must be ensured that an expedi-
ent organisation is in place for the future opera-
tion of the facility, alongside a sufficient number 
of qualified personnel and instructions suitable for 
the purpose. Based on STUK’s assessments and 
inspections, the Commission finds that Posiva has 
prepared sufficient plans for verifying, by means 
of test operation at the commissioning stage, the 
safe and compliant operation of the nuclear facility, 
its systems and components and that its operat-
ing instructions are comprehensive and validated. 
Posiva’s plans also include providing timely train-
ing for the operating organisation, for which Posiva 
has planned a tentative structure and number of 
personnel.
The operating instructions, instructions for the 
identification and control of transients and acci-
dents and Operating Limits and Conditions related 
to the operation of the nuclear waste facility must 
be prepared before submitting an operating licence 
application. Similarly, a condition monitoring and 
maintenance programme for the nuclear waste 
facility must be prepared before submitting an 
operating licence application. Posiva has in place a 
condition monitoring and maintenance programme 
for the facilities and systems implemented as part 
of the Onkalo project.
For ensuring radiation safety, the plans include 
radiation monitoring at the significant release 
routes during the operation of the facility. The sur-
roundings of the facility will include Posiva’s own 
monitoring equipment, but Posiva will also utilise 
TVO's existing radiation monitoring network al-
ready in place in the area.
Decommissioning and dismantling 
of the nuclear waste facility
For nuclear waste facilities, decommissioning re-
fers to dismantling the above-ground elements so 
that, after decommissioning, no special measures 
due to radioactive materials originating from the 
dismantled facility are required on the site. For 
the purposes of the construction licence, Posiva has 
submitted a sufficient description of the decom-
missioning of the encapsulation plant and taken 
decommissioning into account in the design re-
quirements of the plant. In the documentation for 
the construction licence application, Posiva has 
presented the principles of closure in a sufficient 
manner for the purposes of the construction licence 
and designed the closure of the disposal facility 
such that the host rock retains, to the highest pos-
sible degree, its characteristics deemed important 
in terms of long-term safety.
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Ageing management
In connection with the construction licence appli-
cation, Posiva has submitted a preliminary account 
on the plan of the principles of ageing manage-
ment. The plan describes the principles of age-
ing management with regard to the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility. Furthermore, the plan 
includes preparing an ageing management pro-
gramme and enclosing it with the operating licence 
application. STUK has approved the preliminary 
plan of the principles of ageing management for 
the encapsulation plant and disposal facility and 
finds it to be in accordance with the requirements 
presented in Guide YVL A.8. According to STUK, 
the ageing management programme that Posiva 
encloses with the operating licence application 
must describe how the ageing management princi-
ples presented in the preliminary plan are imple-
mented in practice.
Long-term safety
In connection with the construction licence appli-
cation, Posiva has submitted to STUK the safety 
case for the nuclear waste facility, which especially 
discusses the long-term safety of the disposal facil-
ity. The safety case describes the disposal concept, 
disposal system and barriers. The safety of the 
disposal concept is justified with the safety func-
tions, but the safety case does not indicate how the 
actual safety functions were selected.
Government Decree 736/2008 requires the safe-
ty case to be presented in connection with the 
construction licence application and the operating 
licence application of the nuclear waste facility. 
Detailed requirements pertaining to the content 
of the safety case are specified in Guide YVL D.5. 
The Commission share's STUK’s overall conclusion 
that the requirement of the Government Decree is 
met but Posiva must update its safety case in con-
nection with the operating licence application.
Section 12 of Government Decree 736/2008 pre-
sents general requirements for the geological char-
acteristics of the disposal site. Among other things, 
STUK states that Olkiluoto's bedrock has been 
researched in diverse ways. The characterisation is 
sufficient for starting the construction of the dispos-
al site. However, characterisation must be continued 
as the construction project progresses to less re-
searched parts of the disposal site. Posiva’s descrip-
tion of the disposal site is based on the results of 
several different fields and methods of research, and 
combining the data to form an overall understand-
ing requires further development efforts. STUK 
also finds that Posiva’s current operability analysis 
for the disposal site does not include the disposal 
facility for low and intermediate waste, which will 
be constructed along the Onkalo vehicle access 
tunnel. STUK requires that the disposal facilities 
for spent fuel and low and intermediate waste are 
discussed as a whole in the performance assess-
ment. The construction licence application presents 
disposal site research reports, performance assess-
ments and conclusions that the Olkiluoto bedrock is 
suitable for a disposal site. The Commission shares 
the understanding presented in STUK’s conclusions 
that these are sufficient for the construction licence 
stage. The requirements that Posiva has set for the 
host rock are achieved with high probability and by 
a large margin.
Sections 6 and 9 of the Government Decree 
present requirements for engineered barriers. As 
regards the disposal canister and other engineered 
barriers, STUK states that the design bases and 
principles concerning long-term safety are pre-
sented comprehensively on the level of principles 
in the preliminary safety analysis and safety case, 
which were presented as part of the documenta-
tion for the construction licence application. There 
are still shortcomings in demonstrating the per-
formance of engineered barriers and describing 
the potential developments concerning the release 
barriers. These shortcomings require research and 
development before submitting an operating li-
cence application. Furthermore, STUK requires 
that the relation between the safety functions and 
the performance targets of and the design require-
ments for the engineered barriers must be clarified 
before submitting an operating licence application; 
the justifications of safety must be documented in 
a traceable and transparent manner.
One design requirement for disposal canisters 
is that the fuel must remain subcritical. In this 
regard, STUK finds that Posiva’s criticality safety 
analyses cannot entirely rule out the possibility 
for criticality of a disposal canister on a very long 
time span. However, as these analyses use highly 
conservative assumptions on the development of 
the geometry of the disposal canister in the long 
term, it is STUK’s understanding that recriticality 
of disposed fuel would be very unlikely.
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As regards the development of manufacturing 
methods for engineered barriers, Posiva’s work 
on disposal canisters has advanced the furthest: 
Posiva has manufactured components of disposal 
canisters that meet the applicable requirements. 
However, there are still development needs con-
cerning the manufacture of the disposal canisters 
and especially the other engineered barriers as 
well as the demonstration and verification of their 
regulatory compliance.
With regard to the long-term safety of final 
disposal, Section 4 of Government Decree 736/2008 
presents requirements of expected evolution sce-
narios concerning the probable long-term radiation 
impacts. The Commission concurs with STUK’s 
conclusion that, based on the analyses of expected 
evolution scenarios and the analyses describing 
the reduction of the safety functions, the annual 
doses and releases of radioactive materials are be-
low the set limits.
Similarly, Section 5 of Government Decree 
736/2008 presents requirements for consideration 
of unlikely events that impair long-term safety. 
Posiva has considered rock displacements that 
damage disposal canisters, bore penetrations of 
disposed canisters and the disposal facility, boring 
a medium-depth water well at the disposal site and 
rapid corrosion of the internal components of the 
canister as unlikely events that impair long-term 
safety. Posiva has reviewed the unlikely events, 
their probabilities and expectation values of the 
resulting radiation exposures and releases of ra-
dioactive substances. Compared to the dose and 
release limits, the calculation results meet the re-
quirements of Section 5 of the Decree.
One aspect of the safety case is to systematical-
ly create scenarios that assess the uncertainty of 
how the disposal system behaves over time. As part 
of the process describing the potential future devel-
opments of the disposal system, Posiva has defined 
possible scenarios that may lead to the failure of 
disposal canisters and release of radionuclides due 
to a single factor. STUK requires that, with regard 
to developments that deviate from the expected 
behaviour, Posiva also considers in the operating 
licence application the possibility that one or more 
performance targets are not met.
Section 14 of Government Decree 736/2008 
presents additional requirements for items con-
cerning long-term safety in the safety case and 
requires that, in addition to radiation exposure 
impacts on people, possible impacts on flora and 
fauna are analysed. According to STUK’s assess-
ment, Posiva’s biosphere model is overall in accord-
ance with the requirements. With reference to the 
Decree's requirement, detailed requirements con-
cerning the protection of other living nature and 
the possible impacts of disposal on flora and fauna 
are presented in Guide YVL D.5. According to the 
requirements, disposal of spent fuel shall not affect 
detrimentally to species of fauna and flora. This 
shall be demonstrated by assessing the typical ra-
diation exposures of terrestrial and aquatic popu-
lations in the disposal site environment, assuming 
the present kind of living populations. The method 
that Posiva uses for evaluating the impact on other 
living nature is up to date and in line with the best 
practices. Posiva has presented the accumulation 
rates of the absorbed dose for flora and fauna. The 
estimated dose rates are, by a large margin, below 
the currently estimated harmful dose rates for 
healthy animal populations.
The Commission agrees with STUK’s overall 
assessment of the safety case that Posiva has pre-
sented the safety case in a sufficient scope for the 
construction licence stage. The results of the safety 
analysis and the other aspects presented in the 
safety case are sufficient to demonstrate that the 
requirements are met. STUK finds that Posiva’s 
method of forming scenarios is sufficient for the 
construction licence stage but based on the current 
reviews it cannot be said with certainty that the 
scenario analysis makes systematic provisions for 
the developments of the disposal system that are 
significant in terms of assessing safety.
Section 15 of Government Decree 736/2008 
states that the input data and models utilised 
in the safety case shall be based on high-quality 
research data and expert judgement. Data and 
models shall be validated as far as possible, and 
correspond to the conditions likely to prevail at 
the disposal site during the assessment period. 
The Commission shares STUK’s understanding 
that, based on the review, the scope of the safety 
case is sufficient for the construction licence stage. 
However, the operability and safety analysis re-
quire further development and changes that ex-
tend the scope of the safety case before submitting 
an operating licence application.
With regard to other requirements, STUK’s 
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safety assessment also discusses an alternative 
solution (KBS-3H) for the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel, in which the canisters are placed horizontally. 
In its preliminary review, STUK has not encoun-
tered any aspects that would prevent horizontal 
placement from meeting the applicable require-
ments. Posiva has stated that it will compare verti-
cal and horizontal placement in 2016. STUK has 
stated that it is able to process the modifications to 
the basic solution in accordance with Section 112 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree. STUK, however, com-
ments that it is highly likely that implementing a 
significant modification at the construction stage 
postpones the planned starting time of the disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel.
Retrievability of disposed spent nuclear fuel
Government Decision on the Safety of Disposal of 
Spent Nuclear Fuel (478/1999), which was in effect 
when the first Decision-in-Principle on the disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel was issued, required that 
retrievability of the waste canisters is maintained 
to provide for such development of technology that 
makes it a preferred option. This Government 
Decision was repealed by Government Decree on 
the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste (736/2008), 
which does not contain any requirements on the 
post-closure opening of the disposal facility. 
As the Decision-in-Principle, which was con-
firmed by the Government in 2001, presented a 
retrievability requirement, Posiva has presented 
a concept for opening the disposal facility and re-
trieving the disposal canisters at different stages 
of disposal, including time periods after the clo-
sure of the disposal facility, in an appendix to the 
construction licence application for the Olkiluoto 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility. STUK 
has assessed that the principle of Posiva’s disposal 
concept enables opening the facilities without com-
promising safety.
Nuclear safeguards, security arrangements 
and emergency arrangements
Posiva has submitted to STUK a plan on arrang-
ing the control required for the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. IAEA and the European 
Commission monitor the operations in addition to 
Posiva and STUK. As Posiva’s nuclear waste facil-
ity is the first of its type in the world, there are yet 
no detailed international regulations on all aspects 
of regulatory control. Therefore, Posiva’s plan only 
discusses the general level of control and a final 
plan is not yet required.
According to the plans, Posiva’s research facility 
Onkalo will form part of the nuclear waste facility. 
STUK has supervised the construction of Onkalo 
from the outset similarly to a nuclear waste facil-
ity and ensured that the disposal facility does not 
contain any unnecessary facilities that are signifi-
cant in terms of proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Posiva’s plant area has been reported to IAEA in 
accordance with the Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement and IAEA has had no com-
ments.
Posiva has submitted to STUK a preliminary 
emergency plan. At the encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility, Posiva’s own operations can only 
create emergency conditions when spent nuclear 
fuel has been brought into the encapsulation plant 
or the final disposal facility. However, due to 
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj’s (TVO) operating nuclear 
power plants in Olkiluoto, there are emergency 
plans and organisations also for the Onkalo work-
site and the worksite is considered in the emer-
gency plans of the nuclear power plants. Posiva’s 
emergency plan will be specified in greater detail 
in connection with the operating licence applica-
tion.
The Commission recommends co-operating with 
TVO but also finds it important that Posiva has its 
own expert resources for emergency planning and 
arrangements.
When planning and assessing the security ar-
rangements, Posiva has used the design basis 
threat and risk analyses and analysed protection 
needs. STUK finds that the administrative, tech-
nical and operational security arrangements, e.g. 
regarding information security, still need further 
development before starting the construction of 
the nuclear waste facility but the preliminary plan 
is sufficient for issuing a construction licence. The 
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety has not 
received any detailed (confidential) plans for the 
security arrangements. The Advisory Commission 
on Nuclear Security will issue a statement on such 
documents.
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Summary
In conclusion, the Advisory Commission on Nuclear 
Safety finds that the requirements concerning 
safety are up to date with regard to issuing a con-
struction licence. It is the considered opinion of the 
Commission that STUK has carried out a compre-
hensive and professional safety assessment on the 
construction licence application. In its assessment, 
STUK has indicated aspects for which the design 
documentation must be supplemented as work pro-
gresses closer to the implementation of the dispos-
al system and ultimately up to the preparation of 
an operating licence application. Considering that 
the project for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel is 
pioneering on a global scale, it is justified to ad-
vance gradually in planning and implementation. 
STUK has found that the prerequisites for issuing 
a construction licence are met. The Commission 
is not aware of any aspects of operational or long-
term safety that would prevent issuing a construc-
tion licence.
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